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Abstract 
This thesis examines how New Labour policymakers and Black and Minority Ethnic (BME)-
led race equality organisations articulated and connected themes of nation, multiculture 
and ‘race’ equality in policy discourse and discussions over the New Labour period. My 
study extends previous accounts of New Labour and multicultural discourses by 
incorporating the significant, but not always influential, role of BME civil society actors in 
such policy discussions.  
 
My research draws on documents and archival material from and interviews with 
policymakers and race equality actors. I analyse this data using a qualitative thematic 
approach to discern changing policy discourses and claims about the state of the 
multicultural nation and the place of race equality within it. 
 
In the study I suggest that, after a promising start, New Labour policymakers came to 
understand the relationship between nation, multiculture and race equality as a troubled 
and troubling one. At the same time, the three BME-led race equality organisations that I 
focus on in my research struggled to counter government discourses of parallel lives, 
community cohesion and Britishness that were detrimental to efforts to combat race 
inequality.  
 
Policy and policy discursive interventions of BME-led race equality organisations were 
thrown off course not only by New Labour but also by ‘new ethnicities’, and the idea of 
complex and diverse ‘BMEness’. BME-led organisations have struggled to engage with this 
latter destabilisation, let alone develop a politics capable of overcoming such issues. I 
therefore end my thesis by suggesting that, if BME-led race equality organisations are to 
shape policy debates on race equality, there is much hard labour and re-thinking about 
BMEness and re-organising for them still to do. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Locating and undertaking the study  
The balancing act… is not just about commonality and diversity. It is also 
about the value placed on social justice and equality...  [in] a context of 
significant disadvantage across all sectors for minority ethnic group 
members... (Wetherell, 2007: 6). 
 
1 Introduction  
New Labour’s landslide general election victory in May 1997 was much anticipated 
amongst some Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) ‘race’1 equality activists. In opposition, 
New Labour committed themselves to creating ‘a nation for all the people, built by all the 
people, old divisions cast out...’ (Blair, 1995). In the run-up to the 1997 general election 
the party promised a changed society, a new economy and a new politics (Labour Party, 
1997). New Labour’s 1997 general election manifesto gestured towards greater equality in 
Britain in limited but significant ways, including the need to ‘tackle the division and 
inequality in our society’ and the importance of ‘mutual respect and tolerance’(Labour 
Party, 1997: 3). The document also promised to create new offences of racial harassment 
and racially motivated violence to protect ethnic minorities (Labour Party, 1997: 23).  
 
During the early New Labour years, I looked on with interest and hope. As a researcher for 
the New Economics Foundation, a ‘progressive’ think tank working on ‘social justice’ 
issues, I wanted to believe in the promise(s) of New Labour. In particular I wondered if, in 
the terms expressed by Margaret Wetherell in the opening epigram of this thesis, New 
                                                     
1
 The term race is placed within inverted commas here in recognition of the non-objective character of race 
(Appiah, 1991; Omi and Winant, 1996) and its existence not as a meaningful scientific or biological category 
(Denton and Deane, 2010; Solomos, 2003) but as an important social and political one (Gilroy, 1987; 
Solomos, 2003). The term race is used in this contingent way throughout the thesis whether the term is or is 
not placed in inverted commas or is used to refer to concerns about in/equality, such as race in/equality. 
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Labour could build a sense of commonality that respected but did not reify (ethnic) 
diversity, as well as work to reduce race inequality. 
 
A decade after New Labour came to power I was working as a researcher at London 
Metropolitan University and such hopes appeared dashed.  I was advising the BME-led 
policy umbrella partnership Voice4Change England (V4CE) with my colleague Stephen 
Thake. V4CE was brought into being in order to make co-ordinated policy representations 
to government on behalf of BME voluntary and community sector groups and 
organisations, and Stephen and I were helping V4CE to strengthen their partnerships and 
to clarify priorities in their engagements with policymakers. One of the strategic areas that 
we identified as significant was building V4CE’s capabilities in terms of what we called 
‘shaping the debate’ (Voice4Change England, 2007b) on BME-relevant policy issues. This 
was based on the recognition that if an organisation such as V4CE could not influence such 
discussions then policymakers would dominate the discursive terms of the debate and 
issues such as race equality would continue to be side-lined in favour, for example, of 
notions of Britishness as the desired vehicle for commonality and container of diversity. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
My experiences with Voice4Change England and my interest in race equality intersect in 
this thesis. In particular, I take the connection articulated by Wetherell (2007) between 
commonality, diversity and (race) equality as the basis for my study and provide an 
account of changing discourses in the New Labour period (1995-2010) on issues of nation, 
multiculture and race equality through three overlapping research questions. 
 
1. In what different ways have policymakers constructed and understood 
relationships between nation, multiculture and race equality over the New Labour 
period? 
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2. In what ways have these discourses been understood and responded to by Black 
and Minority Ethnic-led race equality organisations that engage in policy-
influencing work? 
 
3. What constraints affect the production and efficacy of policy discourses of New 
Labour and BME policy actors in policy debates of nation, multiculture and race 
equality?  
 
As such I am interested in the discursive shape of the debate about the state of the 
multicultural nation and the place of race equality within it, as well as processes that 
influence such discourses in the New Labour period. I am specifically interested in 
discourse in the sphere of ‘policy’. I use the term policy in a relatively broad sense as an 
area of activity and intentions around government but involving non-government actors 
(Bloch et al., 2013), such as BME civil society organisations.2 My research explores how 
policy discourses and debates were ‘framed’ and how this in turn influences how events 
and behaviours are understood (Goffman, 1975). My research questions have been 
investigated using a qualitative thematic approach applied to ‘pre-scripted’ policy 
documents and interviews with some key policymakers, policy influencers and BME-led 
race equality actors. I return to a discussion of the research process in section three of this 
chapter. 
 
Through my research I aim to make an original contribution to an academic body of 
knowledge in two main ways. First, I offer an account of a pivotal period for issues of race 
equality, namely the New Labour period, in which questions of multiculture and race 
inequality have been problematised discursively in the name of the nation. Second, I 
expand the discussion beyond the inputs of policymakers by considering how BME-led 
organisations attempted to engage in and influence policy discussions in order to further 
                                                     
2
 I also recognise that ‘policy’ can be used in more specific ways, e.g. related to specific processes of 
decisions and implementation (Bloch et al., 2013: 22). 
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the cause of race equality. In this way I consider dialogical aspects of these discourses. 
Though this work is about a particular and important political moment, I hope that my 
work will be read as a contribution to an ongoing debate about the marginalisation of race 
equality in policy discourse and policy action that has continued into the current United 
Kingdom coalition government (see chapter seven).  
 
I turn in the next section to the policy context for the research in terms of the Labour 
party and aspects of its relationship to questions of race equality.  
 
2 (New) Labour and the politics of multiculture and race equality 
In the early New Labour period3, initially in opposition and then in government, 
policymakers displayed an appetite to explore and address apparent tensions between 
the possibility of a shared common national life, multicultural diversity and race equality. 
By the time the party came to power with a landslide election victory in 1997 and a 
mandate for ‘national renewal’ it was emphasising Britain’s ethnic diversity as part of its 
re-imagining and re-invigoration of the nation. For example, its 1997 general election 
manifesto exclaimed that ‘Britain is a multiracial and multicultural society’ (Labour Party, 
1997: 23).  
 
Historically, the Labour party had been the most prominent party political champion for 
equality or equality of opportunity (Reeves, 1983) and it appeared relatively sympathetic 
to the cause of race equality. A history of the Labour party and its policies on equality 
issues is beyond my scope here, however I want to mention the party’s interest both in 
                                                     
3
 The New Labour period can be said to have commenced in 1994 with the election of Tony Blair to the 
position of leader. The ‘newness’ was symbolically formalised in 1995 after the revision of Clause IV of the 
party’s constitution. The Clause was originally drafted by Sydney Webb in 1917 and adopted in the in 1918 
at a meeting at Methodist Central Hall with amendments in 1928 and 1960 (Rentoul, 1995: 458-459). The 
new Clause IV was adopted by Special Conference – also at Methodist Central Hall – on 19 April 1995 
(Rentoul, 1995: 461-462). The latter version advocates living in ‘a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect’.  
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equality of opportunities and outcomes. These two concepts were often intertwined 
(Miliband, 2005), for example outcomes in education, housing and health have to be at 
least somewhat equalised in order that (equal) opportunities might be taken (Reeves, 
1983). The party has also made a distinction between unacceptable and acceptable 
inequalities of outcomes. The former was caused by favouritism and the latter through 
failure to achieve (Tawney, 1964 [1931]). However, the party has also had an ongoing 
debate recognising that (more) equal opportunity might merely enable a few gifted 
individuals to outcompete others and to be successful and attain high rewards rather than 
achieve ‘collective equality that increases the social well-being of the whole community’ 
(Reeves, 1983: 133). When New Labour was in power such debates continued, as I will 
discuss below. 
 
Labour’s interest in some notion of equality meant that it was the only British political 
party that has advanced legislation on race discrimination/equality (Solomos, 2003). It 
introduced the first piece of legislation against race discrimination in modern times, i.e. 
the Race Relations Act 1965 (The National Archives, undated) initiated by Harold Wilson’s 
government. This Act outlawed discrimination on the grounds of colour, race or ethnic or 
national origins but was limited to specified ‘places of public resort’, such as hotels and 
restaurants. The Act also set up the Race Relations Board to adjudicate on claims of racial 
discrimination (National Archives, undated-c). The second Wilson government passed the 
Race Relations Act 1968 (National Archives, undated-c) which aimed to more effectively 
‘integrate’ immigrant communities into wider society and extended anti-discrimination 
measures to housing, employment and education (National Archives, undated-c). This 
legislation set a pattern for what would follow in policy related to BME people – namely a 
policy drive for both integration and anti-discrimination.  
 
The Labour government under Prime Minister Jim Callaghan enacted the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (National Archives, undated-c). The Act extended the definition of discrimination 
to include indirect discrimination and was aimed at preventing discrimination in 
employment, the provision of goods and services, education and public functions on the 
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grounds of race, colour, nationality, ethnic and national origin. This Act established the 
Commission for Racial Equality and gave it greater powers of enquiry and enforcement 
than had hitherto been available to the Race Relations Board that had been established in 
1965.  
 
The next major piece of legislation on race equality was undertaken by New Labour as it 
followed up the 1976 Act with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (National 
Archives, undated-c) in the wake of the Macpherson Inquiry (Macpherson, 1999) into the 
conduct of the police during the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation (see chapter 
three).  
 
Despite its role in legislating against racial discrimination, the Labour party demonstrated 
ambivalence towards BME people. In 1967, Asians from Kenya and Uganda began to arrive 
in Britain in response to discrimination from their own national governments. These 
people had retained their British citizenship and passports following independence and 
were therefore not subject to restricted entry into Britain. In order to stem this flow the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968 (National Archives, undated-c) took away the 
right of residence unless the passport-holders were ‘patrials’ – descendants of people 
(parents or grandparents) born, adopted or naturalised in the UK (Runnymede Trust, 
2012). It would be over 30 years before the Labour party instigated further legislation on 
immigration and asylum – including the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants etc.) Act 2004; the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; and the UK 
Borders Act 2007 (Bloch et al., 2013). Immigration and asylum is not central to my focus 
(see section three) and therefore I go into neither in detail. However, the legislative 
direction involved a general tightening on asylum claims and on non-European Union 
immigration and, although there was racism in Britain before there were comprehensive 
immigration controls (Fryer, 1984; Visram, 2001), immigration restrictions gave 
discrimination ‘the sanction of the state’ and in turn ‘made racism respectable and clinical 
by institutionalising it’ (Sivanandan, 1982: 109). Furthermore, immigration and equalities 
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legislation were tied. For example, the Labour party’s legislative action for equality can 
also be seen as compensation for and complementary to its various anti-immigration 
measures. As Roy Hattersley famously argued in 1965, ‘without integration, limitation is 
inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible’ (cited in Jenkins and Solomos, 
1987: 37). 
 
Despite these restrictions, BME people, those defined as outside the white British 
population but including white people such as the white Irish, have become a larger 
proportion of the British population. Census data for 1991, 2001 and 2011 for the 
population of England and Wales make for interesting reading. The 1991 census data was 
categorised according to white and non-white groups and showed that 93 per cent of the 
population in England and Wales4 were white, i.e. white British; white Irish; white Other; 
white Gypsy or Irish Traveller (cited in Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity, 2012: 1). 
Subsequent figures distinguished white British from other categories of white people, and 
the latter could be included in the wider definition of BME people. 
 
Based on these figures, it was clear that Britain under New Labour was becoming 
proportionately less white British (DCLG, 2007: 41). Between 2001 and 2011 the white 
British population in England and Wales declined from 87.3 per cent to 80.5 per cent. Put 
in other terms, the BME population of England and Wales by 2011 had reached nearly 20 
per cent or almost 11 million people out of a total population of 56 million (Centre on 
Dynamics of Ethnicity, 2012). What was also noticeable alongside this relative decline in 
the white British population was the decrease in importance in percentage terms of those 
populations from what had been known as the ‘coloured commonwealth’ (Shukra, 1998), 
e.g. south Asians (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi), (certain) African and African-Caribbean 
populations. In 2001, this group collectively made up 5.9 per cent of the total population 
in England and Wales and 46 per cent of the BME population. In 2011, the respective 
figure for links to the ‘coloured commonwealth’ was 8.2 per cent of the population in 
                                                     
4
 This stood at 47 million people at the time. 
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England and Wales but due to changing population patterns such as the ‘white other’ 
category through European migration and a rise in the ‘mixed’ population, this ‘coloured 
commonwealth’ group represented a smaller 42 per cent of the BME population (Centre 
on Dynamics of Ethnicity, 2012). This was still a significant bloc but it indicated changes in 
British society – a development encapsulated in, though perhaps overstated by, Steven 
Vertovec’s notion of super-diversity (2006, 2007). 
 
In this context of increased diversity, and given the historic support of BME people for the 
Labour party (Anwar, 1991; Saggar, 2000), it appeared beneficial that the initial New 
Labour project for national renewal would have the BME population central to it. Indeed 
the ‘multi-cultural metropolises’ became the ‘cool’ in ‘Cool Britannia’ (Hall, 2000: 221) 
and, like a Benetton advert, New Labour insisted that every colour was ‘a good colour’ 
(Home Office, 2000).5  
 
When it came to equality, New Labour continued Old Labour’s interest in opportunities 
and outcomes (Diamond and Giddens, 2005). There was, for example, recognition that 
one generation’s outcome (or income) determined another generation’s opportunities – 
as in the case of rich parents and their offspring – and, additionally, that equality of 
opportunity alone would preserve the equal opportunity to be unequal unless there were 
efforts to reduce other forms of inequality (Miliband, 2005: 47-48). However, although 
New Labour did have an interest in equality of outcomes, they were not attempting to 
bring about what can be called ‘simple’ equality where (say) income and wealth were 
evenly (re)distributed regardless of ability and endeavour (Phillips, 1999).6 Instead, New 
                                                     
5
 Such language contained echoes of 1966 when Roy Jenkins, the then Labour Home Secretary, called for 
integration characterised by ‘equal opportunities accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance’ (cited in Sivanandan, 1990: 80). 
6
 For example, in 2004 Tony Blair argued that the aim was: ‘Not a society where all succeed equally - that is 
utopia; but an opportunity society where all have an equal chance to succeed… Where nothing in your 
background, whether you're black or white, a man or a woman, able-bodied or disabled stands in the way of 
what your merit and hard work can achieve’ (Blair, 2004).  
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Labour argued it was ‘committed to tackling poverty and its causes’ (1999: 3) and worked 
in part through what was called the ‘opportunities agenda’ (Hills et al., 2009) – an 
approach intended to ensure that people achieved based on their talents and their efforts 
so that (multicultural) society would reflect and reward merit.  
 
In December 1997, the New Labour government set up the Social Exclusion Unit as a 
means to respond to some of these aspects of inequality. Social exclusion was related to 
inequality but was a specific formulation that Tony Blair described as ‘a short-hand label 
for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked 
problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime 
environments, bad health and family breakdowns’ (cited in Hills et al., 2009: 9). Social 
exclusion appeared to be a ‘common sense’ notion intended to ‘capture the range of 
deprivations that prevent individuals from engaging fully in the wider society around 
them’ (Diamond and Giddens, 2005: 110). Given the array of issues identified by social 
exclusion, it suffered from conceptual conflation and lacked a clear model of how 
deprivations were connected and what factors were causes and what were effects. 
Despite the muddle, social exclusion was a useful way for policymakers to label various 
attempts to give people skills, improve health, tackle crime and so on. Social exclusion was 
also consistent with New Labour’s emphasis on employment as the best route out of 
poverty; redistributive transfers through benefits and tax credits; as well as investing in 
and expanding the size of public services (Lupton et al., 2013).  
 
Though there were some successes in addressing social disadvantage, particularly in terms 
of educational attainment and reduced unemployment (Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission, 2011), the New Labour period was one in which economic inequality and 
issues such as child poverty were high in comparison to the average in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (Diamond and Giddens, 2005). In addition, 
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patterned race inequality also appeared across this period (Wetherell, 2007).7 The most 
recent comprehensive national study of race equality carried out for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission Triennial Review (Equalities and Human Rights Commission, 
2011) makes for depressing reading with regards to race and other forms of equality.  
 
Perceptions of racial prejudice increased over the New Labour period. In 2001, around 40 
per cent of people in England and Wales believed there was more racial prejudice in 
Britain then, than there had been five years previously. However, this figure had increased 
to 56 per cent by 2008 (Equalities and Human Rights Commission, 2011: 33). This was 
likely to have been related to issues of religious prejudice and especially negative 
Islamophobic attitudes towards Muslims in the wake of the London bombings (Allen, 
2010; Kundnani, 2007; McGhee, 2008).  
 
In more concrete terms, the disproportionate use of ‘stop and search’ by the police barely 
improved and was still an issue near the end of the New Labour period. In the case of 
London's Metropolitan Police, for every 1,000 people of different ethnic groups in 1997/8, 
38 white people (one in 26) were stopped and searched compared to 181 (over one in six) 
black people; and 66 (one in 15) Asian people (Home Office, 1998). By 2007/2008, the 
equivalent figures were 41 (one in 25) for white people (a small increase); 168 (a one in 
six) for black people (a small decrease); and 63 (one in 15) for Asian people (small 
decrease) (cited in Equalities and Human Rights Commission, 2010).  
 
In terms of living standards, Department for Work and Pensions data over the period 
between 2006 and 2008 showed the percentage of individuals living in UK households 
below 60 per cent of median income, after housing costs, was 19 per cent where the 
                                                     
7
 However the causal factors behind race inequalities are a complex issue and the role of ethnic origin in 
positive/negative outcomes is not clear and it is likely to be impossible to disentangle a single 
beneficial/detrimental factor when people occupy intersecting social positions (Phillips, 2009; Rattansi, 
2005). In this study, underlying causal relationships are less important and certainly for the work of the 
BME-led race equality organisations it is the widespread disadvantage facing BME people. 
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‘head’ of the household was White British; 26 per cent for Indian households; and 37 per 
cent of Black/Black British households. This figure was considerably higher for 
Bangladeshi/Pakistani households at 56 per cent (cited in Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission, 2010: 480-481). Such data were connected to experiences in the labour 
market and there appeared to be an ‘ethnic penalty’ in terms of higher unemployment 
rates for BME men and women (Cheung, 2007). From 1997 to 2005, there was an 
unemployment penalty for ‘first’ and ‘second’ generation Black African, Black Caribbean 
and Pakistani/Bangladeshi men (Heath and Li, 2008). In other words, ‘life cycle, 
generational and period (over time) improvements’ (Heath and Li, 2008: 280) did not 
appear to reduce this disadvantage for certain BME groups and the penalty was long-
lasting and multi-generational. Therefore race inequalities were firmly entrenched at the 
beginning and throughout the New Labour period (Phillips, 2009). 
 
 A significant feature of the New Labour period was in the way that discussions of and 
responses to race inequality were shaped by considerations of cohesion, commonality and 
solidarity. In the opening epigram of this chapter, Margaret Wetherell (2007) highlighted 
not only the relationship between commonality, diversity and inequality but also 
suggested that attention on race equality risked being lost as policy discussions were 
focussed more towards goals of cohesion and commonality in the face of (ethnic) 
diversity. 
 
These tensions between cohesion on the one hand and diversity on the other have long 
been part of policy discussions on race inequality. For example, as discussed in chapter 
three, an intervention such as the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry became a policy priority 
because of the way that the racism perpetrated against the Lawrence family was deemed 
as egregiously at odds with New Labour’s idea of the new and cohesive nation. Elsewhere, 
it was also the case that the ‘failure’ of BME people to adapt to British life was also 
considered by some policymakers to be a barrier to collectivity – a theme that I discuss in 
detail in chapters four and five.  
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A famous skirmish in 2004 between the then Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, 
Trevor Phillips, and David Goodhart, the editor of Prospect magazine, encapsulated the 
significance of and apparent tension between notions of cohesion and diversity. Goodhart 
(2004) wrote a provocative essay entitled ‘too diverse?’ In it Goodhart argued that 
‘sharing and solidarity can conflict with diversity’ and that diversity supported through 
immigration, asylum and multiculturalism weakened society because it entrenched 
differences in lifestyle, culture, values and affiliations.  
 
Trevor Phillips criticised Goodhart by stating that ‘nice people do racism too’ and  
described Goodhart and those that supported his position as ‘liberal Powellites’ (2004).8 
This Phillips-Goodhart clash and Margaret Wetherell’s intervention (2007) both illustrate 
the tension, discursively if not in actuality, between ideas of cohesion and solidarity and 
diversity and multiculture. This apparent tension forms the analytical frame of my thesis 
which explores and analyses policy discourses about these tensions and the positioning of 
race equality in mediating them. 
 
 
3 Three colours black 
The existence and persistence of race equality and notions of the problem of the BME 
presence in Britain has spurred BME-led race equality organising to intervene in political 
and policy life. Towards the latter part of the New Labour period there were an estimated 
17,000 BME-led9 voluntary and community organisations in Britain (Voice4Change 
England, 2007a) – though the majority of these were small and unfunded. There was no 
                                                     
8
 However, it should also be noted that Goodhart and Phillips also shared some ideas about the limits of 
multiculturalism and the need to emphasise the integration of BME people in society (Baldwin, 2004). I pick 
up this theme in chapter four. 
9
 According to the Arts Council, Black or minority ethnic-led organisations (BME-led) organisations must 
meet both of the following criteria: a) self-definition – an organisation must define itself as Black or minority 
ethnic-led; b) representation – 51% or more of the organisation's board and senior management tier must 
self-define themselves as being from a Black or minority-ethnic group (Arts Council, undated). 
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singular BME voluntary and community sector with shared social analyses, identifications, 
priorities and co-ordinated interventions (Mayblin and Soteri-Proctor, 2011; National 
Council for Voluntary Organisations, 1996). Nonetheless, compared to voluntary and 
community groups and organisations in general, BME-led groups and organisations 
disproportionately provided advocacy and advice on immigration, equal opportunities, 
health, welfare, housing and education services (McLeod et al., 2001).  
 
As a central part of this study, I explore the discursive interventions in policy discussions 
on nation, multiculture and race equality of three BME-led race equality organisations. 
These organisations attempted to encompass African, African Caribbean, Asian and (to 
some extent) other ethnic minority people based on common experiences of racism and 
exclusion in Britain. For the purposes of following changes in discourses over time, I have 
selected BME-led race equality organisations that were active throughout the time that 
New Labour was in government (1997-2010). Each of these organisations was still in 
existence towards the end of 2013. 
 
3.1 Black Training and Enterprise Group 
Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG) is a charitable organisation and company 
limited by guarantee. It was started in 1991 as a project of the umbrella organisation body 
for the voluntary and community sector, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO). In 1996 it became an independent organisation and a registered charity and 
company limited by guarantee. BTEG’s Chief Executive Jeremy Crook OBE has been with 
the organisation since its inception – apart from an 18-month secondment to the 
Department for Education and Employment in 2000/2001. The ‘B’ in BTEG stands for 
‘black’. The organisation defined this grouping as ‘African-Caribbean, Asian, African or 
Chinese origin or other groups who experience discrimination on the grounds of race or 
colour’ (Crook and BTEG, 1992: unnumbered page). This attachment to ‘political 
blackness’ is significant in the way it focuses on racism and downplays issues of cultural 
difference and I shall develop this theme in an in-depth discussion in chapter two.  
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BTEG’s mission is to ‘... ensure fair access and outcomes for black communities in 
employment, training and enterprise, and to act as a catalyst for enabling black groups 
and individuals to play an active role in the economic regeneration of local communities 
through partnership with others’ (Crook and BTEG, 1995: unnumbered page). BTEG’s 
response to racism and discrimination involves BME self-organising and influencing on 
policymaking, in part because ‘mainstream third sector organisations [fail to] operate 
inclusively and meet the needs of BME communities’ (BTEG, 2007a). The organisation’s 
central concern is about BME inequality in terms of education, unemployment and lack of 
promotion for black people that are in employment (BTEG, 2003). Latterly, the 
organisation has been focussing on strengthening communities (BTEG, 2010a) as well as 
working to deliver the REACH role model programme to inspire black boys and young men 
to greater success (BTEG, 2010b; BTEG, 2011).  
 
BTEG is highly engaged with government, for example as a member of various central 
government or national advisory groups (BTEG, 2009a). It often acts in the mode of 
‘critical friend to Government’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012).  
 
In financial terms, BTEG is the largest of the three organisations that I have examined 
closely in this study. At the beginning of the New Labour period in 1997/1998, its annual 
income was around £235,000 (BTEG, 1998), rising to as much as £1.6 million in 2006/2007 
(BTEG, 2008). As large multi-year projects came to an end10 BTEG’s annual income by the 
end of the New Labour period was down to around £778,000 (BTEG, 2010a) and was set 
to fall further, although those figures are not yet published. As was the case with OBV and 
ROTA, the majority of the organisation’s funding came directly or indirectly from the 
                                                     
10
 For example, nearly a third (over £480,000) of the 2006/2007 figure was part of the National Employment 
Panel (NEP) programme funded by the Department for Work and Pensions and aimed at addressing ethnic 
minority disadvantage in the labour market (BTEG, 2008).  
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state.11 In addition, the organisation secured occasional resourcing from independent 
funders such as the Joseph Rowntree Trust.  
 
3.2 Operation Black Vote  
Operation Black Vote (OBV) is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee. It began in 
July, 1996 (OBV, 2011) as a joint initiative between ‘Charter88’ – a campaign for 
democratic reform – and the 1990 Trust – a national policy research and networking 
organisation with a focus on race equality (OBV, 2010a). OBV’s somewhat militaristic 
name ties with its mission to mobilise BME people politically in order to change the BME 
experience in Britain. OBV’s work, similar to that of BTEG, is driven by BME experiences in 
contemporary Britain – including adverse outcomes in policing, education, employment, 
immigration and asylum and a sense of political powerlessness (OBV, 2011).  
 
When OBV became an independent organisation in 1999, its programme was to ‘... 
promote, in a non partisan way, the political education, political participation and political 
representation of the African, Asian, Caribbean and other ethnic minorities in the United 
Kingdom’ (OBV, 1999a: 9). The focus on politics has remained constant to the organisation 
although the specific articulation of their mission has changed. For example, by the end of 
the New Labour period, OBV stated that its aim in terms of reducing the ‘Black democratic 
deficit in the UK’ and support a ‘strong political voice for African, Asian, Caribbean, 
Chinese and other ethnic minorities’ (OBV, 2010b: 2).  
 
OBV attempts to promote more equal outcomes and opportunities through the formal 
state-sponsored political system on the basis that without the full engagement of BME 
                                                     
11
 Indirect monies included Big Lottery Fund; Commission for Racial Equality; and CapacityBuilders (the now 
closed voluntary sector support body and funder). In addition, the organisation was supported more directly 
from government sources such as Connecting Communities (provided by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government to promote cohesion in deprived communities); the Home Office; the Government 
Office for London; and London Councils. 
24 
 
people in political life inequality will continue. They therefore work to ‘politicise’ BME 
people and support BME education, activation and representation in public life. 
 
OBV advances its mission through an evolving set of programmes which include 
shadowing schemes, where BME aspirants spend time with Members of Parliament, 
Councillors and Magistrates. They have also undertaken voter registration campaigns and 
conducted programmes to educate and motivate pupils in secondary schools about 
voting, parliament and the process of running for election in OBV’s Understanding Power 
Citizenship (Mistry, 2005). 
 
As well as the ‘bread and butter’ of these programmes of political engagement, OBV is 
engaged in a broader project to lift the BME community to new heights. For example, in 
the words of OBV co-founder, Derek Hinds, one of the purposes of OBV was to realise ‘the 
potential of a community wide awake and united politically...’ (Hinds, 1997: unnumbered 
page). This was in the spirit of a ‘radical’ black consciousness and politics that I shall 
discuss further in the next chapter.  
 
The financial fortunes of OBV have waxed and waned. In 1999/2000 its annual income was 
over £100,000 (OBV, 2000b) and the trend in income was upwards over the New Labour 
period peaking in 2009/2010 at more than £500,000 (OBV, 2010b). Funders during this 
period included the Commission for Racial Equality; The Joseph Rowntree Charitable 
Trust; London Councils; Electoral Commission; Department for Constitutional Affairs (now 
reformed and subsumed into the Ministry of Justice); and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government. Once again the majority of this funding, as with 
BTEG, was directly or indirectly from the local and/or national state. Although OBV’s 2012 
accounts are not yet publically available, its income has fallen and it has had to reduce its 
staff, resulting in the redundancy of the organisation’s longstanding Deputy Director 
(Pears, 2011).  
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3.3 Race on the Agenda  
Race on the Agenda (ROTA) is a membership organisation with charitable status. It came 
into being in April 1997 succeeding a predecessor anti-racist organisation – Greater 
London Action on Race Equality (ROTA, 2007a). At its inception, ROTA’s charitable objects 
were to ‘… work towards the elimination of racial discrimination and to promote equality 
of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups...’ (ROTA, 
1997: 1). Its aim therefore was to reduce racial discrimination; increase equal opportunity; 
and enhance multi-‘racial’ relationships. Though the first two elements could be measured 
in the type of race equality data cited above, promoting ‘good relations’ was more 
complex and subjective. For example, advances in race equality could lead to worse 
relations if some white people came to resent the loss of their relative privilege. Indeed, 
as I discuss in chapter five, policymakers positioned BME organising and advances for 
equality as problematic for the interests of (certain parts of) the white population.  
 
While OBV and BTEG have been run since incorporation by Chief Executives involved in 
the founding of the organisation, ROTA had five Chief Executives over the New Labour 
period. In chronological order these were Marina Ahmad; Floyd Millen; Dinah Cox; Theo 
Gavrielides; and Elizabeth Henry. As a result, its philosophy and aims have been subject to 
considerably more movement than in the case of BTEG and OBV, although its function as 
‘a policy development, information and research service for the Black voluntary sector…’ 
(ROTA, 2001: 2) has been a constant. The organisation’s focus has extended across a range 
of changing themes over time, including crime and anti‐social behaviour; equalities and 
human rights; community cohesion and homelessness; and health and social services 
(ROTA, 2005; ROTA, 2007a; ROTA, 2008a). 
 
Significantly, ROTA amended its company objects in December 2008 to add the promotion 
of human rights and to replace a prior focus on the Greater London area with a national 
remit (ROTA, 2008b). Both of these can be seen as astute moves, with the former aligning 
the organisation with policymakers towards a more explicit equalities and human rights 
approach (see chapter five). However, ROTA already had an orientation towards human 
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rights and an interest in ‘double and triple discrimination and disadvantage’ according to 
ROTA’s former Chair (Kamila Zahno, 2011, Interview). Moreover, ROTA could generally be 
characterised as moderate and non-controversial in policy terms. By 2007/2008, as part of 
its efforts to inform ‘strategic decision-makers about issues affecting the Black voluntary 
sector and the communities it serves…’ (ROTA, 2003: 3), ROTA was involved in 39 different 
policy forums, decision-making bodies, government and independent advisory boards 
(ROTA, 2008d). 
 
ROTA’s terminology on blackness shifted over the course of the New Labour period. At the 
beginning of 2002, ROTA was explicitly using the term black defined as ‘those people of 
African, Asian, Caribbean and South East Asian descent and other groups who are 
discriminated against on the grounds of their race, culture, colour, nationality or religious 
practices’ (ROTA, 2002: 1). Three months later, ROTA switched to ‘Black and Minority 
Ethnic’ (ROTA and Urban Forum, 2002: 1). This process of transition continued in 2006 
when ROTA’s annual report described it as working with ‘Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
(BAME) communities’ (ROTA, 2006: 2). This was a symbolic departure from earlier 
attempts to develop political blackness and black consciousness (see chapter two).  
  
As with BTEG and OBV, the majority of resources for the organisation were directly and 
indirectly derived from the state. ROTA’s recent funders have included London Councils; 
City Bridge Trust; The Equality and Human Rights Commission; Big Lottery Fund; 
Communities and Local Government; and the Home Office (ROTA, 2008a, 2008d, 2009a, 
2009b, 2010a, 2010b). In the financial year 1999/2000, ROTA’s total income was just 
under £170,000 (ROTA, 2001), a figure that broadly increased year on year and that stood 
at over £540,000 in 2009/2010 (ROTA, 2010b). Like other race equality organisations it has 
lost funding and staff in recent times and its audited accounts showed that, by 2011/2012, 
income had fallen to £350,000 (ROTA, 2012).  
 
I shall return to focus on the work and emphasis of these three BME-led race equality 
organisations in chapter three onwards as I examine their interventions in policy 
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discussions and discourse. For the remainder of this chapter I outline the approach that I 
have taken in my research.  
 
 
4 Undertaking the research 
4.1 Bounding themes and the body of data 
When embarking on my study exploring policy discourses connecting nation, multiculture 
and race equality, I was faced with an issue of defining the scope of my research given the 
number of avenues for investigation were open to me. For example, in the New Labour 
period, questions of nation, multiculture and race equality were tied to immigration, 
asylum, security and Islam/Islamic ‘terror’ (Kundnani, 2007; McGhee, 2005, 2008). I have 
chosen not to focus on these latter issues because they are less central – though still 
connected – to my core concerns. In particular, I do not want discussions of immigration 
and so on to obscure and overshadow the persistent problems of racism and race 
inequality for long-settled BME people. My decision to separate off issues of racism and 
migration is consistent with the broader intellectual split that exists in academic literature 
(Schuster, 2010). Just as academics have tended to work within borders of racism, the 
BME-led race equality organisations whose work I have followed have, in the main, been 
concerned with social justice and equality issues as they relate to settled BME 
populations, leaving immigration, refugee and security issues to other, more specialist, 
civil society organisations. However, although I follow their demarcation and restrict the 
scope of my work, in part to make my research feasible and practical, I do believe that it is 
valid to see migration and these other issues as part of a wider debate and set of anxieties 
about ‘difference’. These anxieties are to the fore in issues of racism and race equality 
that I engage with in my research.  
 
With thematic boundaries in place I still faced the problem of identifying discourses and 
discursive materials that brought together issues of nation, multiculture and race equality 
in the sphere of policy.  
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Discourse is an elusive concept that can mean different things in different circumstances. 
Discourses can be defined broadly as ‘all forms of talk and text’ (Gill, 1996). For Stuart Hall, 
discourse is ‘… a way of representing the knowledge about a particular topic at a particular 
historical moment’ (Hall, 1997: 44). This notion of knowledge-production is in turn 
connected to the socially constructive effects of discourses (Fairclough, 2010; Wodak, 
2009). These create a kind of ‘macro-politics’ (Solomos and Back, 1995) constraining what 
can be said and done in political spheres (Foucault and Sheridan, 1979). This notion of 
social constructionism (Bryman, 2008; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000) is central to my 
research interest. However, despite the constructionist possibilities of discourse, I am 
mindful of the need to avoid expanding the ‘territorial claims’ of the discursive (Hall, 
1992c). That is, although discourses may have power, they do not have agency. They are 
products of social processes and any socially constructive effects are achieved through 
social action based on different social understandings of the world (Gergen, 2001; Gill, 
1996; Jessop, 2002; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2006).  
 
In practical terms, discourse refers to public language that provides accounts of the social 
world and advances responses to issues in that world (Reeves, 1983). Such materials 
relate to argumentation (Antaki, 1994) or ‘rhetoric’ where the latter is defined as ‘the art 
of persuasion or effective communication, connected with speaking with propriety, 
elegance and force’ (Back, 2004: 398). In other words, discourse and the discursive 
materials seek to convince and persuade (Fairclough, 2011; Gill, 1996; L’Hôte, 2010) and 
justify and legitimise certain positions (Capone, 2010; Ochs, 1979). 
 
The corpus (Barthes and Sontag, 1993; Bauer, 2000) of primary materials was made up of 
documents and transcripts of interviews. I aimed to ‘balance’ the corpus and to avoid 
systematic bias rather than to satisfy the more problematic and elusive goal of 
‘representativeness’ (Bauer and Aarts, 2000) or even of establishing the ‘truth’ (Haraway, 
1988). Balance was sought in terms of sourcing written texts produced by different 
government departments, i.e. mainly located in three main institutional sites within 
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government: the Prime Minister’s/Cabinet Office; the Home Office; and the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. In addition I drew on texts across the whole of 
the New Labour period in order to examine contexts, periodicity and patterns of discourse 
at particular moments and over time. The corpus also drew on documents from entities 
related to policymakers and policymaking such as Ted Cantle’s Community Cohesion 
Review Team (2001) and Darra Singh’s Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) as 
well as current and archival documents from three BME-led race equality organisations: 
BTEG, OBV and ROTA. The 1812 interviews drawn on in the thesis come from three broadly 
analogous sources to the documentary data cited above. Seven of the interviews were 
with policymakers – national politicians, senior civil servants, and policy advisors such as 
Tony Blair’s Chief Speechwriter Philip Collins. A further seven interviews were with leaders 
from BME-led or other equality organisations. Finally, another four interviews were 
conducted with other ‘external experts’ that have made interventions to influence policy 
discourses on race equality and the multicultural nation, such as Trevor Phillips and 
Bhikhu Parekh (who chaired the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain). The 
full list of interviewees is included as Appendix one. 
 
4.2 Accessing and gathering data  
I drew on a variety of New Labour policy materials over the period 1995 to 2010. As 
mentioned above, this material was largely drawn from three sections of government 
which mostly dealt with such issues, i.e. the Home Office; the Department for 
Communities and Local Government; and the Prime Minister’s/Cabinet Office. These 
                                                     
12
 I approached 25 potential interviewees. Seven requests were turned down or went unanswered despite 
repeated following up by phone, letter and/or email. In general it was far easier to arrange interviews with 
people working in civil society organisations rather than politicians and policymakers – partly because I have 
either previously met the people involved or was able to make my background and interests sound relevant 
to their own. I was not able to establish the same rapport with policymakers. The gatekeepers that declined 
an interview on behalf of politicians such as David Blunkett MP and Hazel Blears MP cited diary pressures 
and the need to prioritise constituency business as reasons for non-participation. 
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materials were largely in the public domain and retrievable (primarily) through web 
searches, but also through hard copies available in the official publications section of the 
library of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Another important source 
of policymaker discourse was the autumn party conference speeches of New Labour 
leaders between 1995 and 2010. Indeed these speeches were the first policymaker 
materials that I sourced and considered in order to better understand some of the broad 
rhetorical sweeps of New Labour discourses and policy priorities.  
 
Following on from this, I wrote to the three BME-led race equality organisations by email 
to ask them for access to their paper and electronic document archives.  
 
The paper and electronic libraries/archives of BTEG, OBV and ROTA were not assembled 
by professional archivists or librarians. Each of the three BME-led race equality 
organisations had their electronic and paper archives organised in slightly different ways 
and in different volumes. ROTA had a large volume of paper data stored in their London 
office. These were organised on an open shelving system in magazine files that took over a 
large wall about eight feet high by 15 foot wide. The archive included their own 
publications, in particular back issues of their magazine, Agenda; their peer-reviewed 
journal, Policy & Race; and regular policy briefings that offered a digest of key policy 
developments. In addition their archive also contained documents published by others in 
the field of race equality, for example government publications.  
 
OBV had a similar amount of paper-based archival materials to ROTA. However, they 
produced less magazine and journal-type publications than ROTA with more of an 
emphasis on posters and A5 booklets, postcards and other campaigning materials. Much 
of the remaining material was in the form of project files, correspondence, reports and 
proposals for funders as well as media cuttings about OBV’s work.  
 
BTEG’s paper archives were less extensive than OBV and ROTA though they did contain 
many back issues of their own magazine, Race and Regeneration, as well as published 
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project reports. The lower volume of data was due to the fact that though BTEG did 
conduct original research it operated in less of a ‘think tank’ mode than ROTA and in less 
of a public campaigning mode than OBV. Instead the organisation often worked through 
front-line organisations that intervened directly in the lives of BME people through 
educational and training projects.  
 
Although I did inquire about the processes and systems for cataloguing/archiving at each 
organisation, I could not discern with any clarity what these were and it was also unclear 
when and how documents migrated from the domain of the ‘current’ library to becoming 
historical record and entered into an archive. It appeared that in each case the 
library/archive contained material deemed important and in need of ordering and storage 
– typically in magazine files or ring binders – as part of a process of creating an 
institutional timeline. Despite these uncertainties about provenance and assemblage, I 
was mostly just grateful that these organisations had materials that they were prepared to 
grant me access to.  
 
In each of the three organisations I was given what appeared to be free access to paper-
based materials available in ‘hard copy’ in the library/archive. In addition I was provided 
with restricted access to electronic resources on networked computer drives. I had access 
to similar volumes of ‘soft copy’ or electronic hard drive material for each of the three 
organisations. This included some publications produced as part of project work. In some 
cases, where this duplicated hard copy materials, I downloaded the electronic copy so as 
to reduce the amount of paper that I took away from the respective organisations. 
Sometimes the soft material included ‘process’ elements of projects such as funding bids, 
project correspondence and reports to funders as well as internal notes on the progress of 
different projects – but this material, though interesting, was not core to my research 
interests.  
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In each of the organisations, documents and parts of documents that ideologically and 
rhetorically addressed my central selected themes of race equality; nation; and 
multiculture were selected for on-site copying or scanning or transfer to a memory stick.  
 
Interviewees were sampled purposefully (Patton, 1987) and in the majority of cases I 
knew of the person as an actor in my field of interest. Where this was not the case, people 
I interviewed were often suggested by other interviewees in response to my prompting. 
Interviewees were approached through a formal letter sent as an attachment via email in 
which I attempted to explain in everyday language the nature of my research; interview 
length; and how the data was to be used and disseminated (Harvey, 2011). The interviews 
lasted between 30 and 75 minutes and predominantly took place face-to-face at the 
interviewee’s place of work. For logistical reasons, two of the interviews took place over 
Skype with and without video depending on the speed of the internet connection at 
particular moments during the interviews. This was a practical solution in these two 
situations but also a valid approach to research in its own right and not necessarily a 
‘second-best’ option compared to the face-to-face interviews (Holt, 2010). 
 
The interviews contained some common and some tailored areas of investigation for each 
interviewee based on their interest and expertise (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). The interviews 
were semi-structured (Patton, 1987; Wengraf, 2001), combining some set pre-established 
questioning typical of structured interviews alongside some of the more open, interactive 
and ‘non-neutral’ aspects associated with unstructured interviews, where the emphasis is 
on understanding rather than the pursuit of ‘objective answers’ (Fontana and Frey, 1994). 
The types of questions posed and issues raised varied across and within categories of 
interviewees. The opening sections of interviews followed a largely standard format with 
me introducing my project and myself and confirming the time available for the interview. 
Depending on the time available, interviewees would typically be asked to discuss or 
respond to three main areas of investigation: broader questions on discourses of 
multicultural Britain – its existence, features and so on; questions of balancing and/or 
reconciling nation, multiculture and equality; and the place of group identity and BME 
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organising in this context. In each case, these questions were addressed through 
particular discursive interventions that the interviewee themselves had made or were 
knowledgeable about. As an example, I asked Philip Collins, Tony Blair’s former Chief 
Speechwriter, in detail about a speech on integration (Blair, 2006) that he had co-written 
with Tony Blair in 2006.   
 
I regard my interviews as co-constructed data where I influenced responses and meaning 
in the interviews (Antaki, 2002; Miller and Glassner, 1997). For example, there were 
possible ‘race-of-interviewer-effects’ (Gunaratnam, 2003: 53) on interviewees given my 
non-whiteness signalled in advance by my name, and confirmed by my appearance as I sat 
face-to-face with interviewees (Heyl, 2001; Song and Parker, 1995). Quite how this 
affected interview data is not likely to be constant or predictable. Yet there did seem to be 
effects. For example, one interviewee, who was not south Asian, spent a lot of time telling 
me about their south Asian spouse and in-laws – perhaps to establish rapport with me or 
to prove their inclusive credentials. 
 
Another issue in relation to interviews was opposite to the concern above. Instead of 
‘race-of-interviewer-effects’ it was possible that interviews had no effects whatsoever. 
That is, in the ‘interview society’, interviews may have become so normalised that instead 
of interviews as opportunities for exploration and investigation they descended into 
managed, rehearsed and repeated tellings of the self (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997). I 
cannot refute this concern; particularly as my interviewees were ‘political’ actors used to 
making and advocating on behalf of their particular position (see section on ethical issues 
below). However, I would suggest that even where my interviews were in part an 
opportunity for interviewees to repeat established positions, the interviews also enabled 
me at least to ask some less familiar questions that took interviewees on to new ground 
where their responses were perhaps less well-rehearsed. In particular, as is seen at 
various points of my study, I was able to obtain responses from interviewees as individuals 
rather than as representatives of organisations. For example, as outlined in chapter six, 
respondents have admitted that BME-led organisations were an ‘elite’; had not engaged 
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effectively with BME groups such as Chinese and Turkish people; and had to compromise 
in order to keep the ear of policymakers. Each of these reflections was different to what 
these individuals’ organisations had typically spoken about in the public domain. At these 
and other moments I felt that I was at least partially able to escape the shadow of the 
‘interview society’. 
 
4.3 Preparing, sorting and analysing data  
Having collected data from documents and interviews, the data was prepared and sorted 
in the following ways. In the first instance, the interviews which had been digitally 
recorded from start to finish were transcribed by me. I transcribed both my questions and 
interviewee responses. While recordings are necessary for the process of transcribing the 
act of recording may lead to ‘a loss of some aspects of social interaction’ (Peräkylä, 1997: 
204) and perhaps diminish the quality of interview data by abnormalising the encounter. 
However, I think that was unlikely to be a major issue in my study as I was interviewing 
people that were ‘public’ figures used to being interviewed and asked for opinions. The 
recording and subsequent transcription also allowed me to ensure that the interview text 
was converted into the same written-down form as the documentary data. The nature of 
my interest in policy discourse and discussions (see below) meant that the transcription 
style I employed was not verbatim. In particular, ‘ums’ and ‘ers’ and delays were not 
included as I was interested in argumentation rather than more linguistic-orientated 
concerns.  
 
As a consequence of my interest in argumentation and rhetoric, I collected materials 
centred on ideology, claims and justifications of certain policy and programmatic 
positions, rather than material about the detail of project and/or programmatic work 
undertaken by the BME-led organisations and policymakers.  
 
This decision over selection most impacted my work in the archives of the BME-led race 
equality organisations, where I had between one and two days to spend sifting through 
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materials. As a result of the time constraint I required a means of quickly 
including/excluding materials from my corpus. This meant that I made a first pass of 
selecting materials emphasising rhetoric and claim-making. Sometimes documents 
contained both rhetorical and operational subject matter in which case I concentrated on 
the former. A similar exercise of selection and sorting of and within documents was also 
carried with respect to New Labour policy materials. In addition, the interviews provided 
me with an opportunity to focus attention on more specific issues related to my study and 
therefore less sorting and sifting was required, although inevitably not all of the material 
within the interviews was relevant to the way in which my study and interests evolved.  
 
I adopted a qualitative thematic analysis approach (Howitt and Cramer, 2011; Seale, 
2004a) for the study of the data rather than, for example, discourse analysis. The main 
reason for this choice is that discourse analysis has a tendency to focus on quite technical 
linguistic, lexical, grammatical and semiotic approaches that pay less attention to the 
political and sociological context and impact of the text and different discursive 
interventions. At times a focus on the linguistic can be unhelpful in interpreting political 
and social phenomenon, as Jones and Collins note:  
 
... a political document, for example, is a matter of politics and a 
matter for political analysis and judgement. To get at its political or 
ideological significance, we must apply our politically attuned eyes and 
ears to a concrete analysis of the specific political conjuncture to which 
the document belongs and contributes in some way; “linguistic” analysis 
cannot help us with this (Jones and Collins, 2006: 30). 
 
My priority has been to focus on discourse in terms of sociological and political interests 
‘to uncover the large patterning of thought that structures whole texts, rather than the 
finer patterning that structures sentences, and which concerns linguists’ (Scott and 
Marshall, 2005: 159). Despite this, my approach to qualitative thematic analysis draws on 
discourse analysis – in that I am interested in text, context and content in terms of ‘what 
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claims speakers are making about the world, and how they are grounding them’ (Antaki, 
1994: 7).  
 
Having assembled the corpus from policy documents, archived material and transcribed 
interviews, I organised materials by year of publication to enable me to establish a sense 
of the pattern and rhythm of policy discourse. This material was read, re-read and re-read 
again alongside the interview material with a view to identifying tropes and themes. These 
themes were identified and organised with the aid of post-its and highlighter as I went 
through each document (including transcriptions of interviews) making a note of different 
claims and arguments in relation to nation, multiculture and race equality and 
connections between these ideas. Following repeated iterations of this exercise I 
identified a broad pattern and sweep of discourses that I eventually split into the three 
main chronological/thematic phases corresponding to the (sometimes overlapping) early 
(1995-2000), middle (2001-2007) and latter (2006-2010) parts of the New Labour period 
on proportional, parallel and paused multiculture, respectively.  
 
Neither the themes nor the periodisation of them were neat. One theme was not simply 
replaced as a new phase took hold. By way of illustration, the theme of the injustice of 
BME people being under-represented in positive dimensions of national life (such as 
highly paid employment) continued through the New Labour period. However, it did drift 
away from the centre of discourse to the margins. The interview data was thematically 
analysed alongside the documents and helped me to strengthen my understanding of the 
periodised thematic nature New Labour’s time. The interviews were also different to the 
documentary data, i.e. more reflective and backward-looking. The interview material led 
me to develop another strand of analysis that eventually became chapter six, on the 
process and the politics of policy discourse.  
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4.4 Ethical issues, disclosures and positionalities 
Finally, in this methods section I want to turn to issues that relate to my research conduct, 
access to and use of data in my study. Of paramount importance here was my access to 
and relationship with the three BME-led race equality organisations. When I asked for 
access to their office materials, I felt fairly confident that I would be helped because of my 
prior work with Voice4Change England (see introduction). I had also undertaken work 
with two of the three BME-led race equality organisations. In 2005/2006, I advised OBV on 
a pro bono basis on their work to support young people to engage with political issues, for 
example helping them to design a workshop for students at Islington’s Elizabeth Garrett 
Anderson School. In addition, my involvement with Voice4Change England brought me 
into contact with BTEG's Chief Executive. I had only a tenuous link to ROTA, amounting to 
not much more than having been in a meeting in 2008 with their Chief Executive, and a 
conversation with a ROTA board member at a voluntary and community sector research 
event. Despite these rather weak links, I was generously granted similar access to 
library/archive at ROTA to that obtained at BTEG and OBV. All three organisations 
appeared to be willing participants in the research because I presented as a suitably 
sympathetic person to research these organisations and because they felt that theirs was 
somehow an untold story and that my work was somehow part of that storytelling.13  
 
As a result, I was positioned as a relative ‘insider’ with respect to the BME-led race 
equality organisations that were central to my study. This access raises questions about 
my (over) familiarity with some of the actors in my research. It also has implications for 
my research ‘findings’ and the extent to which I could be critical both in the sense of 
questioning, but also in terms of passing negative judgement about these organisations. 
 
One helpful way of thinking about these ideas of potential bias (Seale, 2004b:) is through 
ideas of ‘situated knowledge’ and ‘partial’ knowledge (Haraway, 1988). This is an 
                                                     
13
 Indeed both Jeremy Crook and Simon Woolley, Chief Executives at BTEG and OBV, respectively, 
mentioned this to me informally (not during the formal transcribed interviews). 
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important area of thought in feminist and post-modern critiques of the social construction 
of knowledge (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1986; McDowell, 1992). It questions the notion of 
‘objectivity’ in a point of view on an issue and emphasises that perspectives and 
knowledge is always situated and positioned and cannot be otherwise (Hall, 1991b). 
However, while this is an important ethical statement in itself (Ali and Kelly, 2004), it is not 
enough to simply refute the concept of ‘objectivity’ – though we should do that (Phillips, 
2012). Neither is it sufficient to replace ‘objectivity’ with some idea of relativism as a view 
from ‘everywhere equally’ (Haraway, 1988: 584). Instead there is a requirement that, as 
researchers, ‘we must recognize and take account of our own position, as well as that of 
our research participants, and write this into our research practice’ (McDowell, 1992: 
409).  
 
Situated knowledge helps us to recognise that researcher’s perspectives, like everyone 
else’s, are incomplete, contextualised and not ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ (McDowell, 1992; 
Phillips, 2012). Furthermore, this mindset also enables researchers and readers to engage 
with the particularity of research output and to explore the contextualised nature of 
research and the ‘knowledge’ it ‘produces’.   
 
In practical terms, my connection and access to the three BME-led race equality 
organisations perhaps requires most consideration in terms of how this affected my 
position as a researcher and situatedness of the knowledge produced in my study. As 
stated above, I had certain ‘privileged’ access to the documentary archives and interviews 
with senior figures in three BME-led race equality organisations (BTEG, OBV and ROTA). 
Despite this, my relationship with the BME-led race equality organisations has, in my 
mind, been somewhat ambivalent. I have viewed them as potentially important and useful 
actors in work to combat race inequality but at the same time I began work on this thesis 
partly out of frustration that BME-led race equality organisations were not making more 
effective discursive interventions in policy discussions. That is not to say that I am claiming 
‘neutrality’ between the perspectives of race equality organisers and New Labour 
policymakers. My sympathies clearly lie with the former. However, my situatedness also 
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involves avoiding both a ‘told-you-so’ perspective about the awfulness of policymakers – 
even though their political positions may at times be appalling – or being a cheerleader for 
BME-led race equality organisations. Instead I have attempted to carve out a more 
interesting research path, i.e. to see how policymaker positions changed over time and 
how BME-led race equality organisations engaged with policymakers in the contestation 
and co-production of certain discourses of multiculture, nation and race equality. I 
therefore accept the situatedness, partiality and particularity of my research but also 
recognise that this is in itself a complex picture. 
 
Furthermore, what was ethically more important to me was that none of the research 
participants could exert ‘undue’ pressure to sway my finally published research in a 
particular direction (Ali and Kelly, 2004). One way in which I attempted to represent the 
‘distance’ between myself and the BME-led race equality organisations in order to protect 
myself from such pressure, was to draft and sign a non-disclosure agreement. This 
committed me to keep confidential commercially sensitive details about the three BME-
led organisations involved in my study. As well as being a courteous thing to do, it was 
part of my attempt to reassert my role as a ‘professional stranger’ (Agar, 1996) and to 
avoid over-familiarity with the race equality organisations. The main substantive 
implication of this non-disclosure agreement was that I could not reveal commercial 
information that was not already public knowledge, such as financial arrangements 
associated with projects, e.g. day rates or salary levels of members of staff; or the 
particularities of projects for which the organisations were still seeking funding. It is my 
belief that this had relatively little impact in terms of my study of the discursive 
interventions of these three organisations and that rather it indicated that it was ‘safe’ to 
allow me relatively unfettered access to organisational documents that I discuss directly 
or indirectly in my thesis.  
 
Moving on from ‘positionalities’ and ‘particularities’, there are other practical and ‘ethical’ 
research considerations to address in my work. I secured what I considered to be 
‘informed consent’ of research interviewees (Ali and Kelly, 2004; Patton, 2002) by writing 
40 
 
to interviewees to ask for explicit permission to interview and record them. Face-to-face 
interviewees also saw me using my digital recorder in front of them to emphasise that this 
was a set-piece encounter. My interviewees would not typically be considered ‘vulnerable’ 
(Ali and Kelly, 2004) as they were, in the main, people with some power and status who 
have been interviewed on many occasions.  
 
However, though the individuals involved were not classically ‘vulnerable’, they may have 
been relatively vulnerable in their operating context. For example, one interviewee 
requested that they were not named in the research because they deemed that it could 
cause problems with their employers. I agreed to this request for anonymity to enable the 
participant to speak ‘freely’. Furthermore, I felt that in this case what this senior civil 
servant had to say was potentially important, even if I could not name this person.14 This 
explicit request for anonymity indicated that there were risks associated with departing 
from ‘official’ discursive positions, even for rather senior figures in organisations. As a 
result I recognise that I do, potentially, hold some power over interviewees and have 
endeavoured to use quotes from the interviews in a way that would not cause ‘undue’ 
embarrassment or vulnerability to individuals or organisations that they were attached to. 
At the same time, I have attempted not to circumscribe my research or its ‘potential 
benefits to society’ (Ali and Kelly, 2004: 126).15 On this basis, I anonymised one quote 
from a person that did not ask for overall anonymity (see chapter six). I did this because 
they very honestly referred to race equality organisations as an ‘elite’, disconnected from 
BME populations. This admission might make life difficult for the particular organisation in 
question, e.g. in their attempts to secure funding, and therefore I have left this quote 
unattributed. I made no other explicit changes of this nature. 
                                                     
 
 
15
 I see this as analogous to Suki Ali’s ‘promise’ to one of the children that she interviewed for a piece of 
research. Ali explained to the child that what they said ‘may be used in the research… in such a way that 
would be respectful… but would not get her [the interviewee] into trouble’ (Ali and Kelly, 2004: 124). 
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5 Conclusions  
In this introductory chapter, I have outlined my interest in the ways in which BME-led race 
equality organisations and national New Labour policymakers discursively attended to 
matters of nation (commonality), multiculture (diversity) and race equality. I have outlined 
my use of documents, archives and interviews and qualitative thematic analysis to 
explore, examine and evaluate the primary data in this study. I have argued that policy 
discourses of nation, multiculture and race equality matter and therefore warrant detailed 
investigation. I will develop the discussion of my thesis in the following way. 
 
5.1 Chapter summaries 
In chapter two, I connect my empirical concerns to broader sociological literature on 
nation, multiculture and ‘new ethnicities’ as well as discussions of BME organising as a 
form of political intervention inside the nation. These discussions help me to locate and 
ground my empirical work and in particular to show how policy discourses and discussions 
evident in my empirical chapters are tied to contemporary events and situations but also 
to deeper notions and practices of ethnicity and nation as decisive and divisive lines in 
society.  
 
Chapters three, four and five each cover a particular chronological phase in the New 
Labour period organised according to different and major discursive themes that connect 
nation, multiculture and race equality. Chapter three relates to the first part of the New 
Labour period from 1995-2000, where policy discussion was organised around a notion of 
‘proportional multiculture’, with an emphasis on a more proportional (and beneficial) 
allocation of BME people across national life. This included reducing over-representation 
of BME people in poverty, un(der)employment and low educational attainment and 
reducing under-representation in attainment such as high level employment and 
educational results. Even in this initial period there were indications about the limits to 
which New Labour was willing to go in policy terms, e.g. favouring anti-discrimination 
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compared to positive action to address inequality. Discursively, New Labour 
acknowledged race inequality in Britain but disavowed the existence of a deep connection 
between the nation and (minority) ethnic disadvantage.  
 
The second overarching policy discourse of multiculture was prominent between 2001 
and 2007 and is the subject of chapter four. In it multiculture was presented as a ‘parallel’ 
entity that marked society along distinct and antagonistic lines as evidenced by the 2001 
northern disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. This idea of multiculture as a 
parallel force was perhaps the dominant policymaker-led discourse connecting nation, 
multiculture and race equality in the New Labour period. It was pivotal because it 
positioned multiculture and ‘special’ treatment of BME people for cultural or race equality 
reasons as incompatible with some unspecified notion of commonality. In the meanwhile, 
BME-led race equality organisations attempted to argue that parallelism was not the 
product of multiculture or policy accommodation but was due to race inequality. 
Furthermore, these organisations claimed that only an emphasis on race equality could 
lead to the kind of overlapping lives that policymakers appeared to desire. 
 
Chapter five examines a third phase of policy discourse between 2006 and 2010. This 
attempted to ‘pause’ and downplay multiculture and to overwrite it with a re-emphasis on 
citizenship and nation. In another development, aspects of equality were discursively and 
legislatively re-arranged by policy reform with an emphasis on individualised human rights 
and also wider notion of group inequalities beyond race, including age and sexuality. This 
latter development diverted attention away from the earlier focus on minority ethnic 
dimensions of disadvantage.  
 
Chapter six is on the politics of policy discourse and how such discourses were produced 
and constrained. In particular the chapter explores ways in which policymaker discourses 
had different policy and political functions, including attempting to dominate policy space 
by ‘naming’ a political moment. This chapter also discusses how discursive interventions 
of BME-led race equality organisations were ‘crowded out’ and negated by ‘renegade’ 
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BME policy actors who questioned the nature of BME inequalities and thus undermined 
the ability of BME-led race equality organisations to shape policy discussions and policy-
making. 
 
Chapter seven concludes this thesis. In it I reflect on the changing nature of my 
relationship to my research over its life cycle. I also consider the continuities of New 
Labour discourses of the troubled relationship between nation, multiculture and race 
equality in the time of coalition government. Most importantly, I examine what next for 
BME-led race equality organisations and organising and the prospects for a new phase of 
black/BME politics capable of engaging with complex, non-unitary and unguaranteed 
BMEness associated with ‘new ethnicities’ (Hall, 1991b, 1992a). In particular, I explore the 
possibilities and pitfalls of a new initiative called the Race Equality Coalition (REC) which is 
the result of a number of BME-led organisations coming together to advance race equality 
(Race Equality Coalition, 2013). I reflect on whether this might at last be an opportunity to 
engage with the ‘hard ethical labour’ (St Louis, 2009) that numerous authors (Gilroy, 1992; 
Hall, 1991b, 1992a; Shukra, 1998) have recognised as necessary for a new politics to 
engage with questions of nation and multiculture and to disrupt resilient racism and race 
inequality in Britain.  
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Chapter 2 Landscaping the field: nation, multiculture and BME 
organising 
 
1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I step away from some of the contemporary subject matter of the previous 
chapter and instead attempt to connect the issue of race equality with broader debates 
on nation and multiculture. In particular, I want to suggest that conceptions of the nation 
and multiculture mark BME populations, and therefore the goal of race equality, as 
problematic. In order to advance this viewpoint, this chapter sets out the ‘field’ that my 
empirical work engages with and draws upon. This field is about conceptual 
understandings and discussions of the nation and multiculture but also includes evolving 
post-World War II BME organising which has worked with and against ideas of nation and 
multiculture. As a whole, this chapter will help to provide a backdrop of ideas and 
historical practice that inform the policy debates and discourses in my empirical work. I 
begin this chapter with a discussion about the nation and its deep ties to ethnicity. 
 
2 Nations: something old and something new  
Despite being a contested, complex and contradictory form (Anthias, 2010), nations are 
pervasive and in the modern period have become widely understood as ‘real entities, as 
communities, as substantial, enduring collectivities’ (Brubaker, 1996: 13). Ernest Gellner 
noted that while having a nation was not an inherent attribute of humanity; it had now 
come to appear to be so fundamental that ‘[a] man must have a nationality as he must 
have a nose and two ears’ (1983: 6).  
 
The prospects for race equality in contemporary nations are shaped by understandings of 
how nations emerged and the part that ethnicity has to play in this. There are two main 
theoretical positions on the nature of the nation with differences and overlaps in how 
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they position ethnic minorities in the nation. The first set of theories is primordial and the 
second modernist. I take each of these in turn.  
 
Primordial theories of the nation locate the roots of the nation in pre-modern histories 
and with pre-modern people emphasising the nation’s fundamental, timeless, 
boundedness and internal sameness (Werbner, 1997). The roots of such theories can be 
traced back to Rousseau and his followers and arguments that nations were a return to a 
‘state of nature’ (Smith, 2001) and claims that nations are ‘in the very nature of things’ 
(Gellner, 1983). Organic understandings of this type suggest that nations ‘just are’ – they 
are the building block for the world rather than a socially constructed category of 
collectivity.  
 
The organic nation lends itself to the idea of organic and original. Socio-biological strands 
of primordialism connect biology, kinship and ethnicity (Van den Berghe, 1987) to the 
nation. This may involve the assertion that ‘original’ national people may come from some 
biological common origin or shared kinship (Anthias, 2010).16 Origins and history are 
central to perennialism, another strand of thought under primordialism. Perennialism 
emphasises the continuity of ethnic groups through time – though not necessarily through 
biology (Conversi, 2002; Smith, 2001) – and points to the long history of some nations 
and/or the ubiquity of nationhood. In such cases, the accent may be placed on shared 
cultural features of peoples including ‘language, religion, custom, traditions, feeling for 
“place”’ (Hall, 1992b: 617) as well as regional proximity (Geertz, 1973). At its outer edges, 
perennialism overlaps with another school of thought classified under primordialism, i.e. 
ethnosymbolism. This foregrounds groups or peoples claiming a sense of their own unique 
history, culture and loyalties. Smith argues that these collectives are to be found in most 
                                                     
16
 Such sentiments can be seen in Mrs Thatcher’s appeals to ‘kith and kin’ during the Falklands War (cited in 
Curran et al., 2005: 25-26) and more recently, when Gordon Brown talked about a ‘golden thread’ of 
national values running through British history his was an appeal not to defining biology but to defining 
character (2004, 2007b). 
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ages and that some nation-states emerge out of such groupings and that sense of history 
helps to explain why some nations ‘have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or 
ethnic sentiments’ (Smith, 1986: 216).  
 
Versions of primordialism signal continuities of the nation and mark some ethnic 
groupings as central to the nation and give other ethnic groups peripheral and outsider 
status. As a result of such formulations, BME people in Britain are construed as alien, 
incongruent and out of place (Gilroy, 1987; Solomos et al., 1982). However, primordialism 
does not necessarily leave these people placeless. Such groups may be aliens in one 
nation (Braziel and Mannur, 2003; Conner, 1986) but be considered to have primordial 
attachments to another ‘homeland’ or nation. Primordialism therefore fixes notions of 
nationals and non-nationals, and allocates people to territories and nations.  
 
This understanding of the world of deep-rooted nations and nationality and corresponding 
ethno-nationals is partially disrupted by a second body of literature that provides a 
modernist account of the nation. This school of thought suggests that, rather than being 
original, continuous and timeless, nationalism, nations, nation-states and national 
identities are products of modernity and modernisation (Anderson, 2006 [1983]; Dittmer, 
2010; Gellner, 1983).  
 
In modernist explanations, nations are usually dated to the late 18th or early 19th century 
(Billig, 1995; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 2001). Nations and nationalism were brought on by an 
entirely novel set of conditions that disrupted the previous ordering of society. These 
conditions included the decline of religion and monarchy (Anderson, 2006 [1983]); and the 
breakdown of feudal control as dense populations associated with industrialisation 
replaced the scattered populations of the agricultural age (Gellner, 1983). In this context, 
nations and nationalism provided a new means of social control (Hobsbawm, 1990).  
 
47 
 
Modernists view the nation as constructed and, in the famous words of Benedict 
Anderson (2006 [1983]), as an ‘imagined’17 community. That was not to say that 
primordial thinking and understandings of the nation as natural and inevitable was not 
also the work of imagination. Rather, it was a kind of imagination that viewed a world 
without nations as unimaginable. From the perspective of modernists, imaginings of 
nation sometimes borrowed from primordial and perennial notions of origins and history. 
For example, Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) pointed to the role of ‘invented tradition’ as 
significant in the making and reinforcing of nations in modernity. They defined invented 
tradition as ‘a set of practices… which automatically implies continuity with the past’ 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 1). These practices helped to put ideas of the nation in 
place and to keep them in place. Hobsbawm and Ranger’s work noted some rather visible 
and heavy-handed nationalising inventions, for example the development of ‘traditional’ 
Scottish dress to maintain distinctiveness from the English. However, the nation could also 
be marked in banal and unceremonious ways, such as through ‘the flag hanging unnoticed 
on the public building’ (Billig, 1995: 8). 
 
The constructed modern interpretation of the nation, in contrast to primordial theories, at 
least offered the prospect that the nation might be imagined, invented or flagged in ways 
that side-lined ethnic preferment. If the nation was being ‘made up’ then it should be 
possible to do so in a way that was inclusive of those that were on the outside of 
primordial notions of the nation. Furthermore, if the nation was a product of modern 
imagination, this opened up the possibility of something post-national and beyond the 
nation that could be imagined in due course (Runnymede Trust, 2000). However, neither 
modernism nor imagination or invention guaranteed a break between nation and 
ethnicity. The national imagination could still construct the nation with ethnic preferences 
and position ‘minority’ people precariously within. 
 
                                                     
17
 Enoch Powell had earlier stated that ‘the life of nations no less than that of men is lived largely in the 
imagination’ (Powell, 1969: 245) emphasising the fictive and imagined life of the nation.  
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2.1 The state and the nation 
How the nation is imagined and the place of race and ethnicity within it depends on who 
does the imagining – as my empirical work will show. In Billig’s definition of ‘banal 
nationalism’ (1995), cited above, the flag hangs from a public or state building and the 
state is engaged in a piece of quiet signalling. The (invisible) hand of the state is therefore 
critical in the making and re-making of the nation and in insisting that the nation exists 
and is pre-eminent.  
 
The state may not always be so subtle or gentle as to use the limp flag, as made clear in 
Max Weber’s definition of the state as the entity that has the monopoly of legitimate 
violence in defined territory (1948 [1918]). The state is a political entity that enables 
collective and concerted action (Brubaker, 1996) and control (Calhoun, 2006) in a territory 
and offers (people) comfort based on social control (Goldberg and Solomos, 2002). The 
state is neither monolithic nor unitary in form or actions (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992) – 
though it can be considered ‘more or less coherent’ (Goldberg and Solomos, 2002). It 
includes and acts through such institutions as the armed forces, civil service or state 
bureaucracy, courts, and schools; and these are significant sites of production for national 
values, culture and belonging (Goldberg and Solomos, 2002).18 
 
The state and the nation are closely entwined and Hobsbawm argued that it was the state 
that was the active partner in the relationship: ‘nations do not make states and 
nationalism, but the other way around’ (1990: 10). Furthermore, Ernest Gellner defined 
nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 1983: 1) – where the political unit is in effect 
the state. Nationalist sentiment is satisfied to the extent that the principle of political and 
                                                     
18
 As an illustration of this process, British Education Secretary Michael Gove expressed his concern at what 
he considered insufficient attention on British history at GCSE level (Vasagar, 2011). 
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national congruency is upheld and discontent to the extent that it is violated.19 Most 
significantly, nationalist sentiment may be frustrated if all the people of the ‘nation’ are 
not contained within the political boundary and/or if ‘non-nationals’ are contained inside 
it (Gellner, 1983). In this way the state and particular state actors may be deeply hostile to 
minority ethnic people inside the nation who are considered to be in the ‘wrong place’.  
 
The very notion of race equality can be further undermined by state action to satisfy 
nationalist sentiment. For example, state actors may intervene to ensure that ethnic and 
cultural characteristics become nationalised (Day and Thompson, 2004; Gilroy, 1987); and 
to mobilise state institutions in the pursuit of (racial and ethnic) homogeneity (Parekh, 
2008). Indeed, Parekh (2000) argues that the modern state is less tolerant of diversity 
than pre-modern polities – which were composed of coalitions of ethnic, tribal, clannish 
and other communities. Therefore the (nation) state appears inclined towards a ‘racially’, 
ethnically and primordially-inflected version of the nation (Goldberg, 2001).  
 
One of the most important ways that the state and ethnic minorities interact is through 
citizenship. The concept of citizenship stretches back to classical times and the Greek city-
state. However, there is no real academic or policy consensus about its meaning 
(Martiniello, 2002). Citizenship can be conceived locally, transnationally (Yuval-Davis, 
1997) and postnationally (Soysal, 1994). It is more typically thought of as official and 
acquirable membership of a nation-state (Marshall, 1964 [1950]). T.H. Marshall defined 
citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community’ (1964: 
84 [1950]). Critically, for questions of multiculture and race equality, Marshall argued that 
‘[a]ll who possess the status [of citizen] are equal with respect to the rights and duties 
with which the status is endowed’ (Marshall, 1964 [1950]: 84). Indeed, race equality 
organisations use the idea of race equality as part of citizenship (OBV, 2000; Rose, 1969). 
                                                     
19
 The political and national unit may lack congruity for numerous reasons. The state may not be the only 
legitimate power within a territory and in certain cases there are nations without a state, e.g. Palestine; or 
pseudo-national collectives whose people are spread across several nations, e.g. Kurds (Yuval-Davis, 1997). 
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Marshall’s dimensions of citizenship point to an idea of formal citizenship and nationality 
(Martiniello, 2002) and the passport as a symbol of membership of the nation. In turn, 
civic or ‘territorial citizenship’ differs from the ethnic variety (Hansen, 2000) in that it 
allows people to acquire national citizenship regardless of ethnicity. Citizenship of this 
type can be said to formally ‘de-ethnicise’ (Rattansi, 2007) and transcend other group 
traits such as race, gender and class (Goldberg and Solomos, 2002; Parekh, 2000) in favour 
of voluntary civic community and political community (Anderson, 2006 [1983]; May, 2002; 
Parekh, 2008; Shafir, 1998).  
 
However, citizenship also has informal but substantive dimensions. This means that 
citizenship is not only formally tied to territory and passport, but is also informally 
connected to culture and, in particular,  citizens ‘are assumed to share the same culture 
since they belong to the nation and to the state’ (Martiniello, 2002: 117). Therefore taking 
citizenship may also be seen as an ethnicising process, as citizens are required to sign up 
to and participate in the shared civic project (Brubaker, 1996; McGhee, 2009). In the 
British context it has been argued that this entails adopting a certain kind of normative 
civic whiteness (Burnett, 2004). As a result some parts of the population need to shed 
their ‘excess’ ethnicity whilst others do not. For example, in this context, ethnic minority 
identifications are considered problematic because notions of belonging ‘stand between, 
and mediate, the state-citizen relationship’ (Alexander, 2007: 123).  
 
Yuval-Davis and Werbner (1999) extend this notion of the non-universality and asymmetry 
of citizenship when they argue that: 
 
… the specific location of people in society – their group and categorical 
definition by gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, race, ability, age or 
life cycle stage – mediates the construction of their citizenship as 
‘different’ and thus determines their access to entitlements and their 
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capacity to exercise independent agency (Yuval-Davis and Werbner, 1999: 
5).  
 
Thus citizenship is graded (Martiniello, 2002), raced and ethnicised (Anthias, 2010; 
Kymlicka, 2005; Rattansi, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 1999). Citizenship and the state’s relationship 
to the citizen are neither uniform nor universal even though citizenship formally 
downplays or sets ethnicity aside.  
 
The discussion above illustrates the ambivalent and ambiguous contours of the nation. It 
is both modern in construction and stuck in the depths of time. Formal citizenship offers 
the promise of equality and citizenship rights to members of the nation, regardless of 
ethnicity. However, discussions of nation, civic life and citizenship are still informed by 
ethnicity and hostile to minority ethnicity, whilst simultaneously claiming to rise above it. 
This ambivalence towards and elision of ‘difference’ in the nation can disadvantage those 
considered ‘different’ and deny that discrimination occurs on this basis. By way of 
contrast, multiculture and multiculturalism insist on the centrality of difference in the 
nation and foregrounds how such difference might be responded and adjusted to. It is to 
this topic that I turn to in the next section. 
 
3 Multiculture and the naming of difference 
Difference within the nation can be signalled (and responded to) in different ways. There 
are three terms that begin with ‘multicultur’: multiculture; multicultural; and 
multiculturalism. Each of these articulates different aspects of difference.  
 
The concept of multiculture, in its narrowest sense, can be defined as a demographic 
phenomenon, largely associated with ethnicity and the population phenomenon of 
permanent ‘co-presences’ of minority ethnic people within nations (Harris, 2001) – and 
others include a shared sense of origins; collective identity; community membership 
(Brubaker, 2004; Premdas, 2010; Shukra, 1998); as well as attitudes; beliefs; and values 
(Parekh, 2000; Runnymede Trust, 2000).  
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In policy usage, multiculture, ethnicity and ‘diversity’ have, in effect, come to be used 
interchangeably as encapsulating these various dimensions of ‘deep-seated’ difference 
(Runnymede Trust, 2000). Furthermore, phenotypical and racial dimensions have been 
inserted into cultural characteristics (Barker, 1981; Brah, 1996; Gilroy, 1987; Miles, 1989). 
One way in which these overlaps reveal themselves are through census-type 
classifications which invoke racial categories such as black and white as well as territorial 
ones, such as Asian and African, and nationality such as Chinese (Rattansi, 2007).  
 
What is interesting is that multiculture could be defined in terms of any of society’s 
various heterogeneities beyond ethnicity – including gender, class, sexuality, religion, race 
(Sharma, 2006). However, multiculture with ethnicity at its heart and race in the back of 
its mind has come to be the form of diversity that matters politically and in policy 
discussions. This is because multiculture has been associated with what Parekh (2000) 
calls ‘communal diversity’, i.e. a ‘robust and tenacious’ form of diversity that results in 
‘self-conscious and more or less well organised communities entertaining and living by 
their own different systems of beliefs and practices’ (Parekh, 2000: 3). Communal diversity 
is also connected with different and rival lifestyles, perspectives, identities and loyalties 
that concern national policymakers and state actors (Sharma, 2006). These perceived 
characteristics make communal diversity a form of difference that policy actors find it 
hard to be indifferent to.  
 
Multiculture may also have consequences beyond the demographic and draw attention to 
different aspects of difference including ensuing disparities, subordinations, instabilities, 
uncertainties, adversities and exclusions of BME people within the nation (Gilroy, 1987, 
2004; McRobbie, 2009; Parekh, 2008; Premdas, 2010). However, multiculture is not only 
about (unfair) unequal handling of certain populations by state and other actors, but is 
also about differential treatment that people and groups might want to claim for 
themselves because of their ‘distinctiveness’ within a broader population.  
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In this way multiculture as a feature of population expands to become an issue for wider 
society, i.e. multiculture leads to the multicultural. This connection is made by Stuart 
Hall’s exploration of the ‘multicultural question’, where Hall argued that the term 
‘multicultural… concerns the nature of society as a whole, and thus addresses the changed 
conditions of everyone’ (Hall, 2001: 5). In my thesis I use both the terms multiculture and 
multicultural. I do so somewhat interchangeably because, for me and my interests, 
multiculture cannot simply be a narrow demographic characteristic; it always has meaning 
for the wider nation and society. I do, however, make a distinction between 
multiculture/multicultural questions and multiculturalism, as I discuss below. 
 
3.1 Multiculturalism 
With multiculture as an acknowledged feature of a nation, political actors are confronted 
with multicultural questions such as how ‘... can the particular and the universal, the 
claims of both difference and equality, be recognized?’ (Hall, 2000: 235). Another way of 
asking this type of question is to consider how different groups are able to participate fully 
and equally in society and the economy (Parekh, 2000).  
 
For my purposes, multiculturalism is most helpfully defined as a set of state strategies and 
policies that respond to and manage the problems that multicultural societies generate 
(Hall, 2000; Pitcher, 2009; Rattansi, 2011). There are many different versions of 
multiculturalism (Alibhai Brown, 2000; Hall, 2001; Rattansi, 2011) and these define (and 
respond to) ‘problems’ associated with multicultural societies in different ways. I discuss 
four forms of multiculturalism below: conservative; liberal; cultural pluralist; and critical. 
Each of these forms of multiculturalism prioritises different aspects of multiculture and 
multicultural life.  
 
The starting point for conservative multiculturalism is that multiculture represents a 
threat to the cultural integrity of a nation (Hall, 2000). Conservative multiculturalism 
prioritises the nation and seeks to assimilate (ethnic) minorities and ‘newer’ nationals. Its 
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aim is to meld them into the national culture, whiteness and the traditions and customs of 
the majority (McLaren and Kanpol, 1995). Policies of assimilation can be seen as an 
advance on ‘robust’ primordialism where nationalist instincts are to expel or exclude non-
nationals. Instead the point is to expunge certain minority characteristics as part of a de-
ethnicising/re-ethnicising process.  
 
Under conservative multiculturalism, equality is secured by national citizenship as long as 
citizens adopt and assimilate into the national culture. Failure to assimilate may, from this 
perspective, justify inequality (Parekh, 2008). Conservative multiculturalists are unwilling 
to negotiate over deep-lying disagreements between ethnicity and nationhood (Hall, 
2000; Parekh, 2008). Such conservative sentiments also place ethnic minorities and 
immigrants in an invidious position in setting for them the task of proving themselves part 
of the nation with the ever-present possibility of moving the target out of reach in the 
future (Parekh, 2008). 
 
Conservative multiculturalism acknowledges a relatively narrow conception of national 
culture and identifies those that are and are not carriers of it. Certain forms of liberal 
multiculturalism offer greater flexibility but also have to balance two cornerstones of 
orthodox western liberal thinking – universal citizenship and cultural neutrality of the 
state (Hall, 2000). Furthermore, differential treatment of groups may serve to undermine 
unity or collective solidarity in multicultural settings. Liberal culturalists such as Will 
Kymlicka (1995; 2000) have argued that cultural membership is consistent with liberal 
principles of freedom and equality and justify granting special rights to minorities. This 
position rejects the idea that cultural groups can restrict the political rights of their own 
members in the name of ‘cultural authenticity’.  
 
This form of multiculturalism provides individuals with access to ‘group-differentiated 
rights’ (Kymlicka, 1995). These rights can act to protect the members of certain groups 
from vulnerability to the political power of the majority (Kymlicka, 2000). Such 
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differentiation indicates that the state is willing to accommodate cultural aspects of 
minority groups rather than to eliminate them. 
 
A related and third form of multiculturalism is a cultural pluralist approach to 
multiculturalism. This seeks to defend the diverse cultural dimensions of multiculture. For 
cultural pluralists the problem of multiculture is that cultural distinctiveness might be lost 
and injury could be caused by ignoring such differences (Taylor, 1992). Cultural pluralist 
multiculturalism is a form of ‘strong multiculturalism’ (Harris, 2001: 23) and places weight 
on what is intrinsic to the identity of individuals and groups. In terms of public policy and 
equality, Charles Taylor (1992) argues that recognition of distinctiveness is fundamental 
and that such uniqueness is of equal worth and should be acknowledged as such. This may 
be manifested through public funding for religious schools and other steps to allow ethnic 
minorities to pursue their own religion and languages (Parekh, 1991; Vasta, 2007) but also 
in the acceptance of visible symbols of difference such as the wearing of turbans by Sikh 
police in the UK and Canada, and the Jewish yarmulke in the US air force (Parekh, 2000). 
Such adjustments may also be found in liberal multiculturalism; however the emphasis 
from a culturalist perspective is somewhat different and argues that policy should be used 
to support and encourage the distinctiveness of particular groups of people rather than to 
merely accommodate them.  
 
The question mark against liberal culturalist and culturalist forms of multiculturalism is 
whether adjustments for multiculture and an emphasis on the distinctiveness and equal 
worth of cultures leaves questions of race equality to one side. For example, what is of 
more interest, from a race equality perspective, is not whether male Sikh police officers 
might be allowed to wear turbans rather than police helmets, but that Sikh people could 
expect to be recruited to and advance through the police force in a similar way to their 
white counterparts.   
 
Concerns about questions such as race equality provide the impetus behind a fourth type 
of multiculturalism – critical multiculturalism – which, in theory, attempts to foreground 
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issues of equality, anti-racism and the social and political relations of power as they relate 
to identity and cultural differences (May, 2002; McLaren and Kanpol, 1995; Sharma, 
2006). It is these types of concerns that are core to my own interests as well as to those of 
the BME-led race equality organisations that I study in this thesis. This means that it is not 
‘culture’ for its own sake that matters but racist subordination related to culture (Harris, 
2001). At the same time critical multiculturalism attempts to avoid some of the pitfalls of 
anti-racism which may privilege racism at the expense of other modes of inequality (May, 
2002) and may also be unable to engage with issues of ‘new racism’ which, in part, uses 
cultural characteristics as a resource (Barker, 1981). However, although critical 
multiculturalism foregrounds and attempts to balance such concerns, it has not proved 
easily transferable to a set of policy and programmatic interventions. Thus critical 
multiculturalism is perhaps more effective as a challenge to the complacency of 
multiculturalism than as a practicable way to address cultural difference and race equality.  
 
Multiculturalism in action in Britain has struggled to balance (cf. Walzer, 1983) the 
elimination of certain differences related to race inequality as well as the preservation of 
other differences amongst BME people, e.g. cultural distinctiveness. The answer to 
Stuart’s Hall’s question of how to recognise ‘... the particular and the universal, the claims 
of both difference and equality’ (Hall, 2000: 235) remains elusive.  
 
While multiculturalism initiatives, where they have been enacted, have disrupted ideas of 
monocultural nation-thinking by insisting on explicit discussions of difference, they have 
had ambivalent effects of the struggle for race equality. For example, state recognition or 
funding for cultural groups (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992) has encouraged group 
boundary formation and boundary maintenance (Barth, 1969) making collective struggles 
for race equality more difficult (see the next section on BME organising for further 
discussion). As nationalism made nations (Hobsbawm, 1990), multiculturalism also 
contributed to the making of multiculture (Fortier, 2005) and risked partitioning society 
and sealing cultures (Anthias, 2010); containing difference (Bhabha, 1990); and 
maintaining ‘purity’ (May, 2002). This contrasts with the lived instability of cultures (Back, 
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1994) and the struggles that occur over culture (Parekh, 1991). Furthermore, 
multiculturalism witnessed in Britain can be seen to have retreated from thorough and 
critical re-examination of culture in favour of ‘separate but equal’ cultures (Gilroy, 1996). 
In turn, multiculturalism has not been able to address structural inequality and racism 
(Kundnani, 2002; May, 2002) that have produced a nation that, ultimately, has been both 
‘separate and unequal’ (Johnson, 2010).  
 
In addition, while multiculturalism might disrupt implicitly ethnic-laden nation-thinking by 
insisting on explicit discussions of difference, it is not disruptive enough. For example, 
multiculturalism is bound to and confined by the unitary nation (May, 1999; Sharma, 
2006) and multiculturalism enacted through state intervention is not an escape from the 
nation (and its associated problems for the place of ethnic minorities), but an 
accommodation with it. It is a form of official licensing of ‘difference’ in a way that 
policymakers can locate in their own ‘grid’ (Bhabha, 1990). Specifically, multiculturalism 
has not dislodged the idea of Britishness as a white phenomenon (Hall, 2000).  
 
However, multiculturalism cannot be entirely or only to blame for such problems and 
continued race inequality, in part because the notion of ‘state multiculturalism’ (Cameron, 
2011; Gilroy, 2012), as a co-ordinated and comprehensive policy in Britain, has been 
greatly exaggerated (Younge, 2011).  
 
I suggest that both nation and multiculturalism contain ambivalences towards minority 
people as a presence/problem in society. In different ways these notions can emphasise 
the separateness of BME people and ethnicity as society’s main dividing line in ways that 
support race inequality. Certainly neither nation-thinking – even of the version where 
citizenship is acquirable and ‘equal’ – nor multiculture/multiculturalism appears to offer 
any guarantees of progress on race equality. It is with this backdrop of ingrained 
disadvantage against BME people in Britain in mind that I turn to next to ways in which 
BME political organising has understood and attempted to respond to difference in the 
multicultural nation and to take action for race equality.  
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4 BME organising 
In this section I outline different historical and conceptual dimensions of BME organising 
that have a bearing on the contemporary realities of BME-led race equality activity. I 
suggest that BME-led race equality organisations in the New Labour period were 
constrained by a number of different factors limiting their effectiveness as discursive 
policy actors. In particular, there were the complexities of organising BMEness 
encapsulated by Stuart Hall’s conception of new ethnicities. In addition, there were 
numerous concerns about BME organising as a particularist and therefore suspect basis 
for political collectivity and intervention.  
 
4.1 Towards a black politics  
There is a long history of BME/black organising for race equality in Britain (Ramdin, 1999; 
Solomos, 2003). ‘Ethnic’ associations were established before World War I in maritime 
industries and port cities and spread in the 1950s after immigration from the Caribbean 
and Indian sub-continent (McLeod et al., 2001). In the aftermath of World War II, BME 
organising in Britain was based on geographical links such as to the ‘colonies’ and 
struggles for independence ‘back home’ (Brubaker, 2005). In addition, there were 
cultural/welfare groups which included faith organisations and activities such as education 
about heritage as well as providing advice to deal with the day to day realities of 
education, housing, working with young people, elders and so on (Goulbourne, 1990).  
 
The need for mutual aid amongst BME populations could not be separated from the racist 
context within which BME people existed in Britain. Some BME organising was explicitly 
political and aimed directly against racism (Gilroy, 1987; Ramdin, 1987, 1999; Sivanandan, 
1982; Shukra, 1998). Important early organising against racism typically followed lines of 
national ‘origins’ and specific anti-colonial struggles. For example, Indian Workers 
Associations (IWAs) were initially formed in various locations such as London and Coventry 
in the 1930s (Josephides, 1991). Though IWAs had different emphases, their major 
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concern appeared to be the independence of India. When this was achieved in 1947, IWAs 
still retained interest in Indian affairs but in a postcolonial context increasingly turned 
their attention to the conditions of people with Indian backgrounds living in Britain (Hiro, 
1971). With this ‘new’ focus in mind a number of IWAs were formed in Bradford, 
Birmingham, Nottingham and Southall and in 1958 the local IWAs were centralised to 
form the Indian Workers Associations (Great Britain) (IWA (GB)) in order to provide 
greater co-ordination of action (Josephides, 1991).  
 
In 1958 anti-black riots took place in Notting Hill as white people attacked the houses of 
West Indian residents (Brah, 1996; Solomos, 2003). This event prompted the founding of 
the West Indian Standing Conference in 1958 (Goulbourne, 1991). The impetus for the 
Standing Conference came from the High Commission of what was then the federated 
government of the West Indies, rather than from African-Caribbean immigrants to Britain. 
With high unemployment in the West Indies, the High Commission needed smooth 
settlement of West Indians into Britain to ensure that this channel of migration remained 
open (Heineman, 1972). However, when the West Indian Federation broke up in 1961, the 
Standing Conference became less focused on the West Indies and more attentive to the 
experience of West Indians in Britain and the discrimination that they faced (Shukra, 
1998). 
 
The building blocks of some kind of collective political ‘blackness’ were set in place in the 
early post-war period of the 1950s and 1960s as the British state homogenised people of 
African, Caribbean and South Asian heritage into the category of ‘coloured 
Commonwealth immigrants’ (Shukra, 1998) and/or simply saw a ‘black mass’ (Ramdin, 
1999). By the end of the 1960s, the orientation of black politics in Britain was based on 
‘black power’ and ‘black consciousness’, spurred on by envious glances across the Atlantic, 
where US civil rights organisations appeared to be at the heart of a vibrant mass 
movement in the late 1960s (Shukra, 1998). 
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Through the 1970s and the early 1980s black was a political colour (Sivanandan, 1990) 
that represented African-Caribbean and Asian ‘exclusion from Britain and Britishness’ 
(Gilroy, 2002: 323). Specifically, ‘the formation of an inclusive notion of blackness [was] 
configured as the political colour of opposition to racism’ (Back, 1994: 3).  Furthermore, 
blackness was ‘based on people’s direct, first hand, experience of racism; it has to do with 
how they are treated by ‘white’ society, rather than what culturally distinct groups they 
belong to’ (Jeffers, 1991: 63). Therefore (multi)culture in these arrangements was largely 
set to one side in favour of shared inequality experienced by black people. This 
construction of black politics both generalised and standardised the black experience 
across all BME people and emphasised the need for collective organising for race equality 
and other goals. Furthermore, there was something almost utopian about the idea of 
black:  
 
... despite their differences, the ‘black professional’ in a local authority 
social services department, the Afro-Caribbean ancillary in a hospital and 
the hip-hopping Asian youth of West London may all discover within that 
colour [of black] a medium through which to articulate their own 
experiences and make sense of their common exclusion from Britain and 
Britishness (Gilroy, 1987: 236). 
 
In this version of black, Paul Gilroy outlined the possibility of something demotic, 
solidaristic and perhaps even redemptive. Gilroy also signalled that these higher goals had 
to function in the context of ‘difference’ amongst black people. Working across such 
differences was never without its problems, even in the heyday of political blackness. The 
increased emphasis on ethnicity, in particular, challenged the notion of political blackness, 
as I discuss below. 
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4.2 Moving back from black  
By the 1980s, there were various developments that emphasised the difficulties facing 
black politics. For example, some social scientists had protested that the term ‘black’ was 
developed as a form of political coercion and argued that black specifically referred to the 
historical experience of people of sub-Saharan African descent and therefore was not 
meaningful when applied to Asians (Banton, 1977; Hazareesingh, 1986; Modood, 1988, 
1994). At the same time, the state increasingly began to view and treat ‘coloured 
Commonwealth immigrants’ differently (Sivanandan, 1990), for example along cultural 
lines. Asians, Africans and Caribbeans also experienced different kinds of structural 
positioning, disadvantage and socio-economic trajectories (Ramdin, 1999), implying the 
need for specific kinds of organising and intervention.  
 
In practical terms these complexities meant that an initiative such as the Organization of 
Women of African and Asian Descent, that was set up in the 1970s as a national body, 
declined in the 1980s, in part, because of culturally ‘specific’ issues facing particular BME 
‘communities’ (Brah, 1996: Griffin, 2003). In addition, there was a fragmenting of 
‘blackness’ such that the term ‘Asian’ was split off from ‘black’ (Brah, 1996; Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies., 1982; Solomos and Back, 1995). Furthermore, ‘Afro-
Caribbean’ became ‘African’ and ‘Caribbean’ and ‘Asian’ became ‘Indian’, ‘Pakistani’ and 
‘Bengali’ (Shukra, 1998: 59), as identities and identification became decentred, 
regionalised and nationalised (Hall, 1992b; St Louis, 2009).  
 
In addition, the process of splitting also contained a faith dimension and the difficulties of 
maintaining a coalition of political blackness were most famously exposed by the 
controversy over Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Verses (1988). The novel was 
condemned by some Muslims as blasphemous and led to some demonstrations such as a 
staged book-burning in Bradford in January 1989, as well as protests in Pakistan and other 
Muslim countries. In February 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwā against Rushdie 
(Solomos, 2003). The affair further encouraged debates about the multiple nature of the 
category black/BME (Hall, 1991b, 1992a; Modood, 1988, 1992) and also led to tensions on 
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the political left about appropriate responses. One instinct was to protect Muslims as a 
minority. In this spirit Labour MPs Bernie Grant and Keith Vaz argued for an extension of 
the blasphemy laws to cover Islam. Others on the left supported the right to criticise 
religion and were anxious about the political goals of religious groupings (Solomos, 2003).  
 
The Rushdie affair illustrated the potential tension between shared efforts against racism 
and specific ‘cultural’ priorities. It also encouraged what Arun Kundnani (2002) termed 
ethnic ‘fiefdoms’ – run by community ‘leaders’; notions of fixed cultural identity; and 
ethnic competition at the expense of collective black resistance. The Rushdie affair was 
also a reminder of Asian experiences and agendas that had been suppressed and silenced 
in certain articulations of blackness (Hall, 1991b, 1992a; Modood, 1988, 1992). As a result, 
by the New Labour period there were significant questions about the validity of an 
‘overarching’ BME-led approach to race equality given the multiple and multiplying nature 
of BMEness. 
 
4.3 New ethnicities  
Stuart Hall conceptualised this fragmentary and fraught drift away from political blackness 
in the idea of ‘new ethnicities’ (1991b, 1992a). He argued that new ethnicities 
represented a transition away from a simplified and unified idea of blackness: 
 
... the end of the essential black subject is something which people are 
increasingly debating, but they may not have fully reckoned with its 
political consequences… What this brings into play is the recognition of 
the immense diversity and differentiation of the historical and 
cultural experience of black subjects (Hall, 1992a: 254). 
 
For Hall, there were two phases in black cultural politics, each of which were, in different 
ways, ‘rooted in the politics of anti-racism and the post-war black experiences in Britain’ 
(Hall, 1992a: 252).  
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The first phase of this politics saw racism fought and resisted ‘behind the slogan of a Black 
politics and the Black experience’ (Hall, 1991b: 55). As Les Back stated, at this stage 
‘black… referred to a common response of racism and discrimination and that the use of 
positive black imagery was used to respond to reified notions of black culture’ (1994: 4). 
Therefore, BME organising against racism and race inequality ignored ethnicity and used 
blackness as a means of boosting the esteem of those counted as black. The second phase 
of this politics required engagement with ‘the extraordinary diversity of subjective 
positions, social experiences and cultural identities which compose the category ‘black’… 
[and] the recognition that ‘black’ is essentially a politically and culturally constructed 
category, which cannot be grounded in a set of fixed trans-cultural or transcendental 
racial categories and which therefore has no guarantees in nature’ (Hall, 1992a: 252).  
 
Hall’s articulation of new ethnicities was informed by the idea of the local and the global 
and the shifts in cultural politics implied by globalisation (1991a). This affected the old 
unitary form of Englishness, but also meant that the ‘Black experience [w]as a diaspora 
experience’ (Hall, 1990, 1991b), associated with the ‘deterritorialisation of identities in the 
contemporary world’ (Wahlbeck, 2002: 229); and unsettled notions of ‘home’ (Braziel and 
Mannur, 2003; Safran, 1991). For Hall, ‘[t]he diaspora experience… is defined, not by 
essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity’ (Hall, 
1990: 235). In other words, black/BME diasporic population was on the move culturally 
and Hall recognised the political implications of this. As a result, Hall argued that this 
second phase of black politics needed to work ‘with and through difference’ (Hall, 1992a: 
254), such that it might be able to organise coherently against racism whilst 
acknowledging heterogeneities and diverse BME positionalities (Hall, 1992a).  
 
Therefore, new ethnicities posed a specific conundrum for the idea of blackness and black 
politics: 
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… you are plunged headlong into the maelstrom of a continuously 
contingent, unguaranteed, political argument and debate: a critical 
politics, a politics of criticism. You can no longer conduct black politics 
through the strategy of a simple set of reversals, putting in the place of 
the bad old essential white subject, the new essentially good black 
subject (Hall, 1992a: 254). 
 
Blackness had become destabilised and black people could not be assumed to be one 
(good) thing and white people the (bad) other. Brett St Louis argued that this 
development ‘set black cultural activists adrift – ‘without guarantees’ – and left them to 
face the hard ethical labour of working out what their ideals, commitments and 
aspirations are and might be’ (St Louis, 2009: 571). The empirical chapters that follow 
illustrate some aspects of this ‘adriftness’, and the ways that BME-led race equality 
organisations have attempted to politically organise and intervene to cope with it.  
 
However, as Hall was careful to point out, one phase of black politics did not substitute 
and replace the other. Instead there was displacement, repositioning and reorganisation 
(Hall, 1991b), and the two phases in black cultural politics ‘constantly overlap and 
interweave’ (Hall, 1992a: 252). I would also argue that BME post-war politics in Britain was 
always subject to such repositioning and realignment. For example, though Hall and 
others described a first phase of black politics as a relatively inclusive political colour 
against racism, it was preceded, as described above, by ‘phase zero’ in which BME 
organising was conducted along national, regional and ‘cultural’ lines, as with the Indian 
Workers Associations and the West Indian Standing Conference. In practice, even at its 
height, the first phase of blackness could not exist without drawing on some (prior) idea of 
ethnic allegiance (Shukra, 1998). In effect, blackness was a ‘rounding up’ of different 
groups based on a range of factors associated with ethnicity including culture, skin 
‘colour’, ‘race’ and national ‘origins’; and new ethnicities could be seen as another part of 
the same process.  
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In addition to these difficult ongoing questions of how to configure black/BME politics, 
were other criticisms about the legitimacy of black/BME organising in the first place – an 
issue which I address below.  
 
4.4 Objections to black/BMEness  
Patterns of inequality for black/BME people have resulted in collective black/BME-led 
responses against such disadvantage (Brah and Coombes, 2000; 1990 Trust, 2005; 
Voice4Change England, 2007a). There are clear benefits to collective resistance to 
subordination (McRobbie, 2009) by those disproportionally affected by racism. Shared 
difference can ‘manifest itself in solidarity, in shared dispositions or consciousness, or in 
collective action’ (Brubaker, 2004: 34). The practice of that collective action can also itself 
be politicising (Sivanandan, 1982) and lay foundations for further action and identification 
(Calhoun, 1994).  
 
However, black/BME-led organising has faced criticism from various perspectives for being 
‘differentialist’ (Wieviorka, 1997). One set of concerns about differentialism were related 
to earlier criticisms about multiculture and multiculturalism and the effects that it might 
have on national or collective life. For example differentialism concerned liberals because 
it brought into doubt the neutrality of the state (Barry, 2000). In addition it threatened the 
nation so prized by the political right (Hall, 2000). Black/BMEness also created concerns 
for the political left too as they worried about issues such as race and class solidarity 
(Sivanandan, 1990).  
 
A second set of concerns about differentialism focussed particularly on the human and 
cultural consequences of constructing group identity for political purposes. These included 
anxieties that black/BME lines reified groupness (Bhatt, 2004; Brah, 1992; Brubaker, 2004) 
and essentialised and foreclosed notions of black/BMEness (Alleyne, 2002b; Brah, 1992; 
Mercer, 1994; St Louis, 2009; West, 1990). Pnina Werbner usefully summed up the 
multiple dangers of essentialising in the following way:  
66 
 
 
To essentialise is to impute a fundamental, basic, absolutely necessary 
constitutive quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious 
community, or nation. It is to posit falsely a timeless continuity, a 
discreteness or boundedness in space, and an organic unity. It is to imply 
an internal sameness and external difference or otherness (1997: 228). 
 
Essentialisation homogenised categories of people as permanently and irrevocably 
different in order to provide political coherence. This, however, could paradoxically 
replicate racism’s exclusionary and partitioning modes (Bhatt, 2004; Goldberg and 
Solomos, 2002). For example, one dimension of partitioning revolved around ‘the idea of 
there being a corporate black history and identity which is accessible only to individuals by 
virtue of their experience of being black… [making] racism… specifically a black 
experience’ (Shukra, 1998: 41).  
 
Rogers Brubaker (2004) coined the term ‘ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ to describe a 
category of corporatising political actor that reified group identity for political (as well as 
perhaps personal) ends. These entrepreneurs viewed and presented social, economic, 
political and other phenomenon as group phenomenon. Such actors – who might include 
government politicians and activists in BME-led organisations – attempted to ensure that 
‘communities’ could be imagined as coherent and totalised entities in order that political 
work might be carried out in their name.  
 
In some cases, black/BME political ‘representatives’ and community advocates have been 
criticised for ‘unethical’ practices. For example, they have been labelled ‘compradors’ 
(Sivanandan, 1990) – a type of political operator or trader functioning between powerful 
elites and wider constituencies. Elsewhere, the term ‘tenderpreneurs’ has been employed 
as a pejorative in post-Apartheid South Africa to describe those masquerading as servants 
of the people and using positions of influence to secure government tenders and 
contracts (Feinstein, 2010; Gilroy, 2012).  
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Therefore, from a number of different perspectives – national, cultural, political and 
conceptual – BME political organising and representing has been deemed problematic. 
The BME-led race equality organisations that I examine in my fieldwork operated against 
this backdrop of, at best, scepticism and at worst, cynicism for their groupist inclinations 
and manipulations. However, while it is correct to scrutinise such forms of organising, 
BME political activity has been too easily dismissed as sectarian – representing nothing 
more than black interests – while white-led or non-black political activity has not generally 
been viewed in the same way (Brah, 1992). As Donna Haraway has perceptively noted, the 
term ‘special interest groups’ was applied to those disagreeing with policy/political 
orthodoxy (1988: 575) so that their interests could be more easily dismissed. Conversely, 
the default ‘white-led’ political position adopted in ‘mainstream’ policymaking and civil 
society was considered unremarkable and came without the health warnings associated 
with BME organising. Sayyid recognised this in the passage below.  
 
What I want to suggest is that any critique of essentialism which is not 
also a critique of universalism is problematic, and should perhaps be 
understood as likely to serve as another strategic ploy within the armoury 
of western supremacist discourse. If a critique of essentialism is to be 
mounted, in good faith, it can be done only by extending the critique to 
universalism itself. No doubt Islamists make use of essentialism, but to 
point this out, without pointing out that the western project itself is also 
equally essentialist, seems to be at best eccentric and at worst 
mendacious. The conflict between Islamism  and western supremacist 
discourses can be seen as a conflict between particularity and 
universalism only if one makes the particularity of the West unmarked 
and natural (Sayyid, 2000: 267-268). 
 
Sayyid's original point was specific to the West and Islam but can equally be applied to 
white and black/BME dividing lines. Sayyid suggested that the West/White was a 
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‘supremacist’ form of universalism that (along with Islam) was also essentialised and 
imposed on events. However, it was rarely named as such as it was normalised and made 
invisible. Furthermore, it has also been argued that ‘strategic’ essentialism may be 
justified as part of collective minority political struggles (Alleyne, 2002a; Brah, 1992; Fuss, 
1990; Spivak, 1987). In this way political actors could ‘knowingly’ undifferentiate people 
(Spivak, 1985), providing that this was carried out in a ‘laudable oppositional political 
spirit’ (Ang and St Louis, 2005: 297). 
 
4.5 BME politics and the state 
After all was said and done about the basis of black/BME organising and the difficulties of 
collectivising, there was still a question of how black/BME political entities could best 
promote the interests of BME people in Britain. Here I want to delve further into the 
practice of black/BME politics as a prelude to the empirical material to come. In particular, 
given that the BME-led race equality organisations that I focus on in my thesis have 
chosen to promote race equality by engaging with state policy actors, I consider some of 
the ways in the post war period that black/BME political actors have worked with (and 
against) the state in the cause of race equality. This topic is important because it raises 
questions about incorporation of civil society by the state (Passey and Tonkiss, 2000). At 
the same time, it is difficult to ignore the state, because of the way that state actors can 
enforce ethnic preferences in the nation, as described in section two of this chapter.  
 
A useful starting point for thinking about black/BME organising is the example cited above 
of Paul Gilroy’s notion of black alliances between ‘the ‘black professional’ in a local 
authority social services department, the Afro-Caribbean ancillary in a hospital and the 
hip-hopping Asian youth of West London’ (1987: 236). 
 
Such informal, non-hierarchical alliances were very different to the formal BME-led race 
equality organisations that I study. The alliance of people from different walks of life that 
Gilroy imagined was potentially political, but not in the sense of ‘organised’ civil society. 
Instead this version of black appeared to be the unorganised (and perhaps unorganisable) 
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black politics of the ‘street’ – with a pre-disposition to work against and in resistance to 
the state (Kundnani, 2002). 
 
The BME-led race equality organisations that I study are different: more institutionalised, 
less ‘grassroots’ and, significantly, working with state actors. These organisations have 
taken their lead from initiatives such as the Campaign Against Racist Discrimination 
(CARD), which emerged after a December 1964 meeting in London between Martin Luther 
King and British BME activists (Anwar, 1991; Heineman, 1972). CARD was a coalition of 
black and white antiracism (Shukra, 1998) aimed at influencing ‘central government, 
Parliament, and the media and to building a mass united front for coloured immigrants 
and their children’ (Anwar, 1991: 42). CARD was a blueprint for subsequent ‘engaged’ 
policy-orientated work of BME-led race equality organisations that followed. CARD also 
became embroiled in controversy about involvement with state actors (Josephides, 1991) 
– particularly over how close it should be to the Labour party (Shukra, 1998). This, 
alongside the problems of internal power politics (Heineman, 1972; Solomos, 2003), led to 
CARD’s decline as a political force in the late 1960s (Shukra, 1998).  
 
The model of (relatively) institutionalised and state-connected organising has been one of 
the prominent features of what has been dubbed the ‘race relations industry’ (Anthias 
and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Kalka, 1991; Lawrence, 1982; Tompson, 1988). This, often 
disparaging, term has been coined to describe a formalised, state-sponsored approach to 
promoting ‘harmonious’ relationships in society (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). The 
industry was flexible to the extent that it could accommodate different approaches to this 
problem. For example, at times multiculturalism dominated, with the understanding that 
society was made up of essentially different communities and cultures (Anthias and Yuval-
Davis, 1992). The industry could also incorporate anti-racist elements into its operation 
with the emphasis on political blackness and the discrimination and disadvantages of 
black people (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). Both of these positions had their 
weaknesses. In the case of multiculturalism, these limits have been somewhat discussed 
above and included other problematic assumptions, such as a lack of culture amongst 
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African-Caribbean people and ‘strong’ culture of Asian people (Lawrence, 1982). The limits 
to anti-racism of this form could be described in terms of failure to engage with BME 
differences and over-simplistic ideas of the ‘black experience’ (Ballard, 1992; Cross, 1991; 
Gilroy, 1992).  
 
The industry was comprised at various points in time of institutions such as the Race 
Relations Board and Community Relations Councils, introduced in the 1965 Race Relations 
Act, and the Commission for Racial Equality that superseded them in the 1975 Race 
Relations Act (Tompson, 1988). In addition, there were various posts such as equal 
opportunities advisors in state and state-supported institutions (Ballard, 1992); as well as 
measures in some local authorities, ‘such as ethnic monitoring, positive action, contract 
compliance and outreach community work’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 161). There 
were also, famously, (multicultural) grants for ethnic minority groups and organisations, 
for example the Greater London Council (Gilroy, 1987; Tompson, 1988). Even where these 
grants were administered by the local state, they were often backed by national 
government. By way of illustration, local authorities were able to access the Conservative 
government’s Urban Programme and this funding went disproportionately to black groups 
(Tompson, 1988).  
 
Perhaps most importantly, critics argued that, through involvement in this ‘official’, state-
sponsored race relations industry, black political leadership became ‘quangoized’ and on 
the ‘payroll of a local council’ (Tompson, 1988: 108) and that activists for race equality 
were being incorporated into career streams and into ‘the state’s design’ (Ramdin, 1987: 
496). This, in turn, meant that these theatres of action were divorced from BME people 
and their everyday experiences (Tompson, 1988). Through such processes, state-funded, 
BME-led race equality organisations had become enmeshed in, if ultimately not influential 
on, policymaking. The BME-led race equality organisations studied in my thesis were, 
during the New Labour period, embroiled in such relationships with the state and 
questions about influence.  
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5 Conclusions: Drawing the line – nation, multiculture and BME 
organising  
In this chapter, I have outlined three parts of the field of study that my empirical work on 
race equality engages with: i.e., nation; multiculture and BME organising. The construction 
of the nation as simultaneously primordial and stable and also modern and evolving has 
left and continues to leave BME people in an ambiguous national position. They are at 
odds with the nation as well as emblematic of its modern face (Hall, 2000). Multiculture 
names and notices the position of BME people and difference in the nation. However, 
naming this difference presents its own difficulties in that it may re-invigorate race 
thinking (Bhatt, 2004) and essentialise and reify culture (Brah, 1992; Brubaker, 2004). Both 
nation and multiculture may serve to de-couple questions of equality and difference 
(Yuval-Davis, 1999) and set aside concerns about structural and historical disadvantage 
(Goldberg and Solomos, 2002). Furthermore, they may organise collective life in ways that 
are undesirable. As Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis observe:  
 
Wherever a delineation of boundaries takes place, as is the case with 
every ethnic and national collectivity, processes of exclusion and inclusion 
are in operation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 39). 
 
The new ethnicities debate (Hall, 1991b, 1992a) helps us to think about the way that that 
lines and boundaries of black/BME politics have developed in the post-war period in 
response to racism in the nation. In particular, the earlier comforts of political blackness 
that downplayed (multi)culture in favour of a singular contestation (and experience) of 
racism was confronted with complex,  contingent and unfixed black diversity, alongside 
the continued existence of and need to resist racism.  
 
It is from this unstable platform, destabilised by new ethnicities and problematic notions 
of nation and ethnicity, that BME race equality actors engaged in questions of collective 
national life, multiculture and race equality in the New Labour period.  
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In the next chapter, my first empirical one, I explore the discursive theme of ‘proportional 
multiculture’ that was significant in the early New Labour period. This initial period 
emphasised greater race equality and the legitimate place of BME organising in advancing 
this cause. For a while, at least, it appeared to set aside tensions in black/BME organising 
and between multiculture and nation. Even in this early ‘honeymoon’ period, it appeared 
that such tensions were never too far away. 
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Chapter 3 Towards proportional multiculture 
1 Introduction  
As described in chapter one, New Labour came into power promising to find Britain a 
favourable place in a globalised and changing world and to become more at ease with 
itself on the domestic front. Renewal, change and progress were central New Labour 
themes (L’Hôte and Lemmens, 2009) as the party argued that Britain had to remember its 
national past as well as to engage with a multicultural and an international future.  
 
This study centres on the examination of how nation and national collective life was 
connected to multiculture and race equality in different discourses over the New Labour 
period. I argue that, broadly speaking, policy discourses on nation, multiculture and race 
equality were organised in different themes across three phases of the New Labour 
period. The first discursive theme was ‘proportional multiculture’ where the emphasis was 
on a fairer and more proportional share of the spoils of national life through (limited) 
efforts on race equality. This was the dominant policy discourse of multiculture in the 
period from 1995-2000 when New Labour was in opposition and in its first term in office. 
The second overarching theme of policy discourse of multiculture came to the fore 
between 2001 and 2007 and was centred on policymaker concerns about ‘parallel’ 
multiculture along distinct and antagonistic multicultural lines. The third policy discourse 
theme that I have identified, which was active between 2006 and 2010, downplayed 
multicultural difference or sought to ‘pause’ multiculture and to sideline it by placing 
greater emphasis on conceptions of life in Britain outside its scope, specifically through a 
re-emphasis on citizenship, nation and de-racialised aspects of equality. Parallel and 
paused multiculture will be the subjects of chapters four and five, respectively, whilst in 
this chapter, I focus on the construct of proportional multiculture and the early part of the 
New Labour period.   
 
Proportional multiculture was connected to an idea of ‘multicultural democracy’ with its 
‘gestures towards cultural diversity and inclusion’ (Back, 2002). Multicultural democracy 
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aimed to make room for BME people and one could optimistically view it as an escape 
from the notion of dominant and non-dominant groups (Van den Berghe, 2003) and 
consistent with the idea that cultural diversity might even become part of the self-
understanding of the nation (Parekh, 2000).  
 
However, one of the dangers of the focus on multiculture and the multicultural was its 
disconnection from questions of race equality – placing the emphasis on diversity, but not 
attending to the material disadvantages and everyday realities of being ‘different’. This 
problem stemmed from tensions between difference and equality.  
 
Equality can be viewed as opposite to diversity, as equality refers to equivalence and 
diversity to difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Yet, there would be no need to call for 
equality without difference (Scott, 1994). The crux of the issue is that some (cultural) 
‘differences’ were seen as desirable and chosen by certain people whilst others, such as 
race inequality, were undesirable consequences of difference. As a result, the response to 
inequality is not to erase all variations between people but rather to intervene for equality 
in limited ways ‘eliminating not all differences, but a particular set of differences, and a 
different set at different times and places’ (Walzer, 1983: xii). Therefore, a (degree) of 
justice and equality is necessary to enable commonality in a context of multicultural 
diversity (Phillips, 1999) and, furthermore, race equality may require differential and 
additional rights granted to certain groups in order to allow them to participate on a full 
and equal basis in society (Parekh, 2000).  
 
New Labour’s project for equality in this early part of its existence appeared to ensure that 
existing formal and universal rights were enforced so that BME people might, in time, be 
represented somewhat proportionately to their size in the overall population across 
different spheres of national life. This meant to be less well represented as perpetrators of 
crime in the criminal justice system and to be better represented amongst the ranks of 
holders of top public and private jobs. BME-led race equality organisations for their part 
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aspired to the goal of BME people ‘participating equally in British life’ (Khan, 2007: 55) and 
emphasised that BME people were being disproportionately denied such opportunity.  
 
2 Things can only get better 
The New Labour period can be said to have officially commenced in 1995 after the 
revision of Clause IV of the party’s constitution. The Clause was originally drafted by 
Sydney Webb in 1917 and adopted in 1918 at a meeting at Methodist Central Hall with 
amendments in 1928 and 1960 (cited in Rentoul, 1995: 458-459). The new Clause IV was 
adopted by a special conference – also at Methodist Central Hall – on 19 April 1995 
(Rentoul, 1995) and contained five parts and notably replaced ‘common ownership of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange’ (cited in Rentoul, 1995: 458) in the 1917 
version with ‘power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the few’ 
(cited in Rentoul, 1995: 461) – thus shifting the party away from public ownership of key 
industries. Other features of the revised Clause of particular importance to the interests 
outlined in this study included its emphasis on community, rights and duties and tolerance 
(cited in Rentoul, 1995). Together these themes highlighted New Labour’s commitment 
to: the notion of national collective (community); ‘diversity’ and multiculture (tolerance); 
the idea that what citizens could expect from the nation was positively correlated with 
what they contributed to it (rights and duties); and some idea of racial justice. 
 
In 1995, in his second year as Labour leader, Tony Blair called for a national project 
capable of healing rifts in the diverse and divided nation: 
 
… for far too long it [the Conservative party] has left us defining ourselves 
as a nation, not by what unites us, but by what divides us: a class system, 
unequal and antiquated; a social fabric, tattered and torn; a politics 
where dogma so often drives out common sense; even an education 
system where one part of the nation is taught apart from the other; and 
where, if we do not change course now, we will have two classes of 
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health service, two classes of state school, two Britains, one on welfare, 
the other paying for it... 
 
Let us rouse ourselves to a new moral purpose for our nation to build a 
new and young country that can lay aside all the prejudices that have 
dominated our land for generations, a nation for all the people, built by 
all the people, old divisions cast out, a new spirit in the nation, working 
together in unity, solidarity, partnership – one Britain (Blair, 1995). 
 
Blair identified New Labour as the party of one nation and attempted to take this mantle 
from the divisive Conservatives that had abandoned Disraeli’s vision of national unity.20 
The vocabulary used was elemental – it was about land, people and spirit and it was also 
national with the emphasis on the ‘country’, ‘Britain’ and ‘the nation’. In some ways, the 
line on ‘two Britains’ was standard fare in criticising an incumbent government, but what 
was more interesting was New Labour’s decision to pair something old – the idea of one 
nation – with the need for a ‘new and young country’. The speech contained a moral, even 
biblical dimension – even though at this time Blair was not ‘out’ about his own religious 
convictions – that Britain should be resurrected, redeemed and the mistakes of the past 
could be washed away.  
 
Around this time, BME-led race equality organisations were involved and invited to assist 
New Labour in devising the blueprint for the reconstructed nation whilst New Labour was 
still in opposition. This was in line with one aspect of the new Clause IV of the party which 
emphasised that Labour would collaborate with ‘trade unions and co-operative societies 
and also with voluntary organisations, consumer groups and other representative bodies’ 
(cited in Rentoul, 1995: 462) in order to advance its political aims. BME-led race equality 
organisations and activists fitted the bill, as both ‘voluntary organisations’ and 
                                                     
20
 This attempt to claim Conservative ground was repeated by the current leader of the Labour party, Ed 
Miliband (2012). 
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‘representative bodies’, in that they claimed to speak for a section of society typically 
unrepresented or underrepresented in policy development. 
 
This BME input into New Labour’s policy process was formalised when an advisor with 
knowledge of the BME voluntary and community sector was seconded to work with 
Labour’s opposition spokesperson on Home Affairs, Alun Michael (2011, Interview). The 
advisor, David Weaver, was a Trustee of the 1990 Trust, a leading race equality 
organisation, and was employed as a consultant to work with Michael to specifically act as 
a bridge between New Labour and the BME voluntary and community sector: 
 
… what David [Weaver] managed to do was to get people who are quite 
angry to trust him and me sufficiently to sit down and talk sensibly about 
the challenges they were going through. And that allowed you to get past 
the anger to why is this happening (Alun Michael, 2011, Interview). 
 
The fact that New Labour were prepared to engage with David Weaver illustrated that 
they believed that a BME perspective existed; that it could be represented; and that it had 
been missing from government. Alun Michael valued the role of David Weaver as an 
interlocutor and in particular his ability to act as a firewall and to protect Michael from 
direct BME anger, converting those raw emotions into political dialogue and policy ideas. 
Michael was clear that the best mode of dialogue between New Labour and BME activists 
was ‘to sit down and talk sensibly’ in something akin to the protocols of formal politics. 
For Kundnani, this process of institutionalisation sacrificed the essence of black political 
struggle: 
 
[It] meant taking black culture off the streets – where it had been 
politicised and turned into a rebellion against the state – and putting it in 
the council chamber, in the classroom and on the television, where it 
could be institutionalised, managed and reified (Kundnani, 2002). 
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Kundnani, contrary to David Weaver and Alun Michael, understood the street as the 
natural or appropriate site of and for ‘black culture’ as that was the place where black 
politics had been formed as an unruly and rebellious struggle against the state. However 
that was in itself a (competing) form of reification of black politics and another vision of 
how social change could be achieved. Rather than revisit the earlier discussion outlined in 
chapter two about the trade-offs associated with BME policy work, the point to be made 
here is that New Labour policymakers, including Alun Michael, attempted to introduce a 
familiar structure and pattern of politics to the question of BME challenges and that, 
despite the potential corseting effects of this mode of operating, numerous BME-led race 
equality organisations and BME political activists were willing to engage on these terms.  
 
We definitely invested a lot of time thinking around the Labour party 
[and] people like Alun Michael who led on the voluntary sector... In terms 
of coming to 97 and a New Labour government then, without being 
political, there was a sense there'd be a step change in the way that BME 
communities were perceived and supported and especially the voluntary 
sector and that we would have more of a footing and an influence in 
decision-making and also delivery of services... [O]n the positive side, 
doors were opened for the BME sector to have a formal footing in 
government structures... (Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview). 
 
Jeremy Crook from BTEG did not share Kundnani’s concerns about formal politics. The 
precariousness of BME communities and BME-led voluntary sector organisations 
necessitated and warranted the investment that BTEG and other BME-led organisations 
made into New Labour during the party’s time in opposition. Crook justified the 
engagement as a way to combat precariousness and it offered the prospect of ‘more of a 
footing’ and ‘a formal footing’ that marked out a transition from BME people and 
organisations from the margins into a rightful, central and secure position in the nation. 
For Jeremy Crook, BME voluntary sector organisations were most effective if they had a 
place connected to government structures. 
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Though Crook justified BTEG’s engagement with New Labour in the early days of the 
latter, he also contrasted that early period to the time when the interview took place (in 
2011), when it was clear that BME-led race equality organisations were much further from 
the centre of government. In that early moment, New Labour was providing discursive 
signals that they were committed to race equality – and not just in the comfort of 
opposition when policymakers could be fast and loose with pledges in order to win 
support. 
 
Once in government, New Labour continued to present the case for race equality – or at 
least against discrimination. For example, in his 1997 Leader’s speech at the party 
conference Tony Blair noted the discrepancy between the high-minded idea of Britain and 
the real-life experiences of BME people. 
 
We cannot be a beacon to the world unless the talents of all the people 
shine through. Not one black High Court Judge; not one black Chief 
Constable or Permanent Secretary. Not one black Army officer above the 
rank of Colonel. Not one Asian either. Not a record of pride for the British 
establishment. And not a record of pride for the British Parliament that 
there are so few black and Asian MPs. I am against positive 
discrimination. But there is no harm in reminding ourselves just how 
much negative discrimination there is (Blair, 1997).21 
 
                                                     
21 This was a theme that Blair returned to in the wake of the 9/11 bombings and when Blair was supporting 
the good in American life: ‘I think of a black man, born in poverty, who became chief of their armed forces 
and is now secretary of state Colin Powell and I wonder frankly whether such a thing could have happened 
here’ (Blair, 2001). 
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The excerpt encapsulated Blair’s grand project for the nation and his wish for Britain to 
take its place (again) as a leading light (‘beacon’) on the world stage. He connected this 
desire for world greatness, to which conservative forces in Britain would surely agree, 
with a more difficult observation about racial discrimination. He did not criticise the 
private sector or use them to illustrate his point, but focused closer to home and talked 
about the visible absence of BME people from senior ranks of public service. There may 
have been an ulterior motive at work in that New Labour sought public service reform and 
modernisation (Brooks, 2007; Needham, 2007) and pointing to the failings of the public 
sector served that agenda. More specifically, Blair realised that his reforms required an 
‘enemy’ such as the British establishment. However, in this passage and argument BME 
people were painted as equally deserving of high office as their white counterparts and 
that their absence from top jobs was ascribed only to failings of a system rather than 
shortcomings of BME people themselves. Even though BME people were the innocents 
and exempt from criticism in the excerpt, Blair made it clear that discrimination was the 
problem and that he would not replace negative discrimination with its positive 
counterpart. So, although New Labour was sensitive to unequal outcomes in senior posts 
in the public service, its interest was not to achieve equality of outcomes (Blair, 2004; 
Phillips, 1999). Instead it favoured equality of opportunities (Hills et al., 2009) that over 
time might not equalise outcomes but that could erase some of the starker 
disproportionate features of British life by rewarding ‘talent’.  
 
One of the ways that exemplified the change that was in the air in this early period of New 
Labour was the advent of ‘Cool Britannia’. This term was used in 1996 by Ben & Jerry’s ice 
cream as a name of one of its products. This was ironic because, ultimately, the concept 
turned out to be a piece of confectionary (Bayley, 1998). Stryker McGuire’s article for 
Newsweek magazine (McGuire and Elliott, 1996) was heralded as the naming of this 
moment even though the article did not use the actual term ‘Cool Britannia’. McGuire 
argued that London, rather than Britain, was the ‘coolest city on the planet’; citing the 
fashion, club scene and new money in the city as its pulsating heartbeat. This image could 
not really have taken hold nationally under the distinctly ‘uncool’ Prime Minister John 
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Major – even though Major did try to exploit the idea22 – but it was something that New 
Labour and the not altogether untrendy Tony Blair could appeal to and encourage, not 
just as the spirit of London, but as the epitome of a nation renewed.  
 
There were, as with all attempts to name a moment, questions about what and who that 
naming was for. A leader article in The Economist argued that this construct was not only 
or even mainly for a domestic audience but was part of an attempt to rebuild Britain’s 
standing in the world: 
 
Worried by opinion polls suggesting that foreigners regard Britain as 
backward-looking, and keen to burnish its image for dynamism, the Blair 
government is intent on presenting Britain as a modern, thrusting type of 
nation (The Economist, 1998: 20). 
 
Brit art, pop and lit were all hip and its shining stars were invited into Downing Street in 
the early days for champagne receptions (Hodgson, 2003). There were also attempts to 
co-opt some of these cultural producers into the New Labour project, e.g. through Panel 
2000 which brought together government ministers and cultural luminaries ‘to replace a 
myth of an old Britain with the reality of the modern Britain’ (Cook, 1998, cited in De 
Michelis, 2008: 410).  
 
As ‘Cool Britannia’ was essentially an idea of swinging London stretched, somewhat 
unconvincingly, across the nation as a whole, London’s multiculture was fundamental to 
its ideas. Stuart Hall argued that the ‘multi-cultural metropolises’ were the ‘cool’ in ‘Cool 
Britannia’ (Hall, 2000).23 Though, certainly the idea required multicultural diversity – in 
                                                     
22
 As Stryker McGuire noted: ‘It was odd to hear John Major cite from it [the "London Rules" article] during a 
Mansion House address. When you heard Mr Major talk about the youthfulness and vibrancy of London, it 
had a hollow ring’ (McGuire, 2002).  
23
 Hall also called the idea Cool Britannia a ‘new Labour fantasy’ (Hall, 2000b: 2).  
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part because it was a message to the wider world from which those cultures came – ‘Cool 
Britannia’ was fundamentally white or a white interpretation of the delights of 
multiculture. Its embodiments were rarely from BME backgrounds or even necessarily 
from London but ‘Cool Britannia’ required proximity to newness and BME people and 
communities were one way in which the old and fusty Britain could be left behind. It was a 
frame inside which Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary could claim Chicken Tikka Massala24 
as an exemplary British multicultural dish (Cook, 2001) and New Labour could insist, in 
2000, that every colour was ‘a good colour’ (cited in Runnymede Trust, 2000: 40).  
 
As well as (sometimes vacuous or frothy) talk there was policy action from New Labour to 
make the lives of some BME people in Britain easier and more commensurate with those 
of their non-BME fellows. One early change was the abolition of the ‘primary purpose 
rule’ (Home Office, 1997) – enabling non UK national spouses, fiancés and children that 
were outside of the country to follow their spouse into Britain without needing to prove 
that the marriage was not entered into primarily to obtain admission to the UK. The 
change occurred soon after Labour came into power in 1997, fulfilling a Manifesto 
promise (Labour Party, 1997: 35). According to Home Secretary Jack Straw this meant that 
‘Entry Clearance Officers are being instructed not to refuse entry clearance applications 
where the refusal depends solely on the primary purpose rule’ (BBC, 1997). This 
particularly benefited people with backgrounds in the Indian subcontinent that wished to 
participate in ‘arranged’ marriages (Barot et al., 1999).  
 
Interestingly, the change in the primary purpose rule meant that those applying for 
residency did not have to show that the primary purpose of marriage was not to obtain 
British residency it was now up to immigration officials to prove that this was the principal 
                                                     
24
 In a speech to the Social Market Foundation Cook claimed: 
Chicken Tikka Massala is now a true British national dish, not only because it is the most popular, 
but because it is a perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences. 
Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish. The Massala sauce was added to satisfy the desire of British people 
to have their meat served in gravy (Cook, 2001). 
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motive (BBC, 1997). The change in policy therefore was reflected in a symbolic shift that 
meant that some BME people no longer had to prove themselves to Britain or the British 
state and rather the default position that they and their families were part of Britain. As 
former Home Office Minister, Fiona Mactaggart noted. 
 
I think that [amending the primary purpose rule] was a very significant 
change that we introduced to say that we rejected the Tory position of 
treating south Asian migrant marriage traditions as somehow suspicious 
(Fiona Mactaggart, 2011, Interview). 
 
For Mactaggart, this change was a significant switch of emphasis and a break from the 
Conservatives. Elsewhere, Home Secretary Jack Straw argued that the rule was being 
ended because:  
 
… it is arbitrary, unfair and ineffective and has penalised genuine cases, 
divided families and unnecessarily increased the administrative burden on 
the immigration system (Straw, cited in BBC, 1997).  
 
In doing so Straw justified and grounded the change in ideas of natural and social justice in 
that the rule was ‘unfair’ to ‘genuine cases’ whilst not denying that some cases were 
fraudulent. Perhaps most skilfully Straw argued that the existing measures ‘divided 
families’ – a device that made the measures more difficult to criticise for the apparently 
‘family-friendly’ Conservatives. As well as putting himself on the side of families Straw was 
against waste and placing unnecessary ‘administrative burden’ on the immigration 
system. The implication was that this distracted the immigration service from its ‘real’ job 
of being firm on more dubious immigrants. Therefore the discursive case assembled 
around the removal of the rule was both socially just as well as defensible against criticism 
from the right.  
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While the change was symbolically powerful and of practical importance to families that 
were affected the increase in immigrants appeared to be relatively small. The figure for 
spouses given limited leave to enter (excluding European Economic Area and Swiss 
Nationals) was just under 21,000 in 1996 (Home Office, 2005: 40) to just over 42,000 in 
2007 (Home Office, 2008: 54). It was not clear how much of the additional figure was 
related to the abolition of the primary purpose rule or that those gaining limited leave to 
enter would seek to settle in the United Kingdom. However, it appeared that the abolition 
of the primary purpose rule made relatively little contribution to increased immigration. 
 
2.1 Better things for BME people 
There was optimism about New Labour amongst some BME race equality campaigners 
after a particularly bleak period prior to New Labour: 
 
... basically through the 80s it was all the issues of stop and search 
policing; and that was really a, you know, a pretty bad time for black 
communities, especially young black people. And then in the early 90s 
there was a lot of organisation by the British National Party and that's 
when Stephen Lawrence was killed in 93 (Karen Chouhan, 2011, 
Interview). 
 
Karen Chouhan, the one-time Chief Executive of the 1990 Trust, painted the time before 
New Labour as a desolate one in which black people were harassed both by the state – in 
the form of the police – and by organised civil society racists in the form of the British 
National Party. It was against this backdrop that New Labour’s positive words were 
interpreted by race equality campaigners as a constructive force and efforts to make room 
for multicultural diversity in the initial phase of the New Labour period saw it labelled a 
‘radical hour’ (Pilkington, 2008). However, perhaps instead of a ‘radical hour’, this was a 
pragmatic hour, where the Labour party returned the favour of being the beneficiaries of 
BME votes (Anwar and Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 1998; Saggar, 2000). 
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Another practical benefit was that action for race equality helped to dampen down 
Labour’s longstanding problem over accusations of racism in the party and the attempts of 
the ‘Black Section’ movement to advance black representation and status within the 
Labour party (Jeffers, 1991; Ramesh, 1997; Saggar, 2000). 
 
Despite these practical drivers, Karen Chouhan (2011, Interview) stated that there was a 
sense of progress amongst black/BME anti-racist activists: ‘I mean we felt pretty hopeful... 
that things could happen as a result of community organising. So yeah we did feel that 
there was change in the air’.  
 
It appeared, in terms of race equality, that progress was being made, as New Labour’s 
election song, Things can only get better, had promised. Just as there were some new 
concessions, such as the abolition of the primary purpose rule, there was new money too 
as government supported multicultural democracy with new multi-million pound Home 
Office funding for BME voluntary and community organisations to provide more inputs 
into policy and community development (Home Office, 1999a).  
  
Labour started in earnest to think about policy and innovative ways of 
bridging the gap [with BME voters]. Two things happened – even before 
they were elected – Jack Straw said to Black Britain…, and specifically to 
Doreen Lawrence, that if you vote Labour you would be afforded the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry; which changed the way every institution had 
to deal with race in 1997. And secondly, in Tony Blair's first speech after 
he got elected, I remember speaking with Faz Hakim on, you know, on 
this input – she was a special adviser at Downing Street – she inserted 
into Tony Blair's speech that we cannot be a beacon of society whilst we 
have so few MPs; whilst we have so few black officers. He gave a list of 
things. This discourse had never been... [said]... by a Prime Minister. And 
so you can see that there was a recognition that something dramatic 
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needed to change and 1997 was the start of that. So it started off well 
(Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview).   
 
For Simon Woolley, from OBV, New Labour had ‘started off well’ both rhetorically and in 
policy terms. In particular New Labour appeared to be willing to strike a political deal with 
‘Black Britain’, for example the promise of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in exchange for 
political votes. This move both recognised the travails of being black in Britain and 
acknowledged the idea of blackness as an agentic political force. Woolley also used Blair’s 
1997 Autumn Labour party conference (as cited earlier in this section), where the Prime 
Minister highlighted the absence of black people from various parts of public life, as 
evidence of a new politics where black insiders and advisors (in this case, Faz Hakim) were 
close to and influential in government.  
 
The disproportionate absence of BME people in successful positions in British society that 
had been noted by Blair was the raison d'être of the three BME-led race equality 
organisations that I have studied. As outlined in chapter one, these organisations made 
sense of the world in terms of relatively poor results for BME people across education, 
employment, criminal justice and so on. For example, in 1999 OBV detailed the extent of 
the disproportionality that they were working against. 
 
There are:  
only nine Black MPs out of 651 (only two women);  
only five Black circuit judges, (none women);  
two Blacks in senior Civil Service positions, out of 805 (grade 4 and 
above); 
There are also severe shortfalls in other key public services. (OBV, 1999b: 
unnumbered).  
 
OBV painted a picture of a BME gap. Life in Britain was disproportionally difficult for BME 
people as evidenced by under-representation in these good jobs and because white 
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people were over-represented in them. Reapportionment was required. Nine BME MPs 
out of 651 in total amounted to 1.4 per cent compared to the 2001 Census data that 
showed that 7.6 per cent of the United Kingdom’s population was BME – which would 
have translated proportionately into 49 MPs. In 2000, OBV committed itself explicitly to 
proportional outcomes by stating that ‘[t]he challenge of achieving proportionate levels of 
representation in the political and civic arenas is our core business’ (OBV, 2000a: 
unnumbered). 
  
Jeremy Crook from BTEG highlighted that it wasn’t just the disproportionality that 
mattered but the location of the discrepancies was also important. In particular he viewed 
the disproportionate number of white policymakers as damaging to the interests of BME 
people.  
 
So, until I feel that, you know, these think tanks and the civil servants are 
informed from the experience of living with, working with diverse 
communities then we're not going to get a diverse kind of inclusive policy 
outcome at the end of it. (Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview). 
 
The problem was not just that the policymakers were white and middle-class; they were 
not from another colour or class but from another world. They did not live, grow up or 
work with BME people and therefore could not understand or help to tackle the problems 
that faced BME people. The assumption made by Crook and OBV was that white over-
representation in positions of power was the result of BME disadvantage and resulted in 
further discrimination in other spheres of life. I develop this idea on the ‘representation’ 
of BME policy interests in chapter six.  
 
In this early New Labour period there were two policy episodes that deconstructed and 
spotlighted the relationship between multiculture and the collective life of the nation. 
One of these ‘moments’ was the launch of, and then the government’s response to, the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry which was published in 1999. The other was the publication in 
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the autumn of 2000 to the report of the independent Commission on the Future of Multi-
Ethnic Britain (CFMEB). Though both the Inquiry report and the CFMEB report pointed to 
deep-lying problems of racism in national life there was a contrast in official response to 
the two interventions. The CFMEB, which set out the limits of Britain, Britishness and 
Britannia for many BME people, came to be criticised by New Labour. In the case of the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, though the party resisted certain aspects of its findings and 
attempted to limit what it said about the nation, New Labour engaged relatively 
constructively with the idea of the police as deeply antagonistic to BME people.  
 
3 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and Race Relations (Amendment) 
Act  
In opposition New Labour promised a Public Inquiry into the racist murder of the black 
teenager Stephen Lawrence in April 1993 and the subsequent bungled investigation into 
his death. The Inquiry was announced by shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw at an event 
hosted by Operation Black Vote (OBV, 2011). This decision to launch the Inquiry and to 
announce it in a BME-led forum was designed to indicate New Labour’s commitment to 
race equality and BME Britain. Like its 1997 manifesto promise to abolish the primary 
purpose rule, the Inquiry was also a practical and relatively simple policy step to cement 
Labour’s position as the party of the BME population as well as (once again being) the 
party of the family. Indeed it was the family dimensions of the Lawrence case, given that 
Stephen’s parents, Doreen and Neville, were an exemplary black British married couple 
and that Stephen Lawrence was (characterised as) an ideal, hardworking and ambitious 
son. These circumstances marked out Stephen as different to Ricky Reel (The Guardian, 
1999b) or Michael Menson (The Guardian, 1999a). Both were murdered in racist attacks in 
1997 but were difficult to cast in the role of ideal BME victims because Reel had been 
drinking on the night of his death and Menson had suffered from psychiatric problems.  
 
In his 1998 speech to the Labour party conference, Tony Blair cited the Stephen Lawrence 
case as symbolic of the deleterious position of BME people in Britain.  
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Deny opportunity, leave injustice or discrimination unchecked and we lay 
waste the genius of the nation. When a young black student, filled with 
talent, is murdered by racist thugs and Stephen Lawrence becomes a 
household name, not because of the trial into his murder, but because of 
an inquiry into why his murderers are walking free, it isn't just wrong, it 
weakens the very bonds of decency and respect we need to make our 
country strong (Blair, 1998).  
 
In the excerpt Blair used the Lawrence case as a morality tale as he set out the 
characteristics of the nation and the conditions for membership of it. Lawrence was 
offered as the poster child for New Labour’s Britain – young, studious and striving – and 
was in stark contrast to the ‘racist thugs’ that murdered him. The case was not just a 
personal, family and legal calamity, but a national one.  
 
As with all political speeches and statements Blair was operating in, as well as shaping, a 
political and public context. In particular, unlike with cases such as Reel and Menson the 
shining example set by the Lawrences of black functionality meant that mainstream media 
was on the family’s side in their pursuit of justice. By a bizarre twist of fate it turned out 
that Stephen’s father, Neville Lawrence, had decorated the house of the Daily Mail’s 
editor Paul Dacre and that Dacre had met Stephen Lawrence during that time (BBC, 2012). 
This personal connection appeared to be decisive when, in February 1997, the Daily Mail 
famously published a front page that named and pictured his five murderers (Dacre, 2012) 
and invited the accused to take legal action against the paper if they wished to challenge 
the claim. It was unlikely that the Mail would have been so supportive were it not for the 
connection between the Lawrence family and Dacre or if the Lawrences were not such a 
model family. 
  
The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was led by High Court Judge Sir William Macpherson of 
Cluny. There is the extremely detailed report of the Inquiry (Macpherson, 1999); the 
90 
 
response of the Home Office (1999b); as well as reflections about the Inquiry (Cathcart, 
1999; Cottle, 2004; Marlow and Loveday, 2000) that do a better job of analysis of on 
various different aspects of the Inquiry and its report than I am able to do in limited space. 
For the purposes of my work the central and crucial finding of the Inquiry was that, on the 
basis of its original investigation of the murder, the Metropolitan Police Service was guilty 
of ‘institutional racism’, where this concept was defined in the following way:  
 
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic 
origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour 
which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority 
ethnic people (Macpherson, 1999: 6.34). 
 
The use of the term institutional racism in the Inquiry report represented a remarkable 
journey for the concept which began in black radical thought in the book Black Power 
written by Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton (1967). Macpherson used 
institutional racism to explain what Coretta Phillips termed ‘the mechanisms and 
interacting processes through which ethnic inequalities are reproduced and sustained in a 
cumulative fashion’ (Phillips, 2011: 175). Macpherson’s definition above explained that 
racism was a function of ‘colour, culture, or ethnic origin’, i.e. it was not only against 
African-Caribbean people but it was enacted against people somehow deemed to be 
distinctively not white British. Yet, there were some ways in which Macpherson’s 
deployment of institutional racism was actually rather conventional. 
 
The Macpherson report was both consistent with and departed from the findings in the 
Scarman report into the Brixton riots of 1981.25 Scarman accepted that public bodies may 
                                                     
25
 The Scarman Inquiry was commissioned by the Conservative government in the immediate aftermath of 
the April 1981 Brixton riots to inquire into the disorder and to make recommendations for the future. 
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adopt practices that were ‘unwittingly discriminatory against black people’ (Scarman, 
1981: 11), a theme echoed in Macpherson’s idea of ‘unwitting prejudice’. Scarman had 
rejected the idea that Britain was an ‘institutionally racist society’ where there was 
knowing discrimination against black people as a matter of policy. Macpherson agreed 
with this rejection and instead made the rather narrower argument that the failings of the 
Metropolitan Police in the Lawrence case was based on (unwitting) institutional racism 
based on ignorance and thoughtlessness, rather than malice. 
 
By advancing an argument about the ‘collective failure’ of institutional racism Macpherson 
largely exempted individuals from being racist or perpetrating racism. Instead it was the 
system ‘wot dunnit’. In some ways Macpherson may have been acting in a lawyerly 
manner and avoiding naming names and making charges against individuals that could not 
stick. Instead it was easier to point to a systemic problem. However, this led to 
exoneration for particular Metropolitan Police officers who had behaved in a 
discriminatory and racist manner towards the Lawrence family. In other words, their racist 
behaviour was classed entirely separately from the race-based motives that drove 
Stephen Lawrence’s murderers in the first place. The police were accidental racists and 
the killers were ‘racist thugs’.  
 
The reality of the racism that bedevilled the Lawrence case was rather more multi-layered 
and complex than problems in the machinery of the police or even personal acts of racism 
by police. There were both institutional factors involving the routine operations of 
institutions which may or may not be driven by intentionally racist actors. There were also 
‘micro-racialisations’ where individual prejudice and racism affected interactions of 
everyday life (Phillips, 2011) and individuals were personally culpable for their racism.  
 
Perhaps because of its limits, institutional racism became a powerful emblem within this 
early New Labour period of the tension between multiculture and national life. Leading 
Labour politicians, such as Prime Minister Tony Blair (Hansard, 1999b) and the Home 
Secretary Jack Straw (Hansard, 1999a), accepted the Inquiry’s findings of institutional 
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racism levelled at the Metropolitan Police Service and the Inquiry report informed the 
2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act (National Archives, undated-b) which required 
public authorities to take a more proactive anti-racist and pro-race equality stance 
(Phillips, 2009). However, New Labour, like Macpherson, attempted to play down ideas of 
institutional racism as intentional or malicious.  
 
In my view, any long-established, white-dominated organisation is liable 
to have procedures, practices and a culture that tend to exclude or to 
disadvantage non-white people. The police service, in that respect, is little 
different from other parts of the criminal justice system – or from 
Government Departments, including the Home Office – and many other 
institutions (Straw, 1999).  
 
In this passage the Home Secretary Jack Straw stuck to the idea that the discrimination 
facing BME people was unwitting and not deliberate. Instead, institutional procedures, 
practices and culture inevitably reflected the ethnic makeup of the organisations 
concerned. This logic meant that the police were not alone in their institutional failings 
and Straw even cited his own organisation – the Home Office – as suffering from the same 
problem. Straw was therefore playing down the idea of culpability for discrimination but 
extending its reach into other spheres of public life. It appeared that Straw as Home 
Secretary wanted to provide the police service with some cover from the criticism that it 
had faced by moving the spotlight to other public bodies. One more thing to note was 
how the notion of racism continued to be edged out in discussion about the Inquiry. 
Although New Labour had no problems in labelling Stephen Lawrence’s killers ‘racist 
thugs’, state institutions were guilty only of the less heinous crime of tending to ‘exclude 
or disadvantage’ certain groups. However, the naming of institutions as white meant that 
in a multicultural context they had to become less white to work for modern times. 
Whatever lines of discussion were closed down by policymakers after the Inquiry one line 
that could not be closed down was on the need for institutional reform for race equality.  
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BME-led and other race equality organisations had campaigned for and closely monitored 
developments in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Though the appointment of the Inquiry 
and the subsequent policy response was important to those working for race equality 
there were concerns about a ‘whitewash’. For example, Marina Ahmad who was the Chief 
Executive of ROTA emphasised the deliberate racism of the police: 
 
… there is a so-called canteen culture of overt racism that pervades the 
Police Force. This in turn sets the tempo, the institutional body language, 
which shapes the way that Black communities are policed (ROTA, 1999: 
1).  
 
Ahmad refuted the idea of accidental racist practice suggested by Macpherson and also by 
Jack Straw and instead of subscribing to the idea that it was the institution that infected 
the practice of individuals she argued that it was the personal racism of police officers that 
shaped the workings of the institution. Ahmad went on to express scepticism about just 
why mainstream Britain appeared so concerned with the plight of the Lawrence family: 
 
Many Black people regard public sympathy for the Lawrences as little 
more than a cry of angst from the people of "Middle England". They are 
crying because five working class thugs from south-east London have 
made a mockery of their trusted English system (Ahmad, 1998). 
 
In this analysis ‘Middle England’ – populated by white middle class people and the 
antithesis of Stuart Hall’s multicultural metropolises – was less concerned about the fate 
of a young black man and a black family than with what it meant for their own inflated 
sense of English justice, fair play and civilised society. Middle England’s sympathies did not 
lie with the Lawrences and instead they were outraged that contemptible ‘working class 
thugs’ could shatter their imagined England. Ahmad’s message was telling and at least 
partially correct and, as it was said during New Labour’s honeymoon period, was a 
difficult, brave and provocative idea to articulate. To make it more easily sayable Ahmad 
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distanced herself somewhat from the words by attributing these sentiments not to herself 
or ROTA but instead argued that these were the opinions of ‘many Black people’. This 
protected both Ahmad herself and ROTA from some criticism and portrayed ROTA as bold 
and connected to underrepresented voices.  
 
However, this downbeat assessment was not the majority response to the Macpherson 
Inquiry. Many BME race equality activists were enthusiastic about the findings and 
implications of the Inquiry.  
 
… never in British history have the establishment said ‘you know what, 
our institutions are rotten’ in regards to race. Our institutions, for no 
other reason than the colour of their skin… hold black people back. Now 
that's pretty bold. And you know what it's like that it was the single 
greatest sigh of relief for millions of black people in this country. Because 
we knew it, we felt it, we saw it. It took a white judge to say it before it 
was recognised. And it was a fantastic moment actually… we don't have a 
chip on our shoulder; we've not been making this [racism] up. Now it's 
been acknowledged that it's real (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview).  
 
Woolley’s response to Macpherson was more optimistic than Marina Ahmad’s but also 
shared a similar sense of a society that was divided. The dividing line this time was not 
‘Middle England’ and black people but ‘the establishment’ and black people. The extent of 
division was such that the establishment did not accept black claims of racism – which was 
a form of racism in itself – but that they would take the word of one of their own, i.e. ‘a 
white judge’. Macpherson ended the culture of denial from the white establishment and 
confirmed what black people had known all along.  
   
Woolley was less interested in Macpherson’s claim that racism was ‘unwitting’ and placed 
more stress on the fact that racism was acknowledged at all. One reason for Woolley’s 
effusive response was that the Inquiry offered, at least momentarily, the possibility that 
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racism could be transformed from being a problem for black people into a problem for 
society as a whole (Shukra, 1998).  
 
New Labour’s response to the institutional racism identified by the Macpherson Inquiry 
came in the form of the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act (RR(A)A). The RR(A)A 2000 
was intended to prevent the kind of uneven treatment of BME people by public 
authorities by requiring the latter to take a more proactive stance against discrimination. 
The Act outlawed direct and indirect race discrimination as well as racist victimisation 
across functions not covered by the 1976 Race Relations Act (National Archives, undated-
d).  
 
In addition, the Act required public authorities to positively promote equality of 
opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups. Public 
authorities and public service providers (including private sector organisations that 
delivered public services) were also required by statute to audit, monitor and consult on 
policies and services in order to assess whether there were adverse impacts on different 
ethnic groups. The Act also gave the Home Secretary new powers to extend the list of 
public bodies subject to the general duty to promote race equality and to impose specific 
duties on public bodies subject to the general duty to ensure better performance of the 
duty. In addition, the Act also extended the powers of the Commission for Racial Equality 
to enforce specific duties imposed on public authorities and to issue codes of practice to 
provide guidance to public bodies on how to fulfil their duties to promote race equality. A 
final, very interesting aspect of the Act, given the recent revelations of police action to 
smear the Lawrence family shortly after the murder of Stephen (Evans and Lewis, 2013), 
made chief police officers liable for acts of discrimination carried out by officers under 
their leadership and provided for awards from discrimination claims against the police to 
be paid out of police funds (Home Office, 1999b).  
 
As illustrated by data on race equality provided in chapter one, the 2000 Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act did not eliminate discrepancies and disproportionalities in outcomes for 
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BME people in Britain nor did it overcome the troubled relationship between BME people 
and the police. However, the Act was an advance over what had gone before in terms of 
offering a framework to hold the public sector to account. Joy Warmington from the 
equalities and human rights organisation brap26 (formerly known as Birmingham Race 
Action Partnership) called it ‘a complicated but beautiful piece of legislation’ (2011, 
Interview) but went on to claim that it was also an opportunity missed: 
 
It [the Race Relations (Amendment) Act]... was hardly ever used 
effectively... I think Lawrence was a huge opportunity that unfortunately 
we weren't able to capitalise on because its implementation didn't 
capture the imagination. I think it wasn't used in a way that could really 
galvanise people. It was used as a beating stick in most organisations and, 
you know, sometimes things that are seen as more punitive don't help to 
take the agenda forward. That was not necessarily the intention of the 
legislation but it definitely felt as if that's how it was used, you know. 
People were forever confessing how institutionally racist they were and 
that seemed to be the thing to do rather than, you know, looking at how 
they could critically take forward the agenda (Joy Warmington, 2011, 
Interview). 
 
Warmington’s argument was that the new legislative regime needed to (but did not) 
capture the imagination of white people and organisations and instead created a punitive 
atmosphere that encouraged and normalised a culture of confession rather than an anti- 
racist one. Instead, Warmington saw another path to social change where the emphasis 
was on co-operative work that meaningfully addressed institutional racism. This 
ruefulness at the unfulfilled potential of the Act was shared by Simon Woolley. 
 
                                                     
26
 brap really does call itself this name and uses lower case letters. 
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You had a piece of legislation that had the ability to change the world. But 
it was barely used. Precisely because we were not politically ready to fully 
utilise what it could do. So we never had the tools, you know. We had the 
mechanism to hold every public body to account. What are you doing 
about race? How are you promoting race? What is the standard? We 
didn't. So what would happen is it almost became a tick-box exercise... 
But the gains that we could have had were not really fully realised (Simon 
Woolley, 2011, Interview).  
 
Woolley’s approach of even more scrutiny on public bodies was the opposite to that of 
Warmington. What Warmington viewed as punishment for institutions was, for Woolley, a 
matter of accountability. For him the problem was that black organisations lacked the 
resources or wherewithal to ensure such accountability. Where Woolley and Warmington 
ultimately agreed was that the passing of the legislation did not ensure its meaningful 
implementation. Therefore the moment of apparent discursive breakthrough and the 
naming of institutional racism as a problem in Britain was not the transformative moment 
that might have been hoped for. However, at the time, there was a palpable sense that 
New Labour’s talk in opposition had at least resulted in a legislative environment whereby 
multiculture and collective national life might be made more compatible.  
 
However, I next turn to an episode that showed that even in the early optimistic part of 
their time in government there were limits to the extent that New Labour was willing to 
accommodate multiculture as a feature of the nation.  
 
4 The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain  
A year after the Macpherson report another report on life in multicultural Britain was 
published, this time to a hesitating then openly hostile response from government. The 
independent Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMEB) had been set up 
by the race equality organisation Runnymede Trust as a three year study to:  
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analyse the current state of multi-ethnic Britain and to propose ways of 
countering racial discrimination and disadvantage and making Britain a 
confident and vibrant multicultural society at ease with its rich diversity 
(Runnymede Trust, 2000: iix).  
 
The CFMEB began its work in January 1998, but the idea for the report came prior to the 
New Labour period. Bhikhu Parekh, who became the eventual Chair of the Commission, 
approached the Runnymede Trust with an idea akin to the Commission around 1994 as a 
way to mark the 25th anniversary of the publication of Colour and Citizenship (Institute of 
Race Relations, 1969) – the first survey of ‘race relations’ in Britain. The study was 
directed by Jim Rose, co-founder of the Runnymede Trust. However, for a number of 
reasons, including the need to secure a considerable amount of funding, the project did 
not come into fruition at that time (Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, Interview).  
 
When the Commission began its work it had support from policymakers and the then 
Home Secretary, Jack Straw, was present at the launch of the Commission in January 1998 
(McLaughlin and Neal, 2004: 155). The original Chair of the Commission was Sir John 
Burgh, former Director-General of the British Council. However, Burgh decided to leave his 
position in 1998 and Parekh agreed to succeed him on the condition that he could 
restructure the Commission. This included bringing in Stuart Hall on to the Commission 
along with four or five others, including Tariq Modood as a consultant (Bhikhu Parekh, 
2011, Interview). Therefore, the final Commission was composed of 23 people and 
included commissioners such as the former Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, 
Herman Ouseley, and Andrew Marr of the BBC. The latter was responsible for the final 
write up as Parekh explained: 
 
Different chapters [were] written by different people and we wanted it to 
flow. So we invited Andrew Marr… He looked at all of the chapters and 
made them read like a story (Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, Interview).  
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Adopting the approach of a public inquiry the Commission took evidence from sessions 
around the country and also commissioned research inputs. The Commission attended to 
three central themes of multicultural Britain: acceptance of diversity; action on equality 
(non-discrimination); and enabling national commonality (Runnymede Trust, 2000). The 
majority of the report was dedicated to an analysis of policy and policy reforms including 
policing and criminal justice; education; health and welfare; political representation; and 
employment – all areas in which race inequality were manifest.  
 
Proposals in these areas were underpinned by a series of principles. The first was that all 
people had both equal worth regardless of colour, gender, ethnicity, religion, age or 
sexual orientation, and equal claim to opportunities needed to develop and contribute to 
the collective. A second principle was that citizens were both individuals and members of 
geographical and other communities. The third principle was that, as people were 
different, that uniform treatment would result in inequality. Specifically that equality 
‘must be defined in a culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating but not 
discriminatory manner’. The fourth principle counterbalanced the idea of difference with 
the need for society to be cohesive, and to ‘find ways of nurturing diversity while fostering 
a common sense of belonging and a shared identity among its constituent members’. The 
fifth principle argued that while respect for moral differences was important, every 
society needed a broadly shared set of values, including human rights, the equal worth of 
all, equal opportunity for self-development, and equal life chances, in addition to 
procedural values such as dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Finally, the 
sixth principle asserted that racism could ‘be based on colour and physical features, or on 
culture, nationality and way of life’ and that it was contrary to the aim of common 
belonging (Runnymede Trust, 2000: viii-ix).  
 
The principles taken as individual items and as a whole were, for the most-part, 
uncontroversial. The one exception was, perhaps, the third principle and the idea of 
differential treatment of multicultural groupings. This could be seen as a challenge for two 
cornerstones of western liberal thinking – universal citizenship and cultural neutrality of 
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the state (Hall, 2000). This principle was also practically difficult to navigate in policy 
terms. For example, as was seen in the later parts of the New Labour period, policymakers 
were concerned about being seen to be in favour of ‘special treatment’ for BME people 
(Denham et al., 2010). However, in this early time it was not these principles laid out by 
the Commission per se or even its detailed policy proposals that caused controversy, but 
the way that the report framed the discussion about multi-ethnic Britain.  
 
Bhikhu Parekh identified two parts of the report that created resistance amongst 
policymakers. The first of these was the use of the term ‘post-nation’: 
 
Unless these deep-rooted antagonisms to racial and cultural difference 
can be defeated in practice as well as symbolically written out of the 
national story, the idea of a multicultural post-nation remains an empty 
promise (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 38-39).  
 
The passage contained a number of different elements that individually and collectively 
served to puncture the fantasy of Cool Britannia and a Britain that had moved on from the 
past. The central claim was that the nation contained deep antipathy towards BME 
people. This animosity was both organic (‘deep-rooted’) and symbolic in the way that it 
was incorporated into the nation’s idea of itself (the national story). The second element 
of the passage implied that the national story be re-written which echoed Paul Gilroy’s call 
for the ‘re-writing [of] British history to the point at which it ceases to be recognizably 
British at all’ (2000: 119). Gilroy’s call was provocative, but it also had the consolation for 
policymakers that the re-written (hi)story, however unfamiliar, might still be nationally 
situated. It was Britain, but not as we know it. However, the CFMEB passage above 
identified the national story as problematic before implying that what was required was a 
‘post-national’ turn, and this was a provocation too far for nationalist politicians. Though 
Parekh recognised the trouble that the idea of the post-nation state caused to 
policymakers, he argued that the Commission had been misread.  
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Occasionally we used phrases which I think allowed us to be 
misunderstood. And there are two or three of them – although they are 
now fully accepted but at the time they brought anxiety. One was post-
national state.  When we said Britain can’t be a nation state it has to be a 
post-national state. Now it seems to me so obvious if we have three 
nations: Scotland, England and Wales, it can't be a nation state it has to 
be post-national. And post-national was not intended to denigrate Britain; 
on the contrary, it highlighted the great opportunity that the country has 
to devise something new for the 21st century (Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, 
Interview).  
 
Parekh acknowledged that the Commission’s use of language had perhaps ‘allowed’ them 
to be misunderstood. In other words the Commission had failed to foreclose the 
possibility of mis-interpretation. As well as acknowledging mistakes Parekh defended the 
approach taken. The problem, according to Parekh, was more that the Commission was 
ahead of its time in naming ideas in 2000 that were, by the time of our interview in 2011, 
‘now fully accepted’. However, Parekh’s insistence that the ‘post-national state’ was a 
natural descriptor of the situation of Britain was not an idea around which there was 
political consensus. None of the main Westminster parties appeared, even post-New 
Labour, to be willing to accept the idea of the post-nation. For example, recently, Ed 
Miliband turned to the idea of ‘One Nation’ to describe his inclusive vision of collective life 
(Miliband, 2012). While the post-national state may indeed be the best foundation for 
multicultural Britain it was hard to believe that the Commissioners could not see in 
advance that policymakers and certain parts of the media would take ‘multicultural post-
nation’ as a nightmarish provocation. However, perhaps the context of the moment, post-
Macpherson, and in the midst of Cool Britannia, had convinced the Commissioners that 
the mood was sympathetic to new ideas and language.  
 
Elsewhere, the report rightfully expressed reservations about the conception of Britain 
and pointed to its racial and racist baggage. The report questioned the relevance of 
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Britishness in relation to Britain’s ethnic minorities, in the context of devolution, the 
Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement; and the fact that Scotland, Wales and England 
belong to a nation-state named the United Kingdom not Britain. For my purposes, the first 
of these points was critical and it led to a passage such as the following in the 
Commission’s report:  
 
Where does this leave Asians, African-Caribbeans and Africans? For them 
Britishness is a reminder of colonisation and empire, and to that extent is 
not attractive… For the British-born generations, seeking to assert their 
claim to belong, the concept of Englishness often seems inappropriate, 
since to be English, as the term is in practice used, is to be white. 
Britishness is not ideal, but at least it appears acceptable, particularly 
when suitably qualified – Black British, Indian British… (Runnymede Trust, 
2000: 38). 
 
The Commission strategically totalised BME people such that regardless of place of birth 
BMEness was at odds with unreconstructed Britishness and Englishness.  
 
Another piece of text that Parekh identified as difficult for policymakers to accept was the 
concept of ‘community of communities’.  
 
… citizens are not only individuals but also members of particular 
religious, ethnic, cultural and regional communities, which are 
comparatively stable as well as open and fluid. Britain is both a 
community of citizens and a community of communities, both a liberal 
and a multicultural society, and needs to reconcile their sometimes 
conflicting requirements (Runnymede Trust, 2000: ix).  
 
The CFMEB offered an optimistic vision of multiculture in Britain (Alexander, 2007), in 
which the nation, the citizen and multicultural groupings co-existed side by side. The 
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CFMEB defended the meaningfulness of multicultural minority communities by claiming 
that they were both lasting as well as fluid and open and that they did not isolate or 
prevent people from being part of the nation. The idea of ‘community of communities’ 
had been borrowed from the Indian constitution. As with the idea of the ‘post-national 
state’, it appeared to Parekh to be a self-evident feature of life in contemporary 
multicultural Britain.  
 
… we talked about community of communities. But here again it puzzles 
me. It's a standard phrase in India. When the Indian constitution was 
drafted people said that India is a community of citizens as well as 
community of communities... When we first got that phrase going we 
thought it's so obvious that look if you think of Britain you think of 
individual Brits – fine. But you also think of the fact that there are Afro-
Caribbeans with a history of their own. There are Jews with a history of 
their own. There are communities – Catholics. Scotland is a regional 
community or a national community. There are ethnic communities. So 
Britain is a community of communities. Every country is a community of 
communities. But somehow people immediately associated this with the 
kind of de-constructionist ethic; that we were trying to dismantle this 
country and reduce it to a fragmented entity. That was a complete 
misunderstanding. So, I think a few things here and there about which we 
should have been careful but it would have never have occurred to us 
that the phrase communities of community – it's in retrospect when 
these guys objected. Although even now and even then, I don't think the 
objection was valid (Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, Interview).  
 
The communities that Parekh cited that made up the British community were only partly 
BME and in many cases were (predominantly) white, e.g. there were Scots and Catholics. 
However, though the emphasis on white communities may have been an attempt to 
reassure policymakers it failed to do so. Whereas, in India, the compromise of ‘community 
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of communities’ was required in order to allow the country to come into being, in Britain 
it was seen as undermining and fragmenting. As with the post-nation, Parekh claimed that 
this was another misunderstanding.  
 
When the report first emerged New Labour appeared, if not to welcome the report’s 
findings, to accept it as a serious and constructive piece of work. A news piece in the Daily 
Telegraph on 10 October 2000 entitled Straw wants to rewrite our history carried the 
following response to the report from the Home Office minister, Mike O'Brien:  
 
This is a timely report which adds much to the current debate on multi-
ethnic Britain. The Government is profoundly committed to racial equality 
and the celebration of diversity. We are a multi-cultural society (cited in 
Johnston, 2000).  
 
This was a relatively standard (non-) response to a report that was not particularly effusive 
but it was broadly supportive and, by restating the government’s celebration of 
multiculture and pursuit of race equality, aligned the government and the CFMEB in a 
common cause. Bhikhu Parekh explained how and why New Labour’s response changed: 
 
In Jack Straw’s case, his office had read the [draft] report [ahead of 
publication], approved the report, or at least agreed with it [or did not 
object]. When the Daily Telegraph spread the red herring about the word 
British being racial or racist and the media began to blow certain things 
out of proportion… Number 10 panicked. And remember, elections were 
only a year away (Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, Interview). 
 
New Labour’s shifting response was, according to Parekh, driven by the clamour from the 
Daily Telegraph newspaper. The CFMEB found itself caught up in a media storm. A  Leader 
piece in the Daily Telegraph said that it was ‘astonishing that ministers should have 
welcomed the sub-Marxist gibberish’ (Daily Telegraph, 2000a). Two days later, a comment 
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piece in the same newspaper, titled Don't diss Britannia, criticised Labour’s indecisiveness 
in response to the report:  
 
When the Home Office first learnt of the report's contents, it welcomed 
the findings as "timely". But after this newspaper reported the anti-British 
agenda that the commission peddles, Mr Straw read the report in full. 
Suddenly, it was no longer quite so welcome. Instead of regarding 
Britishness and Englishness as "racist" terms, as the report appeared to 
suggest, Mr Straw now says that he is proud of both. Yesterday, Number 
10, alarmed that a new avenue of attack had been opened up to the 
Conservatives, backed him up (The Telegraph, 2000).  
 
The title of the piece in the Telegraph cleverly both flaunted the paper's ease with the 
vernacular of the multicultural metropolises by using the term ‘diss’ whilst, at the same 
time, reclaiming Britannia for the newspaper’s monocultural middle England suburban 
heartland. The paper also trumpeted its ability to make Jack Straw read the report more 
fully and to change his mind about its worth, illustrating the influence of the paper and 
drawing attention to New Labour’s weakness and fallibility. The erstwhile tailwind behind 
the Commission’s work had turned into a political and media storm (Fortier, 2007; 
McLaughlin and Neal, 2004; Pilkington, 2008).  
 
At the launch event for the report (after the Daily Telegraph articles), Jack Straw took 
Bhikhu Parekh and Stuart Hall aside and told them that he was going to criticise the 
report. Parekh asked Straw what his concern about the report was to which he replied 
that it said that ‘the word British is racist’. Parekh responded as follows: 
 
I said this [British is racist] is not what it meant. We spent about seven 
minutes in a quiet corner trying to take him through the argument but it 
looked at the time that he was pretty convinced that this was the line that 
he wanted to take (Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, Interview). 
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Parekh attributed Straw’s response to the media furore but was also critical of New 
Labour’s response, labelling it one of ‘panic’, brought on by the impending general 
election. Another aspect of the political context was that CFMEB followed on from the 
Macpherson report (Parekh, 2001). As Pilkington argued, the response of the right-wing 
press to the Commission ‘indicated the existence of considerable anger towards the idea 
that Britain needed to change in fundamental ways. In some respects then the [CFMEB] 
report served as a ‘proxy target’ for the resentment felt towards the earlier Macpherson 
report’ (2003: 273). In some cases that resentment was naked and party political: 
 
The Conservatives now have an excellent chance to make good their past 
silence on Macpherson. They must expose the Government's collusion in 
this attempt to destroy a thousand years of British history (The Telegraph, 
2000). 
 
The Daily Telegraph considered and represented the CFMEB and Macpherson as a threat 
to British history and in the face of such attack Jack Straw and New Labour secured their 
position by launching a robust defence of Britain:  
 
… I do not accept the argument that Britain or Britishness is dead. On the 
contrary, both are now receiving a new lease of life. Enduring British 
values of fairness, tolerance and decency are at the heart of the 
Government's reforms to build a more inclusive, stronger society (Straw, 
2000). 
 
Straw countered the argument of the lessening of Britain but did not accept the 
Telegraph’s focus on history instead making a typically New Labour argument about 
renewal and newness. The Home Secretary ignored the critique from the CFMEB about 
the racially problematic idea and practice of Britishness and the recent findings of 
Macpherson. He instead sought to erase Britain’s history of race-thinking (Goldberg, 1994; 
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Goldberg, 2001), overwriting this with innate decency and the British sense of fair play. 
Straw did not deny problems entirely as he cited the need for more inclusivity (rather than 
less racism), but claimed that the required improvements were being delivered by New 
Labour’s reforms.  
 
Straw also argued that Britain was inoculated against racism by ‘enduring British values’. A 
second refutation of Britain as a racial or racist state pointed to its diverse population – as 
in the following speech from Tony Blair:  
 
This nation has been formed by a particularly rich complex of 
experiences: successive waves of invasion and immigration and trading 
partnerships, a potent mix of cultures and traditions which have flowed 
together to make us what we are today.  
 
Blood alone does not define our national identity. How can we separate 
out the Celtic, the Roman, the Saxon, the Norman, the Huguenot, the 
Jewish, the Asian and the Caribbean and all the other nations that have 
come and settled here? Why should we want to? It is precisely this rich 
mix that has made all of us what we are today27 (Blair, 2000b).  
 
This account argued that the problem of racism could not exist in Britain in any 
meaningful sense because of its long history and recent past of multicultural mixedness 
and flows, courtesy of invaders and immigrants. Blair named different origins of modern 
Britons and claimed them all as equally British even though Macpherson showed another 
picture. Instead, Blair appealed to the diverse spirit of Britain and the British. This 
                                                     
27
 Somewhat of a consensus had formed around this narrative as in the same year (2000) the Conservative 
leader William Hague acknowledged that  ‘Our nation is a nation of immigrants, Celts, Picts, Saxons, Angles, 
Normans, Jews, Huguenots, Indians, Pakistanis, Afro-Caribbeans, Bengalis, Chinese and countless others. 
These are British people. It is what makes our country such an exciting and varied place to live’ (Hague, cited 
in The Guardian, 2000). 
108 
 
emphasis on hybridity (and tolerance) of Britain could be used to close down discussions 
of racism because how could the inherently ‘mixed’ (and decent) nation be racist? As this 
was the case and as the British were so decent and fair then the remedy to rogue 
elements of racism was more Britishness (see chapter five for more developments in this 
regard). Therefore the language of multiculture and the nation had turned or perhaps 
returned to complacency in short order and the moment of heightened awareness of race 
equality and the role of BME perspectives and organising against it had seemingly passed.  
 
5 Conclusion: Getting things in proportion  
This first period was not, in hindsight, quite the ‘radical hour’ (Pilkington, 2008) that it 
once seemed. However, there was a policy discussion on the importance of multiculture 
being represented proportionally in national life and democracy. There was a questioning, 
even amongst policymakers, of the over and under representation of BME people in 
different spheres of national life, and the role of discrimination and racism in this 
distribution. Policy discourse and practice engaged with the possibility that the benefits 
and burdens of nation and nationhood could be more equally reapportioned between 
BME and white people.  
 
The abolition of the ‘primary purpose rule’ extended to some BME people the same 
freedom to choose and live with a partner as enjoyed by their white British counterparts. 
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 similarly attempted to reduce the discrepant 
and disadvantageous treatment of BME people by institutionally racist public bodies and it 
was seen as an advance by BME-led race equality organisations.  
 
However, as witnessed by the eventual response of policymakers to the CFMEB report, 
this discursive and policy shift from policymakers towards the redistribution of outcomes 
in the multicultural nation was tied to contradictory New Labour urges that disciplined 
multiculture and advanced racially exclusive nationalism (Back et al., 2002).  Such instincts 
revealed themselves in response to the CFMEB’s calls to re-examine and re-write 
Britishness beyond the vacuity of ‘Cool Britannia’. However, there was at least a debate 
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over the relationship between the nation, multiculture and race equality. As Dinah Cox, 
former Chief Executive of ROTA, reflected the time covered in this chapter was in 
hindsight ‘fucking springtime’ (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview) compared to subsequent 
developments.  
 
By contrast, the next chapter addresses what might be described as autumn or perhaps 
winter for the way that issues of nation, multiculture and race inequality were 
interconnected in policy discourse. This chapter covers the period 2001 to 2007 and charts 
a series of episodes in which policymakers became increasingly concerned that 
multiculture came at the expense of the nation. In turn this problematised BME organising 
and government action for race equality. 
 
  
110 
 
Chapter 4 Parallel multiculture and multicultural overlaps  
… we'd lost that initial agenda – the multiculturalism agenda – which 
essentially said people integrate better [and] quicker when they're 
afforded equality. Simple. Simple. We started to lose that agenda. The 
whole agenda then became about we're not British enough. And… it got 
steadily, steadily worse… (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview). 
 
1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I explored accounts offered by policymakers and BME-led race 
equality organisations of the need to more evenly distribute opportunities and outcomes 
in the nation amongst BME and white people. Even in the first part of the New Labour 
period, this mood and the discourse surrounding it was not solely one way. Though New 
Labour recognised race inequality, their emphasis was largely focused on efforts to act 
against race discrimination rather than special positive measures for race equality. 
Furthermore, in their response to the CFMEB, New Labour demonstrated their resistance 
to discussions of race equality and multiculture which compromised or questioned the 
nation.  
 
In this chapter I explore a second period under New Labour from 2001-2007 and three 
main moments within that time that set back the policy work for race equality and BME 
organising for it. The first of these moments was the so-called ‘northern disturbances’ – 
particularly those that took place in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham over the spring and 
summer in 2001. The disturbances were officially interpreted as signs of ethnic divisions 
caused by over-indulging multiculturalism. The second moment, which was taken by 
policymakers as confirmation of an organised ethnic minority ‘problem’ was the ‘London 
bombings’ on 7 July 2005. In this incident, over 50 people were killed on London transport 
at the hands of four bombers claiming Islam as their inspiration. The third moment 
covered in this chapter is the work undertaken by the government-appointed Commission 
on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) and its response to the concerns of policymakers about 
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the dangerous side of diversity and the growth of multiculture at the expense of common 
bonds.  
 
This shifting discursive environment meant that BME-led race equality organisations and 
their leaders were concerned that the early promise of New Labour was at risk and that 
new understandings of the relationship between multiculture, collective life and equality 
were taking hold. The opening epigram in this chapter by Simon Woolley from OBV 
offered a formula whereby multiculturalism safeguarded action on race equality and in 
turn led to a more integrated society. However, Woolley argued that the virtuous circle 
had been broken and that policymakers had an alternative formula for integration which 
required BME people to conform to being ‘more British’ and less multicultural. In this 
reformulation, action on race inequality was increasingly precarious. 
 
Shifts in government thinking about integration were informed by concerns about how 
BME and non-BME people lived with each other and, accordingly, I organise my analysis in 
this chapter around the themes of parallels and overlaps. The concept of ‘parallel lives’ 
stemmed from ‘official’ readings of the ‘disturbances’ in three northern towns in 2001 as 
triggered by and evidence of ethnically divided local communities. The policy prescription 
to avoid any repeat of the disorder was to ensure that communities were productively 
overlapping and cohesive. Before further exploring the related themes of parallels and 
overlaps, I begin this chapter with an examination of the importance of community as a 
concept that underpinned New Labour’s ideas of living together and commitment to the 
collective.  
  
2 Making community count 
Community is a notoriously elusive concept that seems to defy precise definition or 
analysis (Alleyne, 2002a; Frazer, 1999). Community operates in different spaces – 
territorial, mental and social (Castells, 2004; Cohen, 1995; Keith and Pile, 1993) and is 
used to describe the clustering of people around specific identities and forms of 
collectivity (Alleyne, 2002a) – and even ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 2006 
112 
 
[1983]). At the heart of community is some sort of relationship between individuals and a 
collective. Rousseau famously stated that optimal community was:  
 
a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole 
common force the person and the goods of each associate, and in which 
each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and 
remain as free as before (1968: 60). 
 
Rousseau’s expression of ideal community valorises personal freedom and seeks to tie it 
to the ‘common force’. However, this relationship is in tension and the interests of 
individuals or sub-groups may not be aligned with the ‘whole common’. Indeed, 
community may contain the potential to create oppressive enclosure and the loss of 
freedom (Bauman, 2001; Frazer, 1999) and conversely may be collective in appearance 
only. A number of authors have argued that community, characterised by people seeking 
collectively to make good what they lack individually, based on inalienable rights, 
obligations and fraternal commitments, has largely disappeared (Bauman, 2001; Giddens, 
2000), replaced instead by something that sets aside ethics, questions of redistribution 
and collectivity in favour of individualism. This opens the possibility that living amongst 
each other equates to contiguity and isolation rather than solidarity, mutuality and co-
operation (Nisbet, 1993).  
 
This idea of the death of community is not a new one. In the late 19th century Ferdinand 
Tönnies (2001 [1887]) argued in the context of a modernising Germany that that the 
Gemeinschaft (community) of small town and village pre-industrial Europe was being 
supplanted by Geselleschaft (association or society) that came with industrialisation and 
was characterised by impersonal relations, contracts, bureaucracy and replaced the 
organic bonds of attachment of community. Marx, Durkheim and Weber also wrote about 
the advance of modernisation, capitalism, increased functional differentiation and 
alienation that transformed pre-industrial community into modern society (Giddens, 
1971).  
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The contemporary re-emergence of community under New Labour (Frazer, 1999; Goes, 
2004; Hale, 2004, 2006; Pearce and Margo, 2007; Pitcher, 2009) went against these ideas 
about de-collectivised modern societies. Instead, the party was drawn to aspects of 
community, including its fundamental ambiguities. As one author observed, ‘the very 
attractiveness of community to policymakers lies in its ambiguous potential’ (Schofield, 
2002: 679-680).  
 
While community was certainly elastic, its re-emergence was not purely pragmatic. It was, 
in part, a response and alternative to prevailing political conditions and concerns that the 
Thatcher and Reagan period had decisively and worryingly swung society towards 
individual and against collective interests. For example, the language of community was a 
rejoinder to Thatcher’s more atomistic utterances such as when she argued that: 
 
… there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, 
and there are families. And no government can do anything except 
through people, and people must look to themselves first. It's our duty to 
look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour (Thatcher, 
1987).  
 
The passage above was part of a broader attack against reliance on government. 
Thatcher’s emphasis was on individuals and narrow groupings of family and neighbours as 
self-help units. Despite the tightness of the togetherness advocated, Thatcher’s vision of 
self-help was morally grounded and duty-bound. However, according to Powell (2000) the 
moralistic individualism of Thatcher and Reagan gave way to hedonistic individualism – 
where notions of self-reliance and self-sacrifice were displaced by amoral market-
informed behaviour of self-gratification and wealth accumulation. In response to this, 
political philosophers including Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), Michael Sandel (1982, 1996) 
and Charles Taylor (1985) expressed concerns about the atomistic and hyper-
individualistic nature of modern liberal societies and the resulting social consequences. 
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This group came to be labelled communitarians, though they did not necessarily think of 
themselves in these terms (Hale, 2004, 2006). At the centre of their thinking was a quarrel 
with a Rawlsian notion that government’s main role was to provide individuals with the 
liberties and resources they needed to live freely (Frazer, 1999; Goes, 2004). For example, 
in his essay titled Atomism, Charles Taylor objected to a liberal view that people were 
‘self-sufficient outside of society’ and instead argued for the locatedness of individuals 
(Taylor, 1985: 190). 
 
Sociologist Amitai Etzioni (1993a, 1993b) helped to connect discussions of community and 
policy. Etzioni was a critic of unregulated free-market capitalism and government welfare 
provision, arguing that both undermined sites of community, such as family; localities; and 
polities.28 Etzioni privileged the ties of community and called for ‘moral and social order… 
carried by the community rather than the state’ (1993: 160). In other words, collectivism 
was not bound up in statism and welfarism, but was instead carried through social bonds 
(Etzioni, 1993a).  
 
New Labour may have drawn on Etzioni, who had become a figure of interest in British 
political circles (Hale, 2006), in locating themselves between individualism, the market and 
the state. In 1994 Blair argued that community was a response to a changing and 
precarious world: 
 
Market forces cannot educate us or equip us for this world of rapid 
technological and economic change. We must do it together.  We cannot 
buy your way to a safe society. We must work for it together. And we 
cannot purchase an option on whether we grow old. We must plan for it 
                                                     
28
 By way of illustration, capitalism is associated with demands on employees that hamper parenting and the 
economic interest groups that influence and remove trust in politics. At the same time welfare rights require 
power to be relocated away from local communities in favour of centralised bureaucracy and provide a 
narrative of rights and entitlements that undermine individual, family and community obligations (Etzioni, 
1993a). 
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together. We cannot protect the ordinary against the abuse of power by 
leaving them to it; we must protect each other. That is our insight, a belief 
in society, working together, solidarity, cooperation, partnership. These 
are our words. This is my socialism, and we should stop apologising for 
using the word. It is not the socialism of Marx or state control. It is rooted 
in a straightforward view of society, in the understanding that the 
individual does best in a strong and decent community of people with 
principles and standards and common aims and values. We are the party 
of the individual because we are the party of community. It is social-ism, 
and our task is to apply those values to the modern world (Blair, 1994). 
 
Blair refuted Thatcher’s denial of the existence of society by explicitly stating his belief in 
it. However, while he used un-Thatcherite terms, such as ‘solidarity’, he was as keen as 
Conservatives to distance himself from state control as a site of the collective. Blair argued 
that he was on the side of freedom, but that individuals could only thrive in the context of 
community. These ideas of community were developed in a wide-ranging speech entitled 
Values and the Power of Community:  
 
What are the values [to resolve conflicts between old and new, 
modernisers and traditionalists]? For me, they are best expressed in a 
modern idea of community. At the heart of it is the belief in the equal 
worth of all – the central belief that drives my politics – and in our mutual 
responsibility in creating a society that advances such equal worth… The 
idea of community resolves the paradox of the modern world: it 
acknowledges our interdependence; it recognises our individual worth 
(Blair, 2000c).  
 
Blair claimed that community resolved the contemporary dilemma of the conflicts 
between independence and interdependence. Blair stated that he was speaking about the 
‘modern’ idea of community and its newness gave him permission to endow it with 
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qualities that he valorised. Blair’s politics of community was therefore a classic piece of 
‘third way’ logic (Giddens, 2000; Hale et al., 2004) that rejected ‘false choices’ (Dionne, 
1992) between left and right – in this case collectivism and individualism, respectively. 
However, drawing on the previous passage from his 1994 speech, it was evident that the 
reconciling of the individual and the collective relied on common principles, standards, 
aims and ‘good citizens’. In the absence of ‘good’ citizenship, the house of cards that was 
community could come toppling down.  
 
This requirement that individuals behave in ways that supported collective life was a 
driver behind New Labour’s interest in citizenship. I do not intend to dwell on the topic 
here because I return to the theme of New Labour and citizenship in more detail in the 
next chapter. However, it is important to note that, in this second part of the New Labour 
period, David Blunkett, especially during his time as Home Secretary between 2001 and 
2004, was developing a programme of work that encouraged citizens to connect with each 
other and to the state as part of endeavours to promote ‘active communities’.29  
 
Blunkett's philosophy behind this work was captured in his book called Renewing 
Democracy and Civil Society (Blunkett, 2001). His vision was for a brand of community not 
where ‘anything goes’ but where the emphasis was on ‘the difference between right and 
wrong’ (Blunkett, 2001: 112). Blunkett called for a ‘revitalised’ public political culture; and 
outlined a number of key elements to achieve this including the need to ‘improve political 
literacy, social and moral responsibility and community involvement amongst the adult 
population through citizenship education…’ (2001: 137-138). Blunkett was therefore 
                                                     
29
 According to the now archived government glossary of terms used on Department for Communities and 
Local Government websites, active communities were defined as: ‘communities in which citizens are 
empowered to lead self determined fulfilled lives, and in which everyone regardless of age, race or social 
background has a sense of belonging and a stake in society’ (National Archives, undated). 
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interested in a version of political Communitarianism. As Nick Pearce, former advisor to 
Blunkett, explained: 
 
... I think his [Blunkett’s] view on the community was that, you know, 
whatever your background it was important to be an active citizen. And 
that strong communities had people in them that engaged in the self-
government of that community... it's a Communitarianism that privileges 
political engagement (Nick Pearce, 2011, Interview). 
 
The version of community that Blunkett had in mind was the local community, rather than 
Blair’s meta-term to cover all collective life. Blunkett’s localities were to be governed, 
within the confines of a moral framework, by active citizens pursuing ‘common interests’. 
While strong communities and active citizens appeared to be incontrovertible goods, the 
expectation of community involvement could be a burden.  
 
[The] New Deal for Communities [regeneration scheme], like the 
Conservative government’s Single Regeneration Budget, required poor 
communities to compete for limited resources, while the ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ theme deliberately made new funding for 
neighbourhoods conditional on community involvement (Levitas, 2005: 
199). 
 
Levitas identified a tyrannical strand in community involvement and the way that it could 
be imposed on the most stressed and poorest communities. This meant that David 
Blunkett’s call for an expansion of mutual and community associations based on 
‘overlapping networks of participation and common interest’ (2001: 139) had different 
implications around Britain and could particularly exert further pressure on ‘problem’ 
communities.  
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The government’s concern about the decline of associational life and an interest in its 
revival was closely connected with the work of Harvard Professor Robert Putnam. Social 
capital, like the term community, was slippery and had heuristic properties that helped to 
name and account for a certain sense of disconnectedness in modern society.  Putnam 
defined social capital as ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (1995: 67). 
Social capital could be put to ‘work’ and it had the qualities of a resource (Tonkiss, 2000: 
84) that individuals and groups could use (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119) to achieve 
certain goals (Coleman, 1988: S98).  
 
Putnam claimed that social capital made everyday life better and easier: allowing citizens 
to resolve collective problems; reducing the costs of everyday business and social 
transactions; encouraging a sense of interdependence and shared fate amongst people; as 
well as being psychologically and biologically good for people (Putnam, 2000: 288-290). 
Most importantly, ‘high’ levels of social capital, signalled by ‘civic engagement and social 
connectedness’ contributed to ‘better schools, faster economic development, lower 
crime, and more effective government’30 (Putnam, 1995: 66-67). Putnam (1995, 2000) also 
argued that social capital in the United States was in decline, exemplified by the reduction 
in the number of people involved in team bowling leagues in the United States and the 
rise in numbers of people ‘bowling alone’. 
 
Putnam was the highest profile social scientist in the world at the turn of the millennium 
and he was sought out by policymakers including New Labour (Hunt, 2001) for whom 
Putnam’s ideas usefully tied citizenship, civic renewal and welfare reform together with 
‘softer packaging’ (Arneil, 2007: 42). New Labour and Putnam were a good fit in other 
                                                     
30
 Similarly, according to David Halpern ‘communities with a good ‘stock’ of such ‘social capital’ are more 
likely to benefit from lower crime figures, better health, higher educational achievement, and better 
economic growth’ (Halpern, 2009). 
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ways. Although the party was fascinated with what was modern much of their newness 
was based on contemporary reboots of old notions, such as rights and duties, the family 
and community (Brown, 2000 cited in Wilson, 2001). Putnam’s work on social capital was 
similarly orientated on revival and restoration of civic life in ways that were consistent 
with New Labour’s ideas on renewal.  
 
Despite the policy appetite for Putnam’s work, his understanding of social capital has been 
subject to numerous criticisms. Putnam’s view of valid ‘civic engagement and social 
connectedness’ was nostalgic (Fine and International Initiative for Promoting Political 
Economy, 2010; Talbot, 2000), for example pointing as it did to television as one of main 
causes of the decline in associational life. Similarly, for Theda Skocpol, Putnam’s work 
failed to take note of the changing shape of associational life. She also argued that 
Putnam’s view of civic life was too narrow and that it over-emphasised local groups and 
associations as its centrepiece. Skocpol suggested that ‘American civic voluntarism was 
never predominantly local and never flourished apart from national government and 
politics’ (Skocpol, 2003: 12).  
 
Nevertheless Putnam’s brand of social capital, with its focus on local associational life, 
civic responsibility and good citizenship could be seen to be influential in New Labour 
circles. For example, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown wrote that   
 
Voluntary action is a form of active citizenship, of active engagement in 
the society in which we live. By participating in our community, we learn 
about the world beyond our front doors and garden gates, and our 
citizenship is stronger as a result. It is our own constructive contribution 
to the forging of good social relations and the rich civic society on which 
we all depend. And it is a contribution that the state cannot make in our 
place (Brown, 2000, cited in Wilson, 2001: 25). 
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A variety of associational concepts – voluntary action; citizenship; engagement; and civic 
society – were co-located by Brown and credited with making life liveable. The community 
was painted in idyllic everyday terms – a place of ‘front doors’ and ‘garden gates’ and 
‘good social relations’. Drawing on the ‘folksy’ side of social capital, Brown lauded the 
benefits of voluntary action as a gateway to engaging with and understanding the outside 
world and an input into making that world better. Community engagement was not just 
educational or practical, as was revealed in a speech to a leading voluntary sector 
organisation:31  
 
Your efforts represent society at work, compassion in action, community 
at its best – as someone once said, making the word neighbour not just a 
geographical term but an ethical term as well (Brown, 2000).  
 
Here Brown used community in a different, more grounded way to Blair, more in line with 
Blunkett, tying it to local geography. However, like the Prime Minister he positioned it as 
an (old-fashioned) virtue that encapsulated and required what one author has described 
as ‘public-spiritedness sacrifice for the community…’ (Powell, 2000: 95). Community and 
associational life was therefore central to New Labour’s understanding and explanation of 
the modern world and to the new settlement that the party sought between the 
individual, the market and the state. For the New Labour formula to work community had 
to work. It is in this context that apparent breakdowns in community life witnessed in the 
‘northern disturbances’ need to be assessed. 
 
3 The northern ‘disturbances’ and parallel living 
The so-called ‘northern disturbances’ occurred over the spring and summer of 2001 
mainly centred in Bradford (15 April 2001 and 7-10 July 2001); Oldham (26-29 May 2001); 
                                                     
31
 The speech was given to the National Council of Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) a leading umbrella 
organisation with thousands of members in the voluntary and community sector.  
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and Burnley (24-26 June 2001) alongside some lesser disturbances in Leeds and Stoke-on-
Trent (Home Office, 2001).  
 
The Bradford disturbances attracted significant attention for a number of reasons. 
Bradford had been one place where public burning of Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic 
Verses had taken place in 1989 (Finney and Simpson, 2009; Solomos, 2003) and it had also 
been the location of unrest in 1995. In 2001, there was disorder in April (commencing the 
series of events known as the ‘northern disturbances’). There were further problems in 
Bradford in July. The July disturbances were particularly serious and led to injuries 
sustained by over 300 people – around three times the level in any of the other areas 
involved (Home Office, 2001: 7) and also included the burning down of the Oak Lane BMW 
garage  (Wainwright, 2001). Christopher Allen described the events in July in the following 
terms:   
 
As with other areas where disturbances occurred, far-right and neo-Nazi 
organisations were active. Despite having a march by the National Front 
(NF) banned on the day of the disturbances, many witnesses identified 
large groups in Bradford city centre. Tensions between police, Asian-
Muslim groups and neo-Nazi groups led to confrontation between them. 
The violence escalated: the cumulative effect being the evening’s 
disturbances. 400-500 Asian-Muslim youths fought pitched battles with 
police in the suburb of Manningham (Allen, 2003: 7). 
 
A critical factor in the Bradford disturbances was outside agitation from racists from the 
National Front and neo-Nazis and such activity was also evident in the disturbances in 
Oldham (Solomos, 2003).  
 
The events in Oldham resulted in less violence and damage than those in Bradford. Yet the 
disturbances and the explanations of them also illuminated the micro-politics of local 
space. As with the other sites of the 2001 disturbances there were claims and counter 
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claims about the sources of local tensions. The (slow-acting) catalyst appeared to be the 
violent attack by a group of young Asian males on 75 year old white pensioner Walter 
Chamberlain on 21 April 2001 – more than a month before the disorder. Chamberlain was 
attacked on an access road through an industrial estate towards the mainly white part of 
town where he lived (Vasagar and Ward, 2001). Perhaps as a ‘two-fingered’ response to 
the Macpherson report the police treated the attack as racially motivated and the 
National Front and British National Party32 sought to racialise the attack (Alexander, 2004), 
even though Chamberlain's son expressed the view of the family that it was an assault 
rather than a race issue (Vasagar and Ward, 2001). Months later, in September 2001, 
when a 14 year old boy was convicted of the assault, the presiding judge stated that ‘I am 
quite satisfied there is no evidence here by which a jury could come to the conclusion that 
the crimes were motivated by race’ (cited in Carter, 2001).  
 
The reality was that the role of race in this crime was not altogether clear. It may have 
been possible that if Chamberlain was elderly Asian man that he would not have been 
attacked by these young Asian men. However, if the crime was not racially motivated, 
then it took place in a highly racialised context in which the assault on Chamberlain could 
have just as easily have been an attack elsewhere in Oldham on a 75 year old Asian by 
young white males.  
 
What was certain was that, as was the case in Bradford, the National Front (NF) and 
British National Party (BNP) had been fomenting problems in Oldham as Chief 
Superintendent Eric Hewitt, Head of the Oldham division of Greater Manchester Police, 
acknowledged when he said:  
 
                                                     
32
 The British National Party had been active in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham ahead of the various 
disturbances. Nick Griffin the leader of the British National Party had been speaking in Bradford to 
supporters the night before the summer disturbances in Bradford (Allen, 2010). 
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There is no doubt the presence of the NF and BNP in recent weeks would 
seem to be a deliberate ploy to exploit our racial situation and it has since 
struck a chord of fear among our communities, not just Asian (cited in 
Stokes, 2001).  
 
Hewitt labelled the NF and BNP as outsiders instilling fear into the lives of insiders in ‘our 
communities’. Despite the activities of external agitators the prevailing idea was of 
Oldham as a place with what the Superintendent called a ‘racial situation’ that was 
exploited by outside racists but not caused by them. Instead the attack on Walter 
Chamberlain and the disorder that followed was taken to be a consequence of community 
‘no-go zones’ (Vasagar and Ward, 2001).   
 
A series of local and national reviews into the disturbances were established, including an 
interdepartmental ministerial group announced by Home Secretary David Blunkett in July 
2001. The group was to be chaired by John Denham, the Minister of State with 
responsibility for crime reduction, policing and community safety. The selection of 
Denham, given his portfolio, reflected one strand of New Labour’s thinking that the 
disturbances were a breakdown of law and order. For example, Tony Blair described the 
actions as ‘thuggery’ and that those involved had ended up ‘destroying their own 
community’ (cited in Wainwright, 2001).33 David Blunkett also spoke in July 2001 about 
the law and order aspect to what went on in Bradford: 
 
… what took place in the Manningham district [of Bradford] was sheer 
mindless violence and therefore people acting in a totally anti-social and 
thuggish fashion, rather than some inherent cause through disadvantage 
that we need to address (cited in Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 61). 
 
                                                     
33
 The latter comment perhaps betrayed Blair’s middle class bafflement of how anyone would do such a 
thing to the place that they lived, ignoring the fact that not everyone liked the area in which they lived. 
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In expressing such sentiments, Blunkett imposed a conservative interpretation of civil 
disorder as needless and without purpose, similar to the way that Conservative Home 
Secretary Douglas Hurd had interpreted the civil disorder in 1985 in Brixton and 
Tottenham34 (Benyon, 1987).  
 
In foregrounding law and order, Blunkett turned attention away from questions of race 
inequality and injustice. However, race was an important factor when it came to blaming 
and punishing those involved in disturbances. This can be seen in the harsh sentencing 
that was doled out to Asian-Muslims involved in the disturbances in Manningham, 
Bradford as compared to those found guilty of similar offences on Bradford’s mainly white 
Ravenscliffe Estate.  
 
Whilst those involved in the Manningham disturbances of Asian-Muslim 
descent have received average sentences of four and a half years, at 
Ravenscliffe, those [mostly white people] convicted of their involvement 
in the disturbances have been sentenced to an average sentence of not 
more than two years (Allen, 2003: 41). 
 
The discrepancy in sentencing was intriguing. Participants in the disorder in Manningham 
were charged with riot and those in Ravenscliffe were charged with violent disorder 
(Allen, 2003), which accounted for the sentencing discrepancy. The decision to 
differentiate between the two areas was a ‘political’ one that could be seen as a signal 
that Asians were seen as the central problem in the community and that those convicted 
                                                     
34
 For example, Hurd spoke the mindless excitement of breaking the law and causing disorder when he said 
that  
The excitement of forming and belonging to a mob, the evident excitement of violence 
leading to fears on crimes that we have seen reported and the greed that leads to 
looting… to explain all those things in terms of deprivation and suffering is to ignore 
some basic and ugly facts about human nature (Hurd, 1985 cited in Benyon, 1987: 30). 
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needed to be given tough sentences – both in order to punish them and to deter others 
from similar action.  
 
Whereas the government’s first response (as illustrated by Blunkett above) dismissed any 
legitimate structural or racist causes of the disturbances, it also eschewed culturalist 
explanations of the disturbances and even downplayed the idea of communities divided 
along cultural lines. The emphasis was placed on thuggery plain and simple. However, in 
parliament David Blunkett framed the investigation into the disorder in broader terms 
than criminality alone.  
 
As we share a common citizenship, we have to find ways of working and 
living together in harmony. Our aim is to create an inclusive society, local 
communities which meet the needs of all groups, and a dialogue which 
transcends differences (Hansard, 2001).  
 
This was, on the one hand, a more considered and even emollient liberal response 
(Benyon, 1987) to disorder, compared to the original conservative dismissal of events as 
‘thuggery’. The passage above stepped out of a law and order framework and into a social 
one, emphasising the need to live with and overcome differences and to include 
marginalised people. It even offered the possibility that the issue of race inequality might 
be attended to. The analysis recognised the existence of exclusions and group tensions 
and hinted at the connection between the two. This new framework made a break from 
concerns about policy-community relations that had been central to policymaker 
interpretations of unrest in the 1980s and 1990s (Solomos, 2003). In doing so, it also 
opened up and encouraged the notion that localities were divided on ethnic and cultural 
lines and set up BME populations and organisations for scrutiny and suspicion for their 
roles in damaging community.  
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3.1 Towards parallel lives 
The discursive notion of separate ethnic lives was given initial shape by the first of three 
independent local reviews on the main areas affected by the disturbances. A Bradford 
review (Ouseley, 2001) was led by Herman Ouseley, the former Executive Chairman of the 
Commission for Racial Equality, and was commissioned before the 2001 disturbances 
began. The review was entitled Community Pride not Prejudice and it highlighted some 
local tensions between ethnic groups that came to define the disorder. Ouseley laid the 
ground for the discourse of parallel lives (see below) when he stated that: 
 
... different ethnic groups are increasingly segregating themselves from 
each other and retreating into "comfort zones" made up of people like 
themselves. They only connect with each other on those occasions when 
they cannot avoid each other... (Ouseley, 2001: 16) 
 
Ouseley presented ethnic differences as significant and as the basis of segregation and 
conflict. Furthermore the cause of the segregation was not outside the control of local 
people, unlike racist housing policies. This was their choice. This discourse of self-
segregation argued that both whites and non-whites preferred the company of their ‘own’ 
rather than to stretch themselves and to make the effort to extend their social networks. 
In the context of government’s interest in active communities and citizenship, the 
population of Bradford were inactive citizens whose anti-engagement instincts resulted in 
fragmented communities. As the first of the various reports on the northern towns to be 
published, Community Pride not Prejudice established discursive ideas of communities 
separated along ethnic lines in the policy sphere.  
 
The group producing a report into the events in Burnley (Burnley Task Force, 2001) was 
chaired by Tony Clarke and the corresponding team for Oldham was chaired by David 
Ritchie (Oldham Independent Review, 2001). Once again, the main discursive theme that 
emerged from these reports was the idea of people living in contiguity but without (cross-
ethnic) solidarity. Specifically, it was argued that people lived in separate areas in 
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neighbourhoods according to ethnicity and that other potentially cross-ethnic 
experiences, such as work, school and places of worship, were also monocultural rather 
than multicultural. The Clarke report on Burnley used the phrase ‘parallel lives’ (Burnley 
Task Force, 2001: 7) to describe what the Task Force saw as the separate and segregated 
lives of Asian and White communities.  
 
These three local reports were supplemented by a Community Cohesion Review Team 
appointed by David Blunkett to take a multi-local view and to develop some national 
policy implications to prevent a repeat of the northern disturbances. The team was tasked 
to seek out the views of local residents and community leaders in the towns affected by 
the disturbances, as well as other parts of England that had not been affected, such as 
Southall, Birmingham and Sheffield. The remit of the review team was to ‘identify good 
practice, key policy issues and new and innovative thinking in the field of community 
cohesion’ (Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001: 5). This review provided local colour 
and was in line with the government’s expressed interest in evidence-based policymaking 
(Cabinet Office, 1999; Wells, 2007). Ted Cantle, formerly the Chief Executive of 
Nottingham City Council, was appointed by the Home Secretary to Chair the review team 
(Ted Cantle’s Website, 2012).  
 
The review team concurred with the Bradford, Burnley and Oldham reports and in 
particular it memorably used, or re-used, the phrase found in the Burnley report about 
‘parallel lives’.  
 
Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas 
came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of 
polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which these physical 
divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, 
was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and 
voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and 
cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of 
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a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any 
point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges 
(Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001: 9). 
 
According to the Community Cohesion Review Team, separate living arrangements 
characterised lives that did not touch at any point. Because the basis of separation was 
ethnicity and culture and issues of community (Bauman, 1996) the divide was deemed to 
be deeper than issues of physical separation. The report contrasted the desired state of 
overlapping and interchanging lives with the situation of parallel ones, so fixing in place 
the central discourse of multiculture and collective life of this second part of the New 
Labour period. Cantle’s team emphasised and reified the existence of two sides: south 
Asians and white people. Although blame was not attached explicitly to one side or the 
other for the lack of interchange the narrative of separate education, language and 
networks invited criticism of the ‘newcomer’ Asians who had failed to integrate into the 
mainstream local white communities (Alexander, 2004). Furthermore, the ‘common 
sense’ operating logic was that ‘cultural networks’ only really applied to BME people who 
were defined by culture and not white people (Sveinsson, 2009); and it was therefore 
these closed cultural communities that were the parallel in parallel lives.  
 
The idea, problem and power of a discourse of ‘parallel lives’ was tied to the work 
undertaken by Robert Putnam on community and social capital (cited above). Putnam’s 
discussion of social capital distinguished between bonding and bridging types, where the 
former was more inward-looking, tending towards reinforcing homogeneous groups 
whereas the latter could be more outward-looking and inclusive of greater diversity.  
 
Bonding capital is good for under-girding specific reciprocity and 
mobilizing solidarity… Bridging networks, by contrast, are better for 
linkage to external assets and for information diffusion…. Moreover, 
bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, 
whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves…. Bonding 
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social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas 
bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40 (Putnam, 2000: 22-
23).  
 
Though Putnam did not explicitly label bonding social capital ‘bad’ and bridging social 
capital ‘good’, extending his superglue-WD-40 analogy, the former could result in society 
getting stuck whereas bridging social capital acted as a social lubricant. Putnam’s later 
work (2007) also argued that in more ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, people trusted 
each other less, were less altruistic, and had fewer friends. In other words, they tended to 
‘hunker down’ (Putnam, 2007: 137). Although this latter piece of work came after the 
Cantle report, Putnam's earlier ideas of bridging versus bonding should be seen as 
informing the Cantle report (McGhee, 2003) and the broader idea of ethnic groups living 
in parallel. The interdepartmental ministerial group led by John Denham accepted the 
parallel lives hypothesis and viewed it as associated with, if not a cause of, the 
disturbances. The Denham report argued that ‘in many areas affected by disorder or 
community tensions, there is little interchange between members of different racial, 
cultural and religious communities’ (Home Office, 2001: introduction).  
 
Publication of this report could be said to be the moment that Simon Woolley referred to 
in this chapter’s opening epigram, marking the loss of the ‘multiculturalism agenda’. 
While, for Woolley, this was a source of regret, this was not the case for others. For 
Kundnani (2002), the policy imperative behind parallel lives and community cohesion was 
to find an alternative framework to contain and cage Asian people as effectively as 
multiculturalism once had.  
 
Before turning in more detail to community cohesion as a policy response to parallel lives 
it is worth pausing to reflect on the way that and extent to which, post-northern 
disturbances and post-9/11, this agenda was about Muslims as well as Asians and the 
wider BME population.  
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Much of the official and race equality commentary on the northern disturbances used the 
both the terms Asians and Muslims to refer to people in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham 
with Bangladeshi and Pakistani backgrounds. However, the issue of Muslims was to the 
fore after the northern disturbances as the executive summary of the Cantle report made 
clear: 
 
A Muslim of Pakistani origin summed this up: 
‘When I leave this meeting with you I will go home and not see another 
white face until I come back here next week’ 
 
Similarly, a young man from a white council estate said: 
‘I never met anyone on this estate who wasn’t like us from around here’. 
(Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001: 9) 
 
The Asian man was defined both by religion (Muslim) and national origin (Pakistani) – 
even though he was likely to be a British citizen. By contrast, the white man did not need 
to be assigned a religion because that was deemed not to be an active variable in 
explaining him. His national origin also needed no mention because unlike his Asian 
counterpart he was self-evidently British. What was important was his class, signalled by 
the fact that he lived on a council housing estate and was therefore both white and 
disadvantaged (Denham, 2010;  Kelly and Byrne, 2007; Sveinsson, 2009).  
 
Muslims had already been established as specific figures of concern in British life long 
before the northern disturbances. This phenomenon can be traced back to the 
controversy over Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988) in which Rushdie was 
accused of blasphemy. In January 1989 a staged book-burning took place in Bradford and 
there were demonstrations against the book in Pakistan and other Muslim countries. In 
February 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwā against Rushdie (Solomos, 2003). The 
affair further encouraged debates about the multiple nature of the category BME (Hall, 
1991b, 1992a; Modood, 1988, 1992) and also led to tensions on the left about appropriate 
131 
 
responses. One approach was to protect Muslims as a minority, and in this spirit Labour 
MPs Bernie Grant and Keith Vaz argued for an extension of the blasphemy laws to cover 
Islam. Others on the left supported the right to criticise religion and were anxious about 
the political goals of religious groupings (Solomos, 2003).  
 
This ‘Muslim question’ was given national shape through military interventions in the Gulf 
War in 1990-1991 and continued into the New Labour period with the war in Afghanistan 
in 2001; as well as the war in Iraq in 2003. According to John Solomos these types of 
events  
 
… provided a stark reminder, if any were needed, of how the question of 
national identity had become inextricably linked to the politics of race. 
Perhaps the main social impact of the Gulf War, especially when taken 
together with the Rushdie affair, was to enhance the idea that there was 
some kind of unitary Muslim community in Britain that could pose a 
threat to national identity (Solomos, 2003: 215).  
 
The critical point being made here by Solomos was that the Muslim community was seen 
as some kind of unified threat to Britishness and the British way of life. This idea of an 
imagined unified Muslim threat was particularly embodied in young men, as identified and 
criticised in Claire Alexander's work on ‘Asian gangs’ (Alexander, 1998, 2000, 2004). This 
concern about young Asian men informed subsequent interpretations of the northern 
disturbances and sentencing policy for participants in the disorder (Allen, 2003). In 
addition, the Cantle and Denham reports were finalised after the 11 September 2001 
attacks on New York and Washington DC, and as such the category of Muslim was gaining 
policy currency over the more traditional classification of (south) Asian and policymakers 
such as David Blunkett connected Islam to different and dangerous ‘norms’ in conflict with 
and outside ‘British norms of acceptability’ (cited in Brown, 2001). 
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In this way, the ‘Muslim problem’ was, in the mind of policymakers, different and more 
unified than the more generalised anxiety about BME people as a whole (Allen, 2010). 
However, I would also argue that alongside the specificities of this anti-Islamic turn, it is 
also important to understand the link between this and broader policymaker anxieties 
about multiculture. I see the discourses about a Muslim threat as a distinct thread within a 
wider process of what the CFMEB identified as ‘deep-rooted antagonisms to racial and 
cultural difference’ (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 38). Furthermore, the response to this idea 
of Muslim separateness influenced and had important implications for the broader work 
of BME-led race equality organisations and organising (Alexander et al., 2013). 
 
3.2 Cohesive communities 
The policy response to parallel lives (Cantle, 2001; Home Office, 2001) was cohesive 
communities. ‘Community cohesion’ contained four main elements, each of which 
responded in some way to the problem of parallel lives. The four elements were: a 
common vision and a sense of belonging to the local area; appreciation and valuing the 
diversity of people’s backgrounds and circumstances; similar life opportunities for people 
of different backgrounds; and people from different backgrounds and circumstances 
developing strong and positive relationships (Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001:  
13; Local Government Association, 2002: 6; Local Government Association, 2004: 7).  
 
Community cohesion expressed in these terms referred to a set of outcomes where 
multiculture and wider collective life was aligned and where lives were lived not in parallel 
but in productive overlap. However, community cohesion was full of contradiction as 
Claire Alexander noted.  
 
One of the biggest ironies of the ‘community cohesion’ agenda is that it 
creates the idea of minority ethnic communities at the same time as it 
demands their disappearance, and that it fixes ethnic identity within 
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these community boundaries while demanding it move outside of them 
(Alexander, 2007: 124-5). 
 
The tension in the community cohesion debate meant that it was a simultaneously 
‘retreat to multiculturalism’ (Brighton, 2007: 3) as well as it was an attempt to escape it. A 
step in the latter direction was taken in 2004 when Tom Baldwin (TB) from The Times 
interviewed Trevor Phillips (TP), then Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality. Phillips 
said the following about multiculturalism: 
 
TP: “The word [multiculturalism] is not useful, it means the wrong things.”  
 
TB: [Journalist asks] Shall we kill it off?  
 
TP: “Yes, let’s do that,” he replies. “Multiculturalism suggests 
separateness. We are in a different world from the Seventies.  
 
“What we should be talking about is how we reach an integrated 
society... But I also think people should be allowed to be a bit different. 
It’s a good thing that people are different in Yorkshire than they are in 
Cornwall” (Baldwin, 2004). 
 
In response to a question on whether multiculturalism should be killed off, Phillips 
answered in the affirmative. In the context of the northern disturbances and community 
cohesion, the aim was integration; and multiculturalism was about disintegration. 
Difference would have to be curtailed to the non-threatening regional variety as, in 
theory, such affinities were non-racial and transferable. That is one could acquire 
Cornishness or Yorkshireness, but one could not attain another ethnicity. However, it was 
interesting that Phillips chose two very white identities (Cornishness and Yorkshireness) 
that were difficult, if not impossible, for BME people or even non-BME ‘outsiders’ to fully 
attain. This point revealed how community cohesion was not about the openness or 
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closed nature of identities but specifically about the problem of ethnicity as a site of 
affinity and allegiance. 
 
Community cohesion, by questioning the place of minority ethnicity in society, also 
heralded a move away from concerns of race equality and from BME-led organising for it. 
This shift was not explicit in the definition of community cohesion as it emphasised valuing 
diversity and similar life opportunities for people of different backgrounds as well as 
strong and positive relationships across backgrounds (Community Cohesion Review Team, 
2001; Local Government Association, 2002; Local Government Association, 2004). 
Conceptually, it was not clear how each of the elements of community cohesion related to 
one another in policy terms; what, if any, were the causal links between the dimensions; 
and where equality stood in the list of priorities. According to Ted Cantle, the elements of 
community cohesion were interdependent and that it was a case of all or nothing: 
 
SL: Maybe, given that… community cohesion is a multi-stranded concept 
and has different ideas of common vision, belonging, opportunities and so 
on; I just wonder if you could say something about how those different 
strands interact. For example, are they independent variables, are they 
dependent, are they sequential? 
 
Ted Cantle: No, I think it's very important that they are all done together. 
I mean, that's the whole point of it really… In my view you can’t have a 
cohesive society unless you're also addressing grievances and inequality… 
You can't have cohesion without some form of interaction and connection 
between people… And, similarly, a sense of belonging is only going to be 
achieved if people feel that a part of the community, a stake in the 
community… It's always been clear to me and to all the definitions that all 
the different aspects of cohesion have to be done as part of the same 
process. They're absolutely inextricably linked (Ted Cantle, 2011, 
Interview).  
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Therefore, for Cantle, each of the elements of community cohesion was directly or 
indirectly a response to the problem of parallel lives and contributed to the promotion of 
overlapping lives. The emphasis was on more belonging, more equality and more 
interaction in the community all happening at once and with each element contingent on 
the others. This was also a rejection of a ‘race equality first’ approach that had been 
advanced by some BME-led race equality actors that ‘people integrate better [and] 
quicker when they're afforded equality’ (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview). Now there was 
a simultaneous exchange that was required where BME people could expect advances in 
race equality but only if they were also themselves taking steps to integrate with and 
belong to the community. Race equality was now officially a contingent good. 
 
However, whilst discussions of community cohesion and parallel lives were widespread, it 
was poorly suited to practical policy implementation, as Nick Pearce, former Special 
Advisor to David Blunkett and former Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit, argued: 
 
I mean my own view about the community cohesion side of things is that I 
don't believe that really had depth and kind of traction in government. 
You know, I think John Denham's group around government tried to do its 
best to pull together a response but it struggled to get traction with 
number 10 and the different departments (Nick Pearce, 2011, Interview).  
 
According to Pearce community cohesion was a policy idea without policy ‘traction’. Its 
conceptual circularity made it unclear what was to be done about it. However, though the 
link between community cohesion and practical policy was weak, that did not mean that 
the community cohesion debate did not have an effect. In particular, discussions of 
community cohesion mediated and problematised those of race inequality, multiculture 
and multiculturalism and as such had a profound impact on the work and the workings of 
BME-led race equality organisations (see chapter six for further discussion).  
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3.3 Cohesion and (race) equality 
Parallel lives and community cohesion were built on a notion of population segregation 
that was highly questionable. For example, using 2001 Census data, Finney and Simpson 
acknowledged that the BME population of Bradford clustered in particular parts of the 
district but argued that there were other developments across the area as a whole 
including more ‘mixed’ wards and 'White arrival’ into predominantly BME areas  of 
Bradford (Finney and Simpson, 2009: 123). The implication was that multiculture was not 
associated with physical separation of people along ethnic lines. Rather, in the main, it 
was associated with greater mixing. Elsewhere, Danny Dorling (2005) argued that Britain 
was not segregated along ethnic or faith lines but was at risk of segregation by wealth and 
poverty. Despite these arguments, the proximity of white people and Asian people was 
not in itself proof of harmonious mixing. As such it was hard to refute ideas of ethnic 
segregation at the heart of the parallel lives hypothesis and parallel lives appeared to have 
discursive ‘traction’.  
 
It was significant that in many cases race equality actors did not contest arguments about 
segregation and parallel lives. In part this was because their work was predicated on the 
distinctiveness of the BME experience of race inequality and arguments that BME people 
were being forced through racism to live peripheral lives. Both ideas were consistent with 
notions of parallels. Instead of arguing against segregation race equality actors attempted 
to make sense of why physical separateness occurred and to ensure that BME people 
were not blamed for it.  
 
In the first instance, the usual suspect of racism was held responsible for the lack of 
overlap between BME and white people. Some authors argued that various reports of 
segregation over-emphasised the ‘choice’ of Asians to self-segregate and at the same time 
to correspondingly de-emphasise the importance of ‘white flight’ from areas and to ignore 
the role of local government racist housing policy in balkanising northern mill towns 
(Amin, 2002; Kundnani, 2001). For example, a typical rejoinder took the form: ‘[i]t is not 
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Black communities that do not want to be part of cohesive communities or to be 
integrated; rather they have been segregated by racism’ (1990 Trust, 2005: 31).  
 
A 2001 BTEG press release attacked David Blunkett for seeking to shift blame for the 
disturbances onto BME communities. 
 
… the Home Secretary has deflected attention away from racism and the 
real causes behind the civil uprisings. In doing so, he is blaming the 
victims of racism and discrimination for a wide range of socio-economic 
problems that successive governments have failed to address (BTEG, 
2001: 1).  
 
BTEG argued that racism and discrimination were the guilty parties and the root cause of 
the disturbances aided and abetted by the complacency of governments. BME people 
were innocent victims – playing to an idea of this grouping as blameless and deserving 
justice. Elsewhere in the same press release Jeremy Crook, in order to counter attempts to 
blame BME people for the northern disturbances, attempted to re-invoke the earlier idea 
of institutional racism by saying: ‘… let’s start by talking about the failure of government 
policy to tackle institutional racism in housing, education, jobs and politics’ (BTEG, 2001).  
 
Given the injustice facing BME people, BTEG adopted a radical view of the collective 
violence (Benyon, 1987) and portrayed the actions of people in Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham as ‘civil uprisings’ (BTEG, 2001) rather than disorder, disturbances or riots. OBV’s 
Simon Woolley made a comparable point about the emancipatory impulses behind the 
disturbances.  
 
You know, it’s the ten year anniversary just recently of the Bradford riots 
and anybody that... would want to dig around in it would clearly recognise 
that it was the BNP that started all that you know coming into the areas 
and causing trouble. And all you had was second-generation Muslims 
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saying ‘hang on a second, we’re gonna fight back’. You know. That 
happened in Leicester in the 70s. You know it's happened when 
communities start defending themselves. It was articulated as anti-British 
antidemocratic and black people that were failing to integrate. That’s how 
it was presented and everything else there then followed that... (Simon 
Woolley, 2011, Interview). 
 
These disturbances were framed as justified acts of resistance rather than the 
interpretation of mindless or separatist violence that the government insisted upon. 
Bradford was a legitimate ‘fight back’ from the local community and an act of self-defence 
– led by British-born Muslims responding to provocations from British National Party 
activists. In addition, Woolley suggested that these acts should not be viewed as signs of 
anti-Britishness. Rather, the implication was that BME people were fighting from within 
for a safe space inside and as part of the nation. This had echoes of the claim from Ash 
Amin that those young Asians involved in the disturbances were ‘a counterpublic with 
distinctive citizenship claims’ (2002: 964). In other words, they were actively claiming 
citizenship rather than renouncing it.  
 
Elsewhere, ROTA criticised the way that community cohesion identified BME people and 
citizens as a problem in society. The passage below came from ROTA’s response to 
Guidance on community cohesion produced by the Local Government Association: 
 
Unfortunately the Guidance focuses on mainly Black and Minority Ethnic 
and Youth interests. Older people, disabled people, gay and lesbian 
people, single parents and many others barely feature, if at all. This 
Guidance is evidence of a missed opportunity to deliver a tool to help 
bring about cohesion within communities, with and for everybody (ROTA 
and Urban Forum, 2002: 2-3).  
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ROTA had essentially found out policymakers. Though community cohesion was supposed 
to be about whole communities the fixation with BME people clearly indicated otherwise. 
It was BME people that were deemed barriers to cohesion. By extension this pattern of 
blame and pathologising was consistent with the idea that, after the northern 
disturbances, policy and policymakers appeared to be moving (back) to ideas of 
normatively desirable whiteness (Burnett, 2004; Hall, 2000) which placed the 
responsibility of the challenges of multicultural living with ethnic minorities and presumed 
that the white British population was unproblematic (Robinson, 2005).  
 
However, though these counter-narratives of racism and action against racism as the 
causes of segregation and the disturbances offered by BME-led race equality organisations 
had a ring of truth they were also politically self-serving. For these organisations such 
arguments were a means of avoiding a new and uncomfortable landscape of resistance to 
racism that the northern disturbances represented. After years focussed on secular, 
metropolitan, ‘black’-led anti-racist work, the events of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham 
represented something new and specifically a young, male, Asian, Muslim and small town 
response to race inequality. This was a form of anti-racist parallel politics and one that 
was de-stabilising for ‘conventional’ BME-led race equality organisations.  
 
One response from BME-led race equality organisations as illustrated by BTEG and OBV 
above was to insist that though the modalities of the ‘uprisings’ may have been different 
they were familiar black-led political responses to racism. In other words the Asian Muslim 
‘counterpublic’ were a continuation of a familiar pattern, rather than one that broke the 
mould. However, that was an over-simplistic response and another option was to 
simultaneously say that there were familiar elements of oppression and resistance as well 
as new dimensions. Leroy Richards, former Head of policy at ROTA, tried to explain the 
drivers behind BME population clustering: 
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[i]ndividuals from the same ethnic group often choose to live together for 
support and cultural reasons.35 This does help these groups to become 
more effective at creating environments that maximise their potential 
success within the society they live. Therefore it is important that the 
Government understands why segregation persists in some geographical 
areas’ (Richards, 2004: 10).  
 
Richards offered a structural reason for BME population clustering as a coping response 
against racism and disadvantage. He also provided another reason under the catch-all 
category of ‘cultural reasons’. In doing so he was attempting to engage with something 
that appeared to be different and new about the northern disturbances. The problem was 
that ROTA, OBV and BTEG, like the government themselves did not really understand 
what was going on in those northern towns at the time of the disorder or the implication 
for conventional BME-led race equality work. In the passage above ROTA engaged with 
the idea of ‘culture’, whereas other BME-led race equality organisations chose to ignore it. 
However, in doing so they fell into another trap of suggesting that Asian people were 
somehow culturally programmed, borrowing Putnam’s phrase, to focus on their ‘narrower 
selves’ (2000: 23) and therefore to segregate themselves from others in their locality. This 
conundrum about how to consider and promote race equality and collective life against a 
shifting backdrop became still further complicated when the peculiarities of faith and 
ethnicity in the north of England burst onto the streets of London in 2005.  
 
                                                     
35
 Finney and Simpson also argued that one often-ignored factor behind population distribution was that 
'[s]mall preferences for sharing a neighbourhood with at least some of one's own ethnicity could account for 
significant degrees of ethnic clustering' (2009: 118). In other words BME people may have had relatively 
weak and benign BME preferences for living together with other similar people, e.g. for shared worship, and 
this may have led to population clustering that was inherently problematic or evidence of parallel living. 
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4 Unparalleled problems: The London Bombings  
In Singapore on Wednesday 6 July 2005, Jacques Rogge President of the International 
Olympic Committee announced that the Games of the 30th Olympiad in 2012 were 
awarded to London. London’s bid was built, in exemplary New Labour style, on something 
old – its history – and something new – its place as a multicultural world city. Tony Blair’s 
letter of support in the bid document sold the application as host city on the twin 
promises of sport as the lifeblood of the nation and on ‘the amazing diversity of London’ 
(London 2012, 2005: 5). However, before the celebrations at the awarding of the Games 
could get into full swing they were cut short by the events of Thursday 7 July 2005.  
 
Four bombers, Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lindsay and Shehzad 
Tanweer launched a series of co-ordinated attacks on London Transport. Three bombs 
exploded at around 0850 in the morning. These were on a Circle line train travelling 
between Liverpool Street and Aldgate; on a westbound Circle line train that had just left 
Edgware Road Station; and on a southbound Piccadilly line underground train travelling 
between King’s Cross and Russell Square. The fourth and final explosion took place around 
one hour later on the top deck of a number 30 double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, not 
far from King's Cross as it travelled between its route from Marble Arch to Hackney Wick 
(BBC, 2005). This was London's version of 11 September 2001 except that the threat came 
not from international airspace but from within as three of the four bombers were British 
born and all were British citizens living in West Yorkshire. 
 
By the time of the bombings in London in July 2005 the idea of a unified Muslim threat, as 
discussed in the previous section, had been firmly established in the public and political 
imagination (Solomos, 2003). Nine days after the London bombings Tony Blair made a 
speech in which he portrayed the actions of the bombers as driven by an ‘evil ideology’ 
connected to Al-Qaeda (Blair, 2005) and far removed from multicultural life and 
mainstream Islam.  
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They [Al-Qaeda and its supporters] demand the elimination of Israel; the 
withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the 
wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively 
Taleban states and Sharia law in the Arab world en route to one caliphate 
of all Muslim nations (Blair, 2005).  
 
Blair sought to abnormalise the bombers and the political alliance to which they belonged 
by outlining their preposterous political demands and alien goal of unifying Muslim 
nations. Elsewhere in the same speech Blair contrasted British and Western values: 
‘freedom, tolerance and respect for others’ against those of the Islamic extremists: 
‘suppression of women and the disdain for democracy’ (Blair, 2005). In doing so Blair 
attempted to cast Al-Qaeda as the ultimate parallel and alien entity. He also sought to 
magnify and maximise Al-Qaeda as a global force and ideology affecting the West; 
Westerners; Israel and all Muslim nations, as a justification strategy to give himself 
political scope for future action against Al-Qaeda and its sympathisers.  
 
By December 2006, when Tony Blair was making a series of valedictory speeches before 
he left office in the following May, the Prime Minister made it clear that (a minority of) 
Muslims were Britain’s most pressing multicultural problem: 
 
It [extremism] is not a problem with Britons of Hindu, Afro-Caribbean, 
Chinese or Polish origin. Nor is it a problem with the majority of the 
Muslim community. Most Muslims are proud to be British and Muslim 
and are thoroughly decent law-abiding citizens. But it is a problem with a 
minority of that community, particularly originating from certain 
countries’ (Blair, 2006).  
 
Blair was deliberately balanced and even handed so that he could carry out his desired 
political work and set an agenda for the next Prime Minister once he had stepped down. 
Therefore, of course, the London bombings and the bombers were categorised as 
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anomalous, unrepresentative of multicultural life in the nation and the wider BME and 
Muslim communities. So reasonable was New Labour that it recognised most Muslims 
were decent and law-abiding and many of them shared Blair’s pride in being British. Most 
Muslims, like British Hindus, Afro-Caribbeans, Chinese and Poles were proud Britons, just 
like Blair and the wider British public.  
 
However, because Blair had identified the threat as a particular one it did not mean that 
he and New Labour did not draw wider implications from the situation. As he stated 
elsewhere in the same valedictory speech cited above.  
 
The 7/7 bombers were integrated at one level in terms of lifestyle and 
work. Others in many communities live lives very much separate and set 
in their own community and own culture, but are no threat to anyone.  
 
But this is, in truth, not what I mean when I talk of integration. 
Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about 
values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying 
British values. It isn’t about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the 
rights and duties that go with being a member of our society (Blair, 2006). 
 
Whereas the post-northern disturbances discourse had largely centred on visible signs of 
separation between white and South Asian communities, the London bombers 
represented a different kind of threat. The bombers were apparently ‘integrated’ into 
society, for example, the suspected ringleader of the London bombers, Mohammad 
Sidique Khan was a teaching assistant in a primary school in Beeston, Leeds (BBC, 2007) 
and he was therefore involved in the kind of community ‘interchange’ that John Denham's 
report on community cohesion had deemed desirable (Home Office, 2001). However, in a 
video about the bombings, Khan justified his actions not in local but in global terms of 
British foreign policy: 
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Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly 
responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging 
my Muslim brothers and sisters (cited in Dodd and Taylor, 2005).  
 
For Khan, the level of community that mattered was not the local dimension of 
community cohesion but the global Muslim community. By way of response, the issue that 
mattered was not that Muslims lived amongst and interacted with white people but 
whether these Muslims shared British values. In the case of the bombers, it was their 
values rather than their lives that were un-British. Such people were therefore 
fundamentally and elementally different. Muslims in particular, and BME people more 
generally, were identified as a potential ‘fifth column’ and a specific problem of four 
murderous Britons became a wider question of multiculture and an even more 
problematic version of parallel living. 
 
The London bombings also saw a revival of discourse on the theme of physical 
segregation. For example, after the bombings of July 2005, Trevor Phillips, Chair of the 
Commission for Racial Equality, famously warned about the US-style ghetto-isation of 
Britain and that: 
 
... we are sleepwalking our way to segregation. We are becoming 
strangers to each other, and we are leaving communities to be marooned 
outside the mainstream (Phillips, 2005). 
 
Apart from being catchy and alliterative, sleepwalking to segregation conjured up a 
nightmarish scenario as well as inevitability about the doomed destination towards which 
the population was travelling. The theme of half-awake zombie-like behaviour was 
extended in the idea of people not recognising one another as their fellows but seeing 
each other as strangers. The metaphorical setting then switched from land to water but 
was no less dismal. The result was that whole groups of people were stranded from 
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society’s centre – its main ‘stream’. The imagined outsider communities that Phillips 
conjured up as the problem were BME ones (though not necessarily Muslim). This was 
because his apocalyptic vision explicitly drew on the example of what happened in post 
hurricane New Orleans when the normal rules of civility no longer applied as the US 
government abandoned the city’s largely African-American population.  
 
Letting his imagination run away with him, Phillips (2005) even stated that, left 
unchecked, the process of segregation would lead to ‘chronic cultural conflict.’ This doom-
laden scenario contained echoes of Enoch Powell's famous 1968 ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech 
which warned that ‘the immigrant communities can organise to consolidate their 
members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens’ (The Telegraph, 2007 
[1968]). Though Phillips’ address will unlikely live as long in the memory as Powell’s, it did 
call on policymakers to make a powerful response to avoid the prospect of a riven nation.  
 
4.1 Security and community cohesion 
The policy response to the London bombings, like the reaction to the northern 
disturbances, was framed by a sense of jeopardy and crisis. Well before the events of 7 
July 2005, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was passed in the wake of 
9/11, giving the state a raft of enhanced powers related to terrorism and security, such as 
the freezing of assets and the power to detain indefinitely and deport non-British citizens 
suspected by the Home Secretary to be a terrorist (National Archives, undated-a). The Act 
and the latter provision in particular have caused concerns about the compatibility of 
some of the measures with international human rights principles (Husband and Alam, 
2011: 65).  
 
Since 2003, the United Kingdom government has used a strategy known as CONTEST to 
counter international terrorism. CONTEST was divided into four principle strands: 
PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE which together were aimed at  ‘preventing 
terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals; pursuing terrorists and those that 
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sponsor them; protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and  
preparing for the consequences’ (HM Government, 2006: 9). 
 
The PREVENT strand is of most relevance to my interests, as its focus was on domestic 
‘terrorists inspired by Islamist extremism’ (HM Government, 2006: 8) and mitigating the 
risks of British people carrying out acts of violence, as was the case with the London 
bombings. This work to counter terrorism combined with the discourse of parallel lives to 
form part of a ‘securitisation’ agenda (Husband and Alam, 2011; Kundnani, 2007; McGhee 
2008, 2010) in which BME people, and Muslims in particular, were presented as a security 
threat as well as a broader problem in integrating in the nation. My interests are not 
explicitly on securitisation but rather on the extent to which such concerns affected 
discussions of national life, multiculture and race equality. In this respect, the government 
made the following link between security and cohesion: 
 
… the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and active 
citizenship in Britain strengthens society and its resistance to terrorism 
here in the UK (HM Government, 2006: 9). 
 
The government appeared to recognise that the ‘home-grown terrorists’ were more likely 
to be ‘produced’ in environments characterised by social exclusion and inequality. The 
implicit rationale was that their status as outsiders in Britain led to disenchantment and to 
seek solace in other groupings and entities that made them feel wanted and valued.36 On 
the other hand, there was the counterbalancing call for community cohesion and active 
citizenship with the requirement for BME people to assimilate and to conform (Kundnani, 
2005).  
 
                                                     
36
 However, even in government there was also acknowledgement, as stated by Tony Blair above about the 
London bombers, that ‘terrorists’ might not fit this profile. 
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Ideas of and the connections between equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and 
active citizenship contained in PREVENT were initially developed in the aftermath of the 
northern disturbances and the various reports that followed. In the light of the London 
bombings and what Nick Pearce labelled a lack of policy ‘traction’ (2011, Interview) 
associated with community cohesion, New Labour decided to revisit the topic.  
 
In August 2006, the then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Ruth 
Kelly (2006), launched the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) to look at how 
to counter tensions between people of different ethnic groups and religions. Kelly was 
interested in common bonds and the tensions between these and diversity. As a result, 
the Commission was asked to consider the following: 
 
In our attempt to avoid imposing a single British identity and culture, have 
we ended up with some communities living in isolation of each other, 
with no common bonds between them? (Kelly, 2006) 
 
The question was set up to be answered in the affirmative and implied a series of 
substitutes, complements and choices. A single British identity and culture was distinct 
from the multicultural; the multicultural meant that some communities lived apart from 
each other; isolation was a choice made by different cultural communities in relation to 
each other. Most importantly, a single British identity and culture was necessary (but not 
necessarily sufficient) for common bonds and the end of parallelism. Elsewhere, in the 
speech at the launch of the CIC, Ruth Kelly was careful to avoid direct criticism of BME 
people and instead pondered the complexity of rebalancing multicultural life. 
 
Second and third generation immigrants can face a struggle. Not to adapt 
to life in the UK – but to reconcile their own values and beliefs with those 
of their parents and grandparents. Young people may be seen as Pakistani 
on the streets of Burnley, but many feel out of place and “British” when 
they visit Pakistan (Kelly, 2006).  
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Multiculture, according to Kelly, was a perplexing place – not for her – but for young 
British Pakistanis like the London bombers. They had to navigate feeling in between 
Pakistan and Britain and there were inter-generational issues to be negotiated too. In 
making these points Kelly was drawing on ideas of migrants and minorities being ‘between 
two cultures’ (Watson, 1977) and processes not necessarily of cultural fusion but of 
‘confusion’ (Ali et al., 2008). Yet Kelly exhibited her own confusion when she argued, in 
contradictory terms, that second and third generations of Pakistanis were adapted to life 
in the UK but at the same time they were deemed to be dislocated both in Britain and 
Pakistan. Kelly also labelled them ‘immigrants’ – even though they were British born – as if 
to emphasise their permanent status as outsiders.  
 
Multiculture was not just a dislocating process for (British) Pakistanis but also for white 
Britons, albeit in a different way.  
 
… there are white Britons who do not feel comfortable with change. They 
see the shops and restaurants in their town centres changing. They see 
their neighbourhoods becoming more diverse. Detached from the 
benefits of those changes, they begin to believe the stories about ethnic 
minorities getting special treatment, and to develop a resentment, a 
sense of grievance (Kelly, 2006). 
 
In this passage Kelly added to the sense of a nation marked by parallel or uncomfortably 
overlapping lives. In the case of white people the particular concern was, apparently, the 
BME-isation of their neighbourhoods and the sense that BME people were getting ‘special 
treatment’ and getting ahead. By naming perceptions of favourable treatment for BME 
people as a problem for white Britons, Kelly was signalling that New Labour would go out 
of its way to allay such fears. By voicing (apparent) concerns of white Britons 
uncomfortable with change Kelly was both distancing herself from those concerns (after 
all New Labour was all for change) and at the same time legitimating and encouraging 
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those sentiments. Perhaps more importantly, Kelly was projecting the uncertainty and 
bewilderment of politicians themselves at complexities beyond their policy imagining and 
containment capabilities.  
 
As in other times when policymakers had been uncertain and bewildered, Kelly turned to 
people outside government for help in the form of the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion (CIC). The CIC was chaired by Darra Singh, the Chief Executive of Ealing Council 
and former Chief Executive of Luton Council (Benjamin, 2006). In addition to Singh there 
were 13 commissioners brought in to act in a personal capacity rather than in the interests 
of a particular institution or group in society. They included a trade union activist; a senior 
police officer; a local councillor; academics; and numerous leaders of voluntary and 
community sector organisations. Amongst the commissioners was Michael Keith, then a 
professor at Goldsmiths College. Keith had a longstanding interest in urban issues and 
multiculture and was the former leader of Tower Hamlets Council. Other commissioners 
included Ramesh Kallidai, the Secretary General of the Hindu Forum of Britain and Nargis 
Khan, a Councillor in the London Borough of Hackney who had contributed to the Cantle 
review and had advised the Home Office-led task force ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ 
(Information Daily, 2006).  
 
Although the CIC was brought into existence in the wake of the London bombings, the 
Commission did not particularly engage in security debates covered by PREVENT and was 
much more of a follow up to the reports carried out in the aftermath of the 2001 northern 
disturbances with its focus on the day-to-day, often local experiences of living together in 
multicultural settings. The Commission’s remit extended to England only and it had a 
specific focus to develop a set of ‘practical proposals for building integration and cohesion 
at a local level’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 7). Its work was advanced 
through commissioned research and a consultation process that spanned all the English 
regions. The report developed the work of the Community Cohesion Review Team (2001) 
but branched out from a focus on community cohesion to focus on integration and 
cohesion. These, the CIC argued, were related but distinct processes.  
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We do not believe integration and cohesion are the same thing as some 
argue. Cohesion is principally the process that must happen in all 
communities to ensure different groups of people get on well together; 
while integration is principally the process that ensures new residents and 
existing residents adapt to one another (Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion, 2007: 9). 
 
The separation of cohesion from integration in this way meant that the former was 
primarily concerned with Britain’s settled BME population (Bloch et al., 2013) such as 
those people involved in the northern disturbances. Integration was more a means of 
dealing with new population flows given the rising levels of immigration such as that from 
the expanded European Union (Bloch et al., 2013). While this distinction was not 
necessarily a problem in itself, the question of what to do about largely white central and 
eastern European newcomers was an important but distinct and perhaps distracting one 
to the question of race equality for settled BME populations.  
 
The CIC also advanced a new definition of an integrated and cohesive community which 
was identified as one where: 
 
 There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of 
different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a 
neighbourhood, city, region or country  
 There is a strong sense of an individual’s rights and responsibilities when 
living in a particular place – people know what everyone expects of them, 
and what they can expect in turn 
 Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access 
to services and treatment  
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 There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in 
arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications 
to be subject to public scrutiny 
 There is a strong recognition of the contribution of both those who have 
newly arrived and those who already have deep attachments to a 
particular place, with a focus on what they have in common 
 There are strong and positive relationships between people from different 
backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and other institutions within 
neighbourhoods (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 42). 
 
Differences from earlier definitions of community cohesion included that people were not 
required to have a sense of shared belonging or vision of the local area but instead they 
had a shared contribution towards a collective vision. This allowed for disagreement and 
dissent within a framework of encouraged overlap and commonality. A second difference 
was an emphasis on recognising the contribution of newcomers and long-settled people in 
a particular area – although this encouraged competing claim-making and inevitably 
favoured incumbents that could argue that they were more deeply part of the local fabric 
and had done more to make the local area. This framing gave permission to assert local 
contribution hierarchies and privilege not just between settled populations and new 
arrivals from Europe but licensed white Britons to assert themselves over settled BME 
people and to argue that their families had been contributing to Britain and the local area 
for more generations – thus putting BME belonging in its (inferior) place. A third departure 
from earlier definitions of community cohesion was the focus of individual rights and 
responsibilities that went with local and national citizenship. This was an attempt to 
categorise people outside of ‘cultural’ group membership that had been deemed to cause 
such division. 
 
The Commission developed 57 proposals on both integration and cohesion. Many of these 
were specific and subject to local conditions, such as encouraging local areas to develop 
their own local indicators of integration and cohesion (Commission on Integration and 
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Cohesion, 2007); a new programme of voluntary service for young people to boost local 
citizenship; and, most significantly, a recommendation that ‘single’ ethnicity community 
organisations ‘as part of their application for funding should demonstrate an 
understanding of their role in building integration and cohesion in their local community’ 
(Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 163). In justifying this funding proposal 
the Commission argued that:  
 
… it is clear that single identity work can entrench attitudes and 
stereotypes and can only ever be partial in a community where others 
share the public space… We are also clear that the presumption should be 
against Single Group Funding [awarded on the basis of a particular 
identity, such as ethnic, religious or cultural] unless there is a clear reason 
for capacity building within a group or community. (Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 162-163). 
 
The CIC asserted as self-evident that single identity work was incompatible with 
overlapping lives. It essentially adopted the position laid out in the Cantle report that: 
 
Funding bodies should presume against separate funding for distinct 
communities, and require collaborative working, save for those 
circumstances where the need for funding is genuinely only evident in 
one section of the community and can only be provided separately 
(Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001: 38). 
 
The CIC and the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) questioned the public benefit 
of organising on the basis of ‘single identity’. Such suspicions were nothing new. For 
example, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Enoch Powell had expressed his concern 
that organising amongst immigrant communities could damage ‘their fellow citizens’ (The 
Telegraph, 2007 [1968]). Despite the use of neutral language such as ‘distinct 
communities’ by the CCRT and ‘single community organisation’ and ‘single group funding’ 
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by the CIC to avoid naming BME communities as the problem, BME civil society groups 
and organisations were the main beneficiaries of such ‘distinct’ funding and therefore 
stood to be the main losers in the event of changes (Rattansi, 2010). The proposal against 
single and separate funding therefore showed how what had begun with a particular 
policy concern with Asian-Muslim communities was extended through a ‘chain of 
equivalence’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) to a problem with all forms of BME-led organising 
as potentially separatist.  
 
The report of the CIC threatened the role of BME political organising in addressing 
in/equalities. It argued that the assertion of group identities ‘can still be damaging to 
integration and cohesion if it means privileging one identity over others to access shared 
resource, and relying on the difference between them as a bargaining chip’ (Commission 
on Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 98). At the same time, however, the Commission also 
showed itself to be far from immune from asserting the needs of specific groups when it 
suited its own purpose. For example it named ‘white working class boys’ (Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 4) as a distinct population that needed to be protected 
and assisted.  
 
Cantle's single identity funding proposals were not followed up in the recommendations 
of the interdepartmental ministerial group led by John Denham (2001), in part, perhaps, 
because it was deemed politically difficult to implement at a time when BME 
organisations were relatively strong. Another reason for this non-implementation may 
have been because ethnically-based ‘representative’ organisations were seen by 
policymakers as vehicles through which to manage multicultural and race equality 
problems.37 By the time of the CIC these factors had changed and the single funding 
                                                     
37
 For example, ‘the DfES [Department for Education and Skills] and LSC [Learning and Skills Council] will 
commission work involving local voluntary organisations and statutory bodies to devise local strategies for 
helping more people from ethnic minority groups back into learning’ (Home Office, 2001: 25).  
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proposals were offered up for consultation by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (2008). In the event they were successfully rebuffed by a campaign against 
by a range of BME and non-BME voluntary sector organisations and funders (BTEG, 2007; 
Voice4Change England, 2008). In addition a High Court judicial review case was won by 
Southall Black Sisters in July 2008, as they challenged Ealing Council’s decision to cut 
funding to the organisation on the grounds that the council wanted to provide a generalist 
(‘multiple identity’) rather than specialist (‘single identity’) service. The judge ruled that 
there was no inconsistency between specialist service provision and community 
cohesion.38 However, although the single identity funding proposals were not formally 
enacted, they helped to create a policy and funding environment whereby all BME 
organising was newly scrutinised by funders and policymakers (Perry, 2008). 
 
4.2 BME-led organisations: restoring ‘race’  
Developments against identity-based funding, combined with the rise of Muslim identity 
and faith as a more prominent feature of multicultural life, left BME-led race equality 
organisations in a precarious position. In addition, such difficulties for these organisations 
were exacerbated as there were attempts to re-assert whiteness – this time not white 
privilege, but white disadvantage in the form of the ‘white working class’ (Back, 2010; 
Dench et al., 2006; Sveinsson, 2009) – onto the equalities agenda.  
 
The targeting of ‘single identity’ left BME-led organisations precariously placed especially 
due to the lack of clarity over the definition of this term.  
 
The problem with single identity organisations was that they could be 
specifically a Muslim organisation, a Sikh organisation, a Hindu 
                                                     
38 The judge ruled that the council should have had due regard to its duties under the Race Relations Act and 
carried out an Equality Impact Assessment before policy was changed. The judge also importantly ruled that 
there was no dichotomy between cohesion and specialist services (Gupta, 2008). 
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organisation or an African-Caribbean organisation and actually if they 
represented several different minorities then, in my view, they're not 
single identity (Ted Cantle, 2011, Interview). 
 
This nuanced point was a reminder that many BME-led organisations were actually based 
on multiple identities. However, they might present themselves as ‘single identity’ and 
unified groupings, such as African-Caribbean or Muslim, as part of their attempts to be 
seen by funders, policymakers and others as co-ordinated and solidaristic. In addition, 
funders and policymakers might see single identities where multiple ones existed. 
Ultimately, whether BME-led organisations encompassed multiple identities or not 
perhaps did not matter because they were, by definition, not working for the whole 
community but a particular segment of it. In the parlance of social capital they bridged – 
but only so far.  
 
The problem facing BME-led race equality organisations such as BTEG, OBV and ROTA was 
also that multiply-constituted coherent BMEness was unravelling, as discussed by a 
surprisingly rueful Ted Cantle: 
 
… what’s rather disappointing is that, you know, where I grew up in an era 
when the term black was a sort of political term, is that encompassed 
anybody from a minority community. And at the time I did my report in 
2001 that concept of black had been sort of disintegrating as 
organisations said ‘oh well we're not black, we're Asian or we’re not 
Asian, we're Sikh or we're Muslim’ or whatever. So some of the sort of 
camaraderie, I guess, between minority organisations had actually 
disappeared and splintered and I think there was an opportunity where 
minority organisations could be much more outwardly-focused but had 
actually grown increasingly inward-focused (Ted Cantle, 2011, Interview). 
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Cantle defended the findings of his review against problem ‘single identity’ organising by 
arguing that black identity had splintered (Alexander, 2002; Hall, 1991b; Solomos and 
Back, 1995). More specifically, he suggested that the umbrella term black was outwardly-
focused and the fragments of sub-black organising were problematic and inward-focused. 
Cantle was particularly scathing of and pointed the finger of blame at Asians for both the 
parallel lives that his review team identified, but also the death of political blackness. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, with the latter argument, Cantle came close to Sivanandan’s idea 
of ‘cultural enclaves and feuding nationalisms’ (Sivanandan, 2000: 423).  
 
As pressure was exerted on BME-led race equality organisations to become more 
recognisably and conspicuously multiply-orientated, ROTA was interested in further 
extending their work to encompass certain white people: 
 
… we were gonna look at... white boys in the east end of London and 
achievement at school because there were some issues there going on 
and we were a race organisation so they [a funder] thought that – yeah 
white people have an ethnicity too... (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview). 
 
This overlap was sometimes encouraged, as in ROTA's case with ROTA above, by funders 
that had responded to the recommendations on single identity funding even though they 
were not eventually passed (see Perry, 2008). Even where pressure from funders was not 
brought to bear, BME leaders did recognise the sometimes thin separation of black and 
white lives. As Jeremy Crook noted, ‘[there] are... white people in those [black] 
communities – white people in our families – because obviously there is more mixture 
now and all the rest of it so... those [black and white] mindsets... are a bit dated anyway... 
(2011, Interview). However, while this raised questions about neat and complete 
separations of black and white there were distinctions that required that BTEG maintained 
its BME-centred work as illustrated in this response to the CIC’s report.  
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The report suggests that the reasons why single group funding has been 
awarded in the past are now largely historical – e.g. that groups may ‘in 
the past have suffered direct or indirect discrimination’.  The report 
implies that these reasons are no longer valid, so there is no longer a 
good case for single group funding. But there is plenty of evidence to 
show that ethnicity is related to unequal outcomes in various service 
areas. The inequalities which prompted BME groups to start up in the first 
place are still there, even if the Committee's report completely overlooks 
them (BTEG, 2007: 2). 
 
BTEG responded to the CIC’s assertion that the context and the needs of the moment had 
changed by insisting that the opposite was true. The parallel structures of BME groups 
were created as a means to combat race inequalities and that struggle was still required 
and drove the work of BTEG, OBV and ROTA and many local organisations. 
 
Like BTEG, ROTA attempted to turn the debate away from integration and cohesion and 
back onto staple race equality issues.  
 
The COIC [Commission on Integration and Cohesion] report seems to 
assume that inequalities are not as prominent as they used to be… [W]e 
have concrete evidence that shows that London's BAME [Black Asian 
Minority Ethnic] communities experience a number of disadvantages 
from unemployment, access to health, criminal justice, education and 
regeneration… [I]t is presumptuous to assume that the indirect or direct 
discrimination that originally brought these groups together has now 
ended (ROTA, 2007: 1)  
 
ROTA’s point of intervention was similar to that of BTEG and like that organisation they 
invoked ‘evidence’ of race inequality to discredit the Commission and its readiness to turn 
attention onto cohesion. BTEG also continued earlier arguments (1990 Trust, 2005; Amin, 
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2002; Kundnani, 2001) that discrepant outcomes for BME people were due to structural 
disadvantage:  
 
We would argue that the main barrier to the integration of visible 
minorities is ‘skin colour’ and this is why so many black people were 
channelled into poor housing, low paid jobs and poor schools in the first 
place (BTEG, 2006: 13).  
 
BTEG’s use of integration related to settled BME communities rather than new 
immigrants, as used by the CIC. Integration was a desirable outcome that black people 
were in favour of but that they were denied. They did not choose parallel lives; rather 
these were forced on them. As well as exonerating BME people from blame for an 
apparent lack of integration the passage from BTEG also revealed how they and other 
BME-led race equality organisations responded to the increased profile and policy-
relevance of Muslimness after the northern disturbances. The reaction was to claim 
questions of integration as entirely a black phenomenon – indicated by non-white skin 
colour. Muslim specificities were denied and instead integration (and exclusion) was a 
black thing.  
 
BME-led race equality organisations attempted to subordinate religion to ethnicity. This 
was an ongoing tension in BME organising, reflected in part by questions and difficulties of 
containing south Asians under the black umbrella (see chapter two). Where policymakers 
had overstated the Muslim dimension and ‘problem’ as it affected questions of 
multiculture, race equality and collective life, BME-led race equality organisations were 
guilty of the opposite, insisting on ‘old ethnicities’ rather than new ones (Hall, 1991b, 
1992a), based on a (self-serving) idea that there was no change in the way that racism 
worked and who was affected by it.  
 
As an illustration of this ‘flattening’ process, BTEG stated that ‘[t]he Government believes 
that the veil is a barrier to integration’ (BTEG, 2006: 13), referring to the government’s 
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concern about ‘the face veil as a symbol of separation or a curtain’ (Straw, 2006). BTEG 
mocked the idea that such a small piece of cloth could be so powerful and called instead 
for the government to focus on discrimination against BME people as a far more 
significant barrier to integration. Whilst this was supportive of Muslims in one sense, the 
downplaying of (symbols of) Muslimness was also a way for BTEG to claim Muslim people 
as BME first and foremost, thus ensuring the relevance of BME-led race equality 
organisations.  
 
OBV connected the situation of Muslims to a more general struggle faced by BME people. 
The organisation condemned the speech by Ruth Kelly, Communities Secretary, at the 
launch of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. 
 
In her statement this morning, the Secretary of State while attacking 
multiculturalism and segregation as enemies of integration and cohesion, 
failed once to mention the underlying roots of inequality, discrimination 
and racism that many Muslim and BME communities face (OBV, 2006).  
 
OBV attempted to unify the BME experience by noting that both Muslims and BME people 
faced the same kinds of ‘underlying’ disadvantages. Elsewhere, even before the London 
bombings, they had attempted to draw the similarities between contemporary suspicions 
of Muslims with a broader attack on BME communities: 
 
The predominant issues over the last year for BME communities have 
become very clear. The ‘war on Iraq’ and on ‘terror’, has caused an 
unprecedented level of Islamophobia. The demonisation by certain 
sections of the media towards Muslims has meant that they and their 
religion have sadly become by-words for terrorism… As a result the 
debate about the Governments [sic] social cohesion and Trevor Phillips 
views on multiculturalism radically move away from anti-racism and 
celebrating diversity to demanding that BME communities, particularly 
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Muslims, ‘become more British’, whatever that means. This shift along 
with the policies of ‘stop and search’ and ID cards all form part of the 
political array that will invariably and negatively focus more on our 
communities (OBV, 2005: 1).  
 
The specific issue of Islamophobia was duly noted as a particular mode of racism, but was 
also connected to a generalised political backlash against multiculturalism, anti-racism and 
the celebration of diversity – issues that affected all BME people and organisations alike. 
The theme of the passage was the changing same, where the increased attention on 
Muslim people as a problem was tied to tactics, such as ‘stop and search’, traditionally 
used against other parts of the BME community such as African-Caribbean people. To 
ensure survival, BME-led organisations needed to avoid parallel political lives and to 
ensure that Muslim political struggles remained in broad overlap with BMEness and its 
associated political work. This was partly for practical reasons to ensure that BME-focused 
organisations were relevant to funders and policymakers – an issue made all the more 
pressing after the single funding recommendations (Community Cohesion Review Team, 
2001; Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007).  
 
Alongside the undoubted pragmatism was another principled side to the defence of 
BMEness that emerged in discussion with BME leaders. For example, Dinah Cox, former 
Chief Executive of ROTA, argued that ‘… we should all come together and stand by each 
other in order to prevent this chipping away and this divide and rule’ (2011, Interview). 
For Cox maintaining the overlap with Muslimness was a riposte to colonial techniques of 
separating peoples subject to the same discrimination. This form of resistance was aimed 
at ensuring that BMEness was more than a response to adverse circumstances – a 
‘community of suffering’ (Werbner, 1997) – and was something more like a community of 
action ‘invested with black political agency’ (Back, 1994: 13) and, even, a certain degree of 
romance.  
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Simon Woolley from OBV explained political ‘blackness’ as the basis for common political 
action in the following way: 
 
I think that activists had got to the stage through hard work and 
endeavour to bring peoples together: African, Asians and Caribbeans – 
bearing in mind now at some point that all had been separated by old 
colonial attitudes. Africans against Caribbeans; Caribbeans against Asians. 
But a lot of good people from all sides of... the ethnic divide came 
together and said that united we're stronger (Simon Woolley, 2011, 
Interview).  
 
Woolley praised the achievement of blackness and elevated the status of the ‘good people 
from all sides’ that made it happen. It represented a moment of consciousness and clarity 
in which former colonised subjects resisted colonial ‘divide and rule’ (a term also 
mentioned by Dinah Cox above) enabling solidarity that transcended nations and 
continents. Blackness in Britain was part of a colonial struggle of two hundred years. 
However, this version of blackness was as idealised as policymaker talk of British decency. 
For example, it covered over the cracks in ‘blackness’ and tensions between African and 
African Caribbean communities and south Asians (Modood, 1988). Instead Woolley 
argued that the notion of the ‘black’ community was a ‘good enough’ compromise name 
for collective identification, organising and action (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview).  
 
Jeremy Crook from BTEG also saw the blackness as a force for inclusion, emancipation and 
political agency.  
 
... [The] black self-help movement, which I think was an inclusive 
movement as well in terms of, you know, Asian and black communities, 
was certainly a good thing at the time and vocalised lots of people... 
(Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview). 
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Blackness was an explicitly political formation organised around shared concerns and 
goals. Crook, like Woolley, invested blackness with redemptive and inclusive qualities as 
he argued that the black community enabled BME people to collectively find their voice in 
a silencing environment and to engage in self-help where the state was a hindrance. 
Finally, some of the romance and inclusivity of BME/black community was also revealed 
by Dinah Cox when she detailed, somewhat ruefully, how ROTA, when she began her work 
there in the late 1990s, was super-inclusive and ‘black did include the Irish; the Jewish; 
Asian; African; African-Caribbean communities’ because they were all subject to racism 
and discrimination (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview). This inclusivity was the basis for solidarity 
and a feeling of BME fellowship. So while Les Back was correct when he stated that ‘Black 
community discourse is utilized… as a way to particularize black experiences’ (Back, 1994: 
13) it was also the case that BME leaders, in a context of fragmentary blackness, also used 
the notion of black community and collectivity to generalise black experiences sufficiently 
widely to advance a political and principled emancipatory project. 
 
At the same time, secular race equality and faith organisations were not predisposed or 
even well-placed to stand by each other, as Karen Chouhan, the former Chief Executive of 
the antiracist organisation 1990 Trust, explained. 
 
… we can see that Islamophobia is the new racism; we can see what was 
happening; that… there was a divide and rule going on. So it was an 
antiracist agenda and so to that extent we were happy to support; be 
involved; do as much campaigning as we could to support people... 
 
I think that the difficulty [is that]… we're not religious people so… that 
was the tension for us. We could see how it [faith] related to racism, but 
we didn't particularly want to be supporting single faith schools or things 
like that (Karen Chouhan, 2011, Interview).  
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Karen Chouhan encapsulated the conundrum facing secular organisations working for race 
equality. Islamophobia was the most virulent strain of racism of the moment. Black 
solidarity necessitated an anti-racist response whilst resisting some of the implications of 
a Muslim-centred politics, such as separate education that in turn undermined solidaristic 
BME politics. Simon Woolley similarly was concerned about fragments of blackness.  
 
[In the past] we didn't have competing forces such as a redefined Muslim 
community in particular; but also Sikh and Hindu that after 9/11 and 7/7 
redefined themselves as not being the other. We're not Muslim. We're 
not black, we're Muslim. So we've had to go the extra 10 miles in saying 
that we still include you (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview).  
 
The splintering of south Asian collectivity39 played out enmities imported from the Indian 
subcontinent on British shores and also created distance between Muslims, Sikhs and 
Hindus and some ‘overarching’ black identity. Like Cantle, Woolley blamed south Asians 
for a break up of black politics but also argued that it was still possible to keep such groups 
in the black fold. However, the elasticity of blackness was tested not only by the contours 
of faith but also those of new European migration and the rise in asylum seekers from the 
former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and Somalia (Bloch, et al., 2013) that meant that those BME 
populations that formed the first iteration of the black political community were 
becoming a smaller proportion of the British BME population (see chapter one).  
 
5 Conclusions 
This middle part of the New Labour period was framed by policy discourses and 
policymaker concerns about parallel lives prompted initially by the northern disturbances 
                                                     
39
 For example see Runnymede Trust (2007); a study into British Hindu identity commissioned by the Hindu 
Forum of Britain which distances British Hindus from their Muslim counterparts in a context of community 
cohesion. 
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of 2001 and then the London bombings in 2005. The discourse of parallel lives pointed to 
and constructed a problem of modern Britain where ethnic communities lived next to one 
another but not with one another. This notion was particularly troubling for New Labour 
because of the importance it attached to community as a means to reconcile individuality 
and collectivity in the absence of state control. This importance attached to community 
from New Labour meant that ‘alternative’ BME communities were unwelcome ‘rivals’.  
 
The government’s proposed response and alternative to parallel lives was community 
cohesion which set back the idea of race equality by foregrounding and prioritising local 
belonging and strong and positive relationships across ethnicities (Community Cohesion 
Review Team, 2001; Local Government Association, 2002; Local Government Association, 
2004). Though community cohesion also spoke of the importance of similar life 
opportunities being available to people regardless of background this was itself contingent 
on BME people demonstrating that they belonged in and were loyal to the wider 
community. 
 
Though parallel lives was in many ways about a spotlight on BME and especially south 
Asian people this debate was also about white people, including sentimental ideas of lost 
whiteness (Dench et al., 2006). Policymaker conceptions of community cohesion made it 
clear that it was important to avoid what Ruth Kelly described as ‘ethnic minorities getting 
special treatment’ (Kelly, 2006) because it harmed cohesion by creating resentments and 
grievances amongst white people. Opening up debates about whiteness and white 
working class people might have been a valuable exercise if it brought class and equality 
back onto the political agenda (Sveinsson, 2009). However, as mobilised by New Labour, 
discussions of whiteness in the context of parallel lives and community cohesion were 
expressed in terms of ethnic competition and the problematic overlap between BME and 
white people. Therefore, by 2007, the work of the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion advanced proposals to restrict funding for ‘single identity’, specifically BME, 
organisations.  
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As a result, discourses of parallel lives had set back both the pursuit of race equality and 
BME-led organising for it, as BME organising was implicated in the violence of the 
northern disturbances and the London bombings. As the then Chair of BTEG observed 
there was the ‘real danger that black-led organisations are seen as part of the problem [of 
the lack of community cohesion and shared values] and not the solution’ (BTEG, 2008: 4). 
However, BME organising for race equality was not just set back by hostile policymaker 
discourses and their consequences, but also due to the rise of Islam as a specific and 
important political identity.  
 
The response from BME-led race equality organisations was to note but also to play down 
the significance of Muslimness. BME-led race equality organisations tried to return 
discussions of ethnic minorities and Muslims in Britain to the ongoing problem of race 
inequality and to subsume Islamophobia and ‘Muslim issues’ into broader concerns and 
narratives about the perils of being BME in Britain. This was partly the result of a desire of 
these organisations to resist policies of ‘divide and rule’; a principled commitment to 
BME/black as a hard-won political identity. It was also a coping mechanism and pragmatic 
response to ensure policy-relevance of BMEness over and above Muslimness.  
 
In the next chapter I move on from this second period of multicultural parallel and 
overlaps to examine the third and final part of the New Labour period. Here policymakers 
(re)turned to discourses and conceptions of individual citizens and the nation as a whole 
as a means to settle fraught discussions of collective living at sites other than (increasingly 
problematic) multiculture.  
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Chapter 5 Pausing multiculture: re-asserting nation and citizen  
1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the third and final part of the New Labour period, from 2006 up to 
the general election defeat in 2010. The discursive thread of the previous chapter of 
parallels and overlaps was the result of policymaker disquiet about multiculture and the 
multicultural, triggered particularly by the events of the northern disturbances and 
London bombings. In the absence of such calamitous occurrences, the period of time 
covered in this chapter was more centred on ongoing attempts by policymakers to 
respond to multicultural troubles. I argue that the developments in this period combined 
to form a discourse of multiculture ‘paused’. This attempted to escape the paradoxical 
position which policymakers sought the disappearance of multiculture whilst at the same 
time fixing it in place (Alexander, 2007). I am not suggesting that this period was somehow 
post-multicultural or that there was a cultural ‘U-turn’, but rather that policymakers 
attempted to work discursively around multiculture as a means to manage it.  
 
There was not a single unified discourse or discursive theme that policymakers offered to 
counter the centrality of parallel and overlapping multiculture as a way of understanding 
and managing society. Instead I suggest that the discourse to look past multiculture was 
made up of three related strands. The first of these was an increased focus on the nation 
and Britishness. A second strand was the importance of citizenship as a common feature 
of life in Britain that could govern how people might behave individually and live together 
collectively. The third strand of discourse was based on reconfigured discussions of 
equality and inequality. This centred on the enactment of the 2006 Equality Act which de-
privileged the place of race in equalities by both focusing on (in)equality both as a more 
individuated experience and simultaneously turning attention to categories of people 
other than BME that might be susceptible to discrimination, such as young and old, as well 
as lesbian and gay people.  
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Despite the way that each of the three dimensions of discourse was a departure away 
from multiculture, they also contained elements of the previous discourse of parallel lives 
such as ideas of belonging and definitions of good conduct (Ali, 2003). The result was that 
this reconstituted discourse of the third and final part of the New Labour period did not 
escape the limits, problems and entanglements of multiculture but it continued the earlier 
work on parallel lives to make the source of multiculture, namely BME people and BME 
organisations, a problem for British society. 
 
2 Britain calling 
2.1 Towards a British patriotism  
In this section I explore the way in which policymakers turned to the nation as a higher 
calling for citizens of any ethnicity. This focus on Britain and Britishness was not new for 
New Labour though its function was different in this latter period. ‘New Labour, new 
Britain’ was one of the party’s early slogans (Blair, 1994, 1995) and, as cited in chapter 
three, Tony Blair spoke of the need to renew a weary and divided nation after a long 
period of Conservative rule. Elsewhere, Britain’s ‘rich mix’ (Blair, 2000b) was given a 
central place in the idea of a renewed Britain. In those early interventions, Blair 
deliberately aligned himself with an outward-focused Britain akin to the Foreign Policy 
Centre’s idea of Britain as a ‘global island’ (Leonard, 1997: 12).  
 
Whereas Blair was interested early on in ‘new Britain’ and ‘Cool Britannia’ as a means to 
rebrand the nation, Gordon Brown seemed to have deeper and more thoughtful 
engagement with ideas of Britain, British history and Britishness. Brown's interest in 
Britishness preceded his brief period as Prime Minister (from June 2007 to May 2010) and 
included early pamphlets engaging with constitutional and devolutionary aspects of 
Britain (Brown, 1992, 1999).  
 
Gordon Brown’s British Council annual lecture in July 2004 (Brown, 2004) focused on 
‘[c]reating a shared national purpose’ and rediscovering ‘a clear and confident sense of 
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who we are as a country’. This interest, as befitted a speech to the British Council, was 
about Britain’s place in the world; about the world’s place in Britain, e.g. in the form of 
Britain’s BME population; and also about the shape of Britain itself given devolution in 
Wales, Scotland and London.  
 
Brown was eager to emphasise the nation not just as the site of renewal but as a means to 
guide politics itself. In January 2006 he made a speech to the Fabian Society entitled The 
Future of Britishness. In it he argued that Britishness was at the centre of multiple policy 
and everyday questions. 
 
When we take time to stand back and reflect, it becomes clear that to 
address almost every one of the major challenges facing our country:  our 
relationships with Europe, America and the rest of the world; how we 
equip ourselves for globalisation; the future direction of constitutional 
change; a modern view of citizenship; the future of local government, 
ideas of localism; and, of course, our community relations and 
multiculturalism and, since July 7th, the balance between diversity and 
integration; even the shape of our public services; you must have a clear 
view of what being British means, what you value about being British and 
what gives us purpose as a nation (Brown, 2006).  
 
The aim was to elevate Britishness to a guiding light for policy. The answer to national 
policy challenges was to be found in the meaning of the nation – even though it could 
easily be argued that it was policy that gave meaning to the nation. Brown’s fascination 
for Britishness had been inspired by what he had seen in the United States.  
 
I think the first time I went to America, and looked at what people 
thought of themselves as Americans, and went in to bookshops in 
America and found there were so many books about the idea of America, 
the values of America, the identity of America, what America is and who 
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Americans are, and then looked at the debate in Britain, and found that 
we so were wedded to the idea of evolution and to almost empiricism 
that we had not considered that actually our national identity, more so 
than America, and earlier than America, was founded on values, that we 
in Britain invented the modern idea of tolerance… (Brown, 2009). 
 
This passage was taken from an interview conducted by the journalist Matthew d’Ancona 
for a BBC Radio 4 series on Britishness and it revealed both Brown’s fascination and 
admiration for the United States and its interest in and sense of itself. For Brown, Britain 
as a nation was even more steeped in (decent) values – but Britain lacked the strength of 
national identity of America or the desire to create one. Brown’s response was to reject 
the idea of a continually evolving and organic British identity and to lay down what he 
imagined to be some enduring features of Britain and British life. To give national identity 
greater meaning Brown turned, in a number of speeches, to the naming and claiming of 
so-called British principles, characteristics and values including tolerance, liberty; fairness 
and fair play; responsibility and duty; and  internationalism (Brown, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008) 
 
This was a highly selective set of features of Britain that were all desirable and compatible 
with multiculture and race equality. However, they lacked resonance as being particularly 
British or particularly meaningful as Nick Pearce, former Head of the Number 10 Policy 
Unit during Gordon Brown’s premiership, explained.  
 
That speech he [Brown] gave on liberty shortly after he went to number 
10 was very much in that mould of saying here are the golden threads of 
[Britishness], you know. The people he talked to were people like Linda 
Colley and people who tried to understand the invention of Britishness 
and what it meant and what values it carried. But it was non-exclusivist; it 
was non-ethnically reductivist, but as a consequence it was quite thin. It 
felt quite academic and cold… He genuinely did want to make Britishness 
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more than it was but I just think it didn't work… It wasn't thick enough 
(Nick Pearce, 2011, Interview).   
 
Through his conversations with Colley, whose work was on how British identity had been 
forged historically (Colley, 1992), Brown recognised that golden-age Britain was an 
invention and that the task at hand was one of re-invention. Brown did not and could not 
define Britain in explicitly closed ethnic or religious terms but the version of Britain 
conjured up was difficult to grasp and anaemic. In the context of contemporary times 
Britain was not particularly distinct and its ‘golden threads’ could not be woven together.  
 
A major imperative behind attempts by Blair and Brown in this period to define Britishness 
with greater clarity were the troubling events of the northern disturbances and the 
London bombings. While these were viewed by policymakers as evidence of a lack of 
community cohesion, they were also seen as signs that some BME Britons did not feel 
British. Brown, like Blair,40 had from the early days of New Labour spoken up for the 
mixed-up multicultural essence of Britain. 
 
… a belief in fair play, a tolerance that has enabled us to welcome 
successive waves of immigrants – from Saxons and Normans to 
Huguenots and Jews and Asians and Afro-Caribbeans – into what today is 
a thriving multicultural nation (1997, cited in Brown: 2006: 345). 
 
Even in these heady early New Labour days Brown argued that it was not the endeavour 
of immigrants that had earned their place in Britain but rather that Britain had been a 
                                                     
40
 For example, in 2000 Blair said that Britain had been made by:  
successive waves of invasion and immigration and trading partnerships, a potent mix of 
cultures and traditions which have flowed together to make us what we are today (Blair, 
2000).  
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welcoming place to migrants because of its inherent values of fair play and tolerance.41 A 
decade later, Gordon Brown extended the narrative when he stated that Britain had not 
just welcomed immigrants but that it was the product of interchange with the outside 
world through ‘2,000 years of successive waves of invasion, immigration, assimilation and 
trading partnerships’ (Brown, 2006). The centring of Britain’s historic openness to the 
outside world in Brown’s later intervention enabled him to criticise ‘outsiders’ within 
Britain.  
 
… we are waking from a once-fashionable view of multiculturalism, which, 
by emphasising the separate and the exclusive, simply pushed 
communities apart. 
 
What was wrong about multiculturalism was not the recognition of 
diversity but that it over-emphasised separateness at the cost of unity. 
Continually failing to emphasise what bound us together as a country, 
multiculturalism became an excuse for justifying separateness, and then 
separateness became a tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – 
even greater exclusivity (Brown, 2007b). 
 
The line adopted by Brown was of multiculturalism warping the true essence of British 
togetherness. Under its aegis, diversity became separateness and exclusivity. Where it was 
supposed to safeguard diversity it instead promoted disunity. Where warped 
                                                     
41
 Brown’s was an idealised and even old-fashioned version of Britain. In some ways it was consistent with 
rather Conservative notions of the nation. For example, in 1993, speaking about the resilience of Britain’s 
essence in the context of its role in Europe, John Major painted the following idyllic (for some) picture:  
 
Fifty years from now Britain will still be the country of long shadows on county grounds, warm beer, 
invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers and – as George Orwell said – “old maids 
bicycling to Holy Communion through the morning mist” and if we get our way – Shakespeare still 
read even in school. Britain will survive unamendable in all essentials (Major, 1993).  
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multiculturalism had once overshadowed the nation Brown sought to reverse the process 
and to pursue a ‘strong modern sense of patriotism and patriotic purpose’ (Brown, 2006); 
replacing the passive tolerance of old (Gilroy, 2012) with something more strident.  
 
Paradoxically though patriotism was supposed to be under threat from multiculture, it 
appeared also to be on the rise as Gordon Brown proudly proclaimed in a February 2007 
speech to the Commonwealth Club.  
 
A few years ago less than half – 46% – identified closely with being British. 
But today national identity has become far more important: it is not 46% 
but 65% – two thirds – who now identify Britishness as important, and 
recent surveys show that British people feel more patriotic about their 
country than almost other European country (Brown, 2007a). 
 
Therefore the positioning of multiculturalism as a threat to commonality and nation was 
greatly exaggerated and indeed BME people identified with Britishness more than white 
counterparts.42 BME identification with the nation was not enough, however, as Jack 
Straw explained.  
 
We have to be clearer about what it means to be British, and to be 
resolute that what comes with this is a set of values that have not just to 
be shared but accepted. Yes, there is room for multiple and different 
identities, but there has to be a contract that they will not take 
precedence over the core democratic values of freedom, fairness, 
                                                     
42
 In 2012 a survey commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council (University of Essex, 2012) 
showed that people from ethnic minority backgrounds identify more closely with Britishness than their 
white counterparts. The survey asked “how important is being British to you?” the average scores by 
ethnicity on a 0-10 scale were as follows: 
Pakistani (7.76); Bangladeshi (7.75); Indian (7.68); Black African (7.64); Middle Eastern (7.48); Other (7.03); 
Chinese (6.90); Caribbean (6.89); Mixed race (6.78); White (6.58) (British Future, 2012).  
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tolerance and plurality that define what it means to be British. It is the 
bargain and it is nonnegotiable (Straw, 2007).  
 
Building on Blair’s argument (2006) about the need for integration and consensus around 
British values, Straw also emphasised the need to behave like a ‘Brit’. This appeared to be 
an attempt to bring unruly BME people into line and perhaps a sign of ‘island race’ (Gilroy, 
2002: xxxvi) indignation at the behaviour of ‘outsiders’. Where Blair (2006) spoke of ‘duty’ 
Straw talked of a contract and nonnegotiable values as BME people were obliged to 
pledge allegiance to and live by and under British values. In insisting on the subservience 
of multiculture, New Labour displayed little of two heralded British values, namely 
tolerance and plurality.  
 
For policymakers, viewing policy questions through the lens of the nation also added to a 
sense of the nation being under threat.  
 
… when terrorists struck London on 7 July 2005, it was not seen or felt as 
an attack simply on London, or even England, but on Britain itself. Why? 
Because for generations Britain had been a country in which many 
different nationalities and cultures live together, confident that in times 
of trouble we share risks, rewards and resources (Brown, 2009: 26).  
 
By 2009 the London bombings were positioned not as an attack against London, 
multiculture or innocent civilians but as an attack on the nation itself. The nation was 
portrayed as under siege and in crisis and legitimate grievances about race inequality in 
Britain were shifted from prominent view on the political stage. Instead a romantic 
version of Britain was presented; and in the passage above Brown insisted that ‘risks, 
rewards and resources’ were shared in multi-national multicultural Britain. This idealised 
version of Britain further undermined attempts to locate the attacks in a context of race 
inequality. 
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From rhetoric to policy 
Values of the British nation and of British nationals were the cornerstone of attempts in 
this period to bolster Britishness. The importance of values to policymakers was illustrated 
by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion who claimed that values ‘speak of what is 
most truly important to us and inform and motivate the actions we take… [and]… are 
touchstones of moral action and motivators for change’ (Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion, 2007: 65-66). 
 
In Gordon Brown’s tenure there was an attempt to codify British values in a Green paper 
on constitutional renewal as stated in the following terms.  
 
Through an inclusive process of national debate it [the government] will 
work with the public to develop a British statement of values that will set 
out the ideals and principles that bind us together as a nation (Ministry of 
Justice, 2007: 57). 
 
Though the statement of values never came into being it indicated that values were not 
simply to be named and claimed rhetorically by policymakers as British but were seen as 
an important part of a process of creating Britishness and Britons and identifying those 
people that did not belong.  
 
As Nick Pearce suggested above, despite the attempts of Gordon Brown, the Britishness 
agenda did not go very far because of the weakness of the concept. Its thinness was 
revealed by policy proposals made in its name. These included a Museum for Britishness 
in the form of a permanent building to act as a centre of national identity (Hope, 2007); 
and a ‘national day’ (Goldsmith, 2008; Kelly and Byrne, 2007). Both proposals indicated a 
very literal approach to the idea of nation and belonging as if the answer to deeply 
complex issues of belonging was a day at the Museum or a good old-fashioned ‘knees-up’.  
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There were mixed views about policy discussions about Britishness inside policy circles. On 
the positive side the idea of ‘civic patriotism’, as opposed to the ‘ethnic‘ version discussed 
in chapter two, was appealing and inevitable according to Sunder Katwala, former general 
Secretary of the Fabian Society. Katwala in his time at the Fabian Society had considerable 
dealings with Brown43 and the former’s interest in the Britishness agenda saw him go on to 
found and direct the identity and integration think-tank, British Future. He argued that  
 
… in the end I think all of the national identities will have to find a 
contentful civic patriotisms that work in diverse societies, for diverse 
citizenships. And the thing you can say in Britain is, well it was multi-
ethnic, it was multinational and it was civic from the start and it was 
always plural… So the inherently plural nature of Britishness is why it feels 
comfortable… 
 
… the reason for confidence about Britishness is because if you want to 
say look diversity is just part of who we are; it’s ineradicably, inevitably 
part of our future. But the reason it's inevitably part of our future is 
because it's part of our past; it always has been (Sunder Katwala, 2011, 
Interview). 
 
Katwala’s analysis was in tune with Brown’s optimistic comment, cited above, about 
Britain as a place where ‘different nationalities and cultures live together’ (Brown, 2009: 
26). This accepted the idea of Britain as deeply and irretrievably multicultural. Yet Katwala 
also differed from policymakers in that he did not share their anxieties about British 
multiculture. Conversely, he did not share the concerns expressed in the Commission on 
the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMEB) that Britishness held fears for BME people. 
Instead, Katwala argued that Britishness was on an inevitable path to reconciling 
multiculture and the nation based on civicness and plurality. However, Katwala’s optimism 
                                                     
43
 For example, Brown’s 2006 speech on Britishness was delivered to the Fabian Society.  
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did not provide an answer to why multiculture was such a source of policymaker anxiety 
and why race inequality was such a feature of British life. His ‘contentful patriotism’ might 
not contain sufficient content or contentment. 
 
Katwala carefully avoided placing shared values at the centre of such patriotism. 
Specifically he stated, ‘doesn't everyone want fair play and whatever?’ (Sunder Katwala, 
2011, Interview). Similarly, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion report noted that 
‘while “high level” values can be held in common, there can still be substantial 
disagreement about how to apply them to particular circumstances’ (Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 65). The devil was in the detail.  
 
Former Blair Chief Speechwriter, Philip Collins, was particularly sceptical about common 
values and argued that  
 
... the search for a common set of values which goes beyond the banal is 
doomed to failure; there is no such set of values; it doesn't matter that 
there isn't because what there has to be is commitment to a procedure 
and a process of a liberal democracy. And that that is the overlap in which 
we all live… (Collins, 2011, Interview)   
  
Collins took a governance approach to the situation. Agreement on common values was 
not essential in the management of collective life. Credible institutions and processes of 
liberal democracy (that maintained the rule of law, human rights and civil liberties) could 
ultimately govern and arbitrate between differing practices in the multicultural nation. 
However, the institutionally racist leanings of national institutions offered little guarantee 
of equal treatment and equal opportunity. Furthermore, it was clear that discussions of 
Britishness coupled with ideas of problem multiculture meant that policymakers did not 
want to be seen to on the side of BME people:  
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We have worked hard to ensure that people know that Government is 
committed to making sure, in every community, in every corner of this 
country, that we are on their side and that this is reflected in everything 
we do. This means no favours or privileges for special interest groups. Just 
fairness (Denham, 2010: 5). 
 
Ultimately the centrality of the nation meant that government wanted to govern and 
wanted to be seen to govern in the ‘national interest’. Responding to race inequality and 
BME organising qualified as special favours and was deemed to antagonise people in 
white corners of the country. Race equality was therefore to be moderated by public 
perceptions of fairness and appropriateness – even where that was likely to leave race 
inequality intact.  
 
2.2 The push and pull of Britain 
As policymakers attempted to re-assert the nation as a means to frame and contain the 
multicultural society, BME-led race equality organisations were deeply ambivalent to this 
agenda. These organisations contested the idea that Britain and Britishness was the open 
and inclusive entity that policymakers claimed and wanted to maintain the right for BME 
people to identify and pledge their allegiance to other nations or entities than Britain. 
However, at the same time, BME-led race equality organisations did not want to 
overthrow the nation but wanted to enhance it and the place for BME people within it. 
 
The blueprint for BME and race equality campaigner uncertainty about Britain and 
Britishness was most (in)famously laid out by the CFMEB. As mentioned in chapter three, 
the CFMEB was reluctant to accept British as a descriptor for the country’s BME 
population:  
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Britishness is not ideal, but at least it appears acceptable, particularly 
when suitably qualified – Black British, Indian British…' (Runnymede Trust, 
2000: 38). 
  
The CFMEB argued that there were ‘deep-rooted [British] antagonisms to racial and 
cultural difference’ (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 38) and yet despite this tenuous footing that 
BME people had as Britons Britishness had a claim on them and BME people were 
expected to declare their allegiance to Britain.  
 
Of course this phenomenon was not exclusive to the New Labour period. In 1983, a well-
known election poster appeared in ethnic minority press showing a young black man in a 
suit and tie with the caption ‘Labour says he’s black. Tories say he’s British’ (cited in Gilroy, 
1987: 58). On the one hand the young black man was claimed as ‘one of us’ and given 
British status that trumped colour, and yet this status was insecure and came at a price. As 
Paul Gilroy noted the young man had to rid himself of black garb and signifiers – hence the 
suit – and conform as his price of admission into the nation (Gilroy, 1987). Policymakers 
from both main political parties were obsessed by BME allegiances. In April 1990, the 
former Conservative Cabinet Minister Norman (now Lord) Tebbit set out his infamous 
‘cricket’ test which judged the loyalty of Asians by whether or not they supported the 
England cricket team.44 It was much less clear that Tebbit cared whether people with 
Australian or New Zealand heritage cheered for England or not, presumably because their 
‘cultural proximity’ to Britain nullified their threat.  
                                                     
44
 Tebbit stated the following in a US newspaper interview
  
A large proportion of Britain's Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side 
do they cheer for? It's an interesting test. Are you still harking back to where you came 
from or where you are? (Tebbit, 1990, cited in Manning and Roy, 2007: 3-4).  
 
Tebbit went on to argue that if his comments on the cricket test were taken more seriously ‘those [7 July 
2005 London] attacks would have been less likely…’ (Davie, 2005). 
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The New Labour period saw an extension of such approaches – albeit slightly more subtle. 
Simon Woolley from OBV was correct in the aftermath of the 2001 northern disturbances 
that the policy ‘agenda then became about we're [BME people] not British enough’ 
(Woolley, 2011, Interview). Arun Kundnani expanded on this unease in the following way: 
 
One of my main concerns with the current policy framework is the 
assimilationist tone of much of the rhetoric; alongside a discourse of 
blame directed towards new migrants and especially British Muslim 
communities, who are expected to show ‘which side they are on’, through 
an allegiance to a ‘phoney’ Britishness rather than a genuine universalism 
(Kundnani, 2005). 
 
Kundnani and Woolley resisted the idea both that the loyalties of BME people were 
misplaced and that BME people should have to declare and demonstrate loyalty to Britain. 
BME loyalty and the act of choosing to be British was, however, powerfully symbolic for 
policymakers. This revealed both British anxieties about BME people but also, less 
obviously, British insecurities and self-doubt that it was worthy of being chosen. One can 
see ‘Cool Britannia’ as an attempt to convince Britain and the wider world of its 
worthiness and its nefarious twin ‘Cruel Britannia’ (Cohen, 1999) as a countervailing effort 
to keep the world away. In the context of the northern disturbances, London bombings 
and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, British BME people and especially Muslims were 
required to choose Britain and to be seen to choose Britain, but at the same time they 
could never be ‘British enough’.  
 
BME-led race equality organisations challenged the official portrait of virtuous 
multicultural Britain. 
 
When one considers the institutional racism within employment and 
housing and the fact that legislation was needed to curb overt forms of 
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discrimination, it is hard agree with this notion of Britain as a ‘tolerant 
society’ in the second half of the twentieth century. The experience of 
many black and Asian immigrants during this period is often at odds with 
the notion of a ‘tolerant’ and welcoming Britain (BTEG, 2007b: 3). 
 
In understated and reasonable language emphasising the power of their point, BTEG 
highlighted the fallacy of Britain as a tolerant and welcoming place. Racism was 
institutional, i.e. organised and embedded, and policymakers that emphasised British 
decency were detached from real BME life that BTEG was deeply connected to. Not only 
was Britain not a tolerant nation it was complacent as Jeremy Crook from BTEG stated 
when he claimed that ‘[a]s a country we are still not bold enough and determined enough 
to deal with racial inequalities at the highest levels in the public, private and third sector’ 
(BTEG, 2008: 7). 
 
Despite this concern about being cast in the role of perpetual outsiders, the BME-led race 
equality organisations that I studied were not against the nation. Rather, they each sought 
to transform it. In the case of OBV its efforts went to the heart of the formal politics of 
Britain; namely to increase BME involvement and interaction in British public life. This 
focus on national life was evident in the ways in which some events were viewed as 
nationally important. For example, Simon Woolley argued that the Macpherson Inquiry 
verdict made ‘British history’ and also stated that the build-up to the 1997 General 
Election was ‘the first time in British politics that the black community had been put on 
the radar as a political force…’ (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview). In these ways Woolley 
connected BME race equality and the story of the nation as a whole. Furthermore, after 
the election of Barack Obama as the President of the United States, OBV introduced the 
idea of the ‘Obama generation’ of BME political leaders and fantasised about the 
prospects of a BME politician one day leading Britain (OBV, 2009).  
 
Elsewhere, a consultation document from the Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
which asked for feedback on whether it was appropriate to claim values shared by other 
181 
 
nations as ‘British values’ in order to help the nation to cohere around them. Whereas 
even political actors close to the government such as Philip Collins pointed out the 
conceptual and practical limits to the idea, BTEG did ‘not see any harm in calling the 
shared values we hold British’ (BTEG, 2007b: 3). This was hardly a ringing endorsement of 
Britishness by BTEG but it did demonstrate that it and other BME-led race equality 
organisation were located in the nation and in the project of national improvement rather 
than in any desire to see its downfall. This was different to the priorities cited above, 
where Kundnani (2005) contrasted Britishness and universalism. 
 
One of the most striking features about the written texts of the three BME-led race 
equality organisations was that of the three central issues in this thesis – multiculture, 
race equality and nation – these organisations had considerable amounts to say about 
multiculture and, of course, the need for and approaches to race equality. However, they 
were relatively silent on connecting the work for race equality to the project of developing 
the nation. That mission had been tackled by the CFMEB early on in the New Labour 
period with mixed results. The antagonistic response to the CFMEB may have served to 
discourage endeavours to link efforts on race inequality and the life and progress of the 
nation. A more important reason may have been the specialist nature of many civil society 
organisations. These organisations were focussed on the narrower ‘day job’ which was the 
issue of race equality and the material realities associated with that rather than the 
macro-politics of nation-making. 
 
The three BME-led race equality organisations were specialist in two main senses. First, 
they had a particular set of sectional beneficiaries in mind for their work, namely BME 
people and communities; and second, each of the organisations had particular sectoral 
interests. For example, in this latter part of the New Labour period ROTA was focussed on 
specific areas that included crime and anti‐social behaviour; homelessness; health and 
social services (ROTA, 2008). BTEG in the meanwhile was focused on BME employment 
rates, educational attainment and entrepreneurship (BTEG, 2008). OBV at this time 
worked to increase the political education, participation and representation of BME 
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people (OBV, 2008). The mix of the sectional and sectoral specialisms of these BME-led 
race equality organisations appeared to overshadow the national context in which those 
sectional and sectoral disadvantages were situated.  
 
This failure to locate their work in a national context may have been a tactical mistake 
given the aim of BME-led race equality organisations to secure a full and equal place 
inside the nation for BME people and the increased turn of policymakers towards ideas of 
the nation. However brap, the explicitly non BME-led equality and human rights 
organisation, argued that the failure of BME-led race equality organisations to address 
and locate their work explicitly in the (national) collective was not a tactical failure of 
BME-led political interventions but inherent to these forms of organising.  
   
We don't understand at the moment what the bigger gain is because we 
don't necessarily believe we're in this society together. So I think that 
there's something about reframing that agenda so we begin to believe 
that we are a society together and that, you know, that is something that 
I think traditional race politics dismantles very quickly (Joy Warmington, 
2011, Interview). 
 
For Warmington, as with John Denham’s point about ‘special interest’ (2010: 5), there was 
a tension between the collective and the sectional interest. Instead of being all in this 
together it was a case of all being against each other. BME identity politics was a culprit in 
that its focus on specific interests meant that it detracted from the whole. Though 
Warmington undoubtedly had a point about the risk of narrow BME thinking, her words 
were also themselves advancing brap’s own sectional interests as a new and 
transformative civil society actor in equality.  
 
Unsurprisingly, Jeremy Crook from BTEG disagreed with this assertion of being 
disinterested in and detrimental to the collective. He argued that BTEG had made the 
effort to position race equality as a collective project. 
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… we have certainly from our communities tried to make sure that we 
have got a voice whether locally or nationally to advance our interests 
and make this place a fairer society for everyone… and we've never kind 
of said that it's just about us having more opportunities for ourselves. I 
think we've wanted to make the system fairer for everyone so that you 
are judged on your merit and your qualifications and your experience and 
not the colour of your skin. So I'd like to think that there's been a benefit 
to all communities in this country from the efforts you know of race 
equality organisations… (Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview).  
 
Crook argued that the ultimate goal was to have a ‘fairer society for everyone’. However, 
a merit-based system, with the implication that this would lead to a more proportional 
distribution of BME people in good jobs, other things being equal, would adversely affect 
white people that benefitted from the status quo. As it transpired, the argument about 
the principle of merit was rarely if ever advanced in written-down texts from BME-led race 
equality organisations. Instead the emphasis appeared to be about the progress of BME 
people that left BME-led organisations open to accusations of ‘special pleading’ (Gilroy, 
1992: 49). 
 
However, it was also the case that BME-led organisations were expected by policymakers 
to only engage in special pleading and sectional thoughts. 
 
... the unfortunate fact is that if you just get bracketed as race equality 
organisations or... black organisations [then] very often you're perceived 
as having a very narrow of the world... that's only about black people or 
about black and Asian people (Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview).  
 
The process of policy development, discourse and discussion meant that policymakers, 
funders and others did not want to hear from BME-led organisations on questions of 
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nation even where these organisations had expertise to lend, for example on questions of 
fairness and equality, let alone on wider issues such as environment or foreign policy. BME 
perspectives were instead considered narrowly sectional and sectoral – a stereotype that 
BME-led organisations did little to counter.  
 
There was one notable and belated attempt from a BME-led initiative to fully engage with 
the idea of race equality and the life of the nation. This was the 2010 ‘Black Manifesto’45. It 
argued the following: 
 
Britain is a country rightly proud of its historic contributions to setting the 
global standard for democracy and the rule of law. Trial by jury, the 
National Health Service, access to state education, universal suffrage and 
the more recent adoption of human rights legislation are examples of a 
nation that has sought to ensure that most vulnerable in society are 
guaranteed basic access to important services and protected from 
unlawful discrimination (Equanomics UK, 2010: 2). 
 
This was an attempt to co-locate race equality to other great British achievements around 
which one could build a political and public consensus. More specifically, the manifesto 
argued that race inequality was incompatible with Britain’s journey as a ‘modern, 
progressive, inclusive society’ (Equanomics, 2010: 2). Unfortunately this argument did not 
fit well with the policy mood of the time (see chapter seven for further discussion on the 
coalition government).  
 
                                                     
45
 The manifestos had been produced to coincide with every general election in the United Kingdom since 
1997, by a coalition of BME-led and non BME-led organisations concerned about race equality. The 2010 
Manifesto involved over 40 organisations: Operation Black Vote, Runnymede Trust, Oxfam and Black Mental 
Health UK. 
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3 Citizens and citizenship: On best behaviour  
3.1 New Labour, new citizens 
The (re)construction of Britain and Britishness attempted to pause multiculture by 
appealing above and beyond it. In contrast, the debate on citizens and citizenship ducked 
under the issue of multiculture and ethnic groupings and towards the population as 
individuals. At the same time, citizenship emphasised individual rights and responsibilities 
(Goldberg, 2008) thus attaching and obligating the individual to the collective.  
 
Citizenship had been associated with voluntary civic community over tribal loyalty (Shafir, 
1998) as well as an attachment to political community (Anderson, 2006 [1983]; May, 
2002; Parekh, 2008). Most importantly, even though it was possible for citizenship to be 
conceived locally, transnationally (Yuval-Davis, 1997) and postnationally (Soysal, 1994), it 
is more typically thought of as official membership of a nation-state (Marshall, 1964 
[1950]; Touraine, 1994). Indeed Bhikhu Parekh (2000) has argued that the (nation) state 
and citizenship have operated as two parts of a whole. 
 
In this latter part of the New Labour period nation and citizenship were explicitly tied to 
Britishness (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Yet citizenship could also be de-coupled from ideas 
of Britishness and British identity as historian Linda Colley explained in a Downing Street 
Millennium Lecture on Britishness in the Twenty-first Century. 
 
Instead of being mesmerised by debates over British identity, it would be 
far more productive to concentrate on renovating British citizenship, and 
on convincing all of the inhabitants of these islands that they are equal 
and valued citizens irrespective of whatever identity they may individually 
select to prioritise… (Colley, 1999, cited in Weight, 2002: 732).  
 
Although this formulation kept the link between citizenship and Britain, Colley advocated 
a shift away from often angst-ridden ideas of Britishness and the need for (BME) people to 
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identify as British, in favour of more concrete and equal benefits of British citizenship. 
Instead she favoured filling British citizenship with meaning – making it full and equal 
regardless of how British citizens chose to identify. Colley also de-emphasised Britain and 
Britishness by using the less familiar term ‘these islands’. This reduced emphasis on Britain 
was taken up by the CFMEB which argued that the aim should be to develop ‘a sense of 
affiliation to the supranational entity known as ‘these islands’’ (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 
38) and that perhaps one day a unifying term equivalent to ‘Nordic’ might be developed to 
reflect them.  
 
Despite the invitation from Colley and the CFMEB to broaden connectivity beyond notions 
of Britain and Britishness New Labour chose to ignore this appeal and instead they 
appeared ‘mesmerised’ both by Britishness and British citizenship.  
 
The citizen was important to New Labour because s/he was required to play their part in a 
renewed Britain and in a new post-Thatcherite settlement, which, according to Stuart Hall, 
included ‘a new relationship between markets and the public good, the individual and the 
community’ (Hall, 1998: 9). The citizen was understood as a social concept in that it 
signified that the individual was part of the wider collective web and was an active 
participant in networks of social capital and community life discussed in chapter four. 
According to Gordon Brown, there existed a long chain by which different elements of 
society were connected ‘stretching from the individual and family to the community and 
state’ (Brown, 2000, cited in Wilson, 2001: 6).46  
                                                     
46
 These linkages were reminiscent of the famous connections made by Edmund Burke in 1790 (2003: 40) in 
which he stated:  
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the 
first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by 
which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind. 
 
The individual was attached to the 'little platoon' – small groupings to which the individual person might feel 
considerable affinity and sense of belonging, for example to family, and various forms of community, such as  
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In order to strengthen these connections the earlier part of New Labour’s time in office 
had seen attempts to promote the role of active citizens as part of a broader rebalancing 
between individuals, communities and the state. David Blunkett was the main champion 
of this agenda during his time as Home Secretary between 2001 and 2004 in his work on 
‘active communities’ (see chapter three on community) aimed at linking citizens with each 
other and to the state for the ‘advancement’ of the local community (Blunkett, 2001). 
Blunkett favoured citizens that were active, moral, political and working in overlapping 
and constructive ways with fellow citizens. Henry Tam, a senior civil servant who worked 
with David Blunkett, described the aim of civil renewal as tackling the ‘lack of [a] 
relationship between the state and citizens’ (Henry Tam, 2011, Interview). Tam described 
three strands to this work to strengthen the connection of individuals to the state: 
 
One is individuals who just don't have the know-how or confidence to 
engage with the state so we promoted work to actually help develop 
people skills and confidence… The second strand was developing 
communities and community organisations… The third was developing 
relationships between state and citizens. So, that's recognising that even 
if you have individuals that are more confident, you have very vibrant 
community organisations, you still need state organisations; central 
government; local government to be open and responsive to actually 
create the opportunities for people to engage (Henry Tam, 2011, 
Interview).  
 
Tam’s description interpreted active citizenship as essentially a good governance initiative 
in accordance with David Blunkett’s interest in promoting community ‘self-government’ 
(Nick Pearce, 2011, Interview). However, to focus on this element alone would be to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
people sharing identity, experiences or locality – and then from there to wider groupings such as society, 
country and, in modern parlance, humanity. 
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ignore the moral dimension of the work and Blunkett’s own emphasis on encouraging a 
combination of ‘political literacy, social and moral responsibility’ (Blunkett, 2001: 137-
138). Moral and social responsibility meant that all organised citizen activity was not good 
activity – this was only the case if active citizens were delivering collective ‘goods’ such as 
community cohesion.  
 
In the third part of the New Labour period in the wake of the northern disturbances and 
the London bombings policymakers placed a greater emphasis on citizenship as the 
relationship between citizens, in addition to the relationship between the citizen and the 
state that was prominent in Tam’s definition. For example, Sadiq Khan, former Minister of 
State for Communities described citizenship as a ‘horizontal contract between citizens’ 
(Khan, 2007: 24). This reflected a desire in New Labour to extend and to make more 
explicit the demands placed upon citizens.  
 
What we hold in common and the sense that it is good to contribute to 
wider society has tended to be implicit in Britain – not stated and debated 
clearly as in some countries like France. Our approach to citizenship has 
been laissez faire (Kelly and Byrne, 2007: 3). 
 
The call from Kelly and Byrne was for a ‘more overt but inclusive sense of citizenship’ 
(2007: 4); as well as ‘a clear statement of British citizenship, its rights and responsibilities’ 
(2007: 5). This work, along with that cited above from Sadiq Khan, illustrated how New 
Labour wished to use citizenship to control interactions between citizens and indeed 
require citizens to productively overlap with the state and with each other as part of the 
requirements of citizenship. 
 
From rhetoric to policy 
Soon after Gordon Brown took up the post of Prime Minister New Labour published a 
Green Paper entitled The Governance of Britain (Ministry of Justice, 2007) to make aspects 
of British citizenship more explicit. The document outlined the ‘Government’s vision and 
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proposals for constitutional renewal’ and covered a wide variety of issues including 
measures to: hold the executive to account; to reform democracy, e.g. through an elected 
second chamber; and – of most interest here – to develop citizenship, specifically to 
reassess  
 
... the rights and responsibilities that shape the relationships which the 
people of this country have with each other [and]... the relationship 
people have with the institutions of the state, at a local, regional and 
national level (Ministry of Justice, 2007: 6). 
 
Proposals included a review of British citizenship (Ministry of Justice, 2007) to be 
conducted by Lord Goldsmith. Ahead of the review the government was clear about the 
importance of citizenship:   
 
Each of us possesses multiple identities because we define ourselves in 
different ways depending on the factors that matter most to us. Factors 
such as gender, race, ethnicity, age, disability, class and faith are shared 
with some and different from others. But in addition to these there is a 
national identity that we can all hold in common: the overarching factor – 
British citizenship – that brings the nation together (Ministry of Justice, 
2007: 53).  
 
According to the Green Paper, citizenship was tied to the nation and made it cohere. It sat 
alongside, but was superior to, other aspects of identity such as race, ethnicity and faith 
because citizenship and national identity – the two were offered as synonymous – was 
one characteristic that most of the population could share. In adopting this approach the 
government rejected Linda Colley’s earlier advice to focus on full and equal citizenship and 
to forgo questions of British identity (1999, cited in Weight, 2002) and argued that ‘a 
clearer definition of citizenship would give people a better sense of their British identity...’ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2007: 54). Citizenship was to be used as a mechanism to nationalise 
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people as it was suggested that a ‘clearer understanding of the common core of rights and 
responsibilities that go with British citizenship will help build our sense of shared identity 
and social cohesion’(Ministry of Justice, 2007: 57). Just how clarifying rights and 
responsibilities of British citizenship would enhance social cohesion was unclear. The 
citizens of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham all theoretically ‘enjoyed’ full and equal British 
citizenship and evident tensions were the results of unequal and/or diminished chances in 
life (Amin, 2002).  
 
While New Labour attempted to make citizenship a more explicit set of rights and duties, 
government only had limited scope to influence the behaviours of existing citizens. Things 
were different in the sphere of immigration where policymakers could make much more 
explicit demands of migrants whilst dangling the carrot of citizenship. Picking up from the 
2002 White Paper on nationality, immigration and asylum policy (Home Office, 2002), 
New Labour introduced the conception of ‘earned citizenship’ (Brown, 2008; Home Office 
and UK Border Agency, 2009). In a speech on the subject in February 2008 Gordon Brown 
argued that: 
 
Citizenship is not an abstract concept, or just access to a passport. I 
believe it is – and must be seen as – founded on shared values that define 
the character of our country (Brown, 2008). 
 
According to Brown, the nation mirrored the values of citizenship. Under the proposed 
‘earned citizenship’ regime prospective new citizens were expected to demonstrate that 
they were worthy of and shared the so-called national values. The requirement was, like 
the besuited black man in the Tory election poster cited earlier, that these newcomers 
had to demonstrate that they were on Britain’s side; meeting English language 
requirements; and that they were ‘joining in with the British way of life’, including 
showing ‘commitment to the UK by playing an active part in their community’ (Home 
Office, 2009: 7) and ‘engaging with UK society’ (2009: 9). This work on the moral and 
behavioural components of citizenship sat alongside earlier work to establish a points-
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based approach to manage the flow of migrants which included suitability criteria such as 
qualifications, earnings, English language skills and the funds available for individuals to 
support themselves (Home Office, 2006). Together, the points-based system and ‘earned 
citizenship’ would produce the ideal citizen projected onto the figure of the immigrant. 
They were: educated and employable; capable of paying and making their way in the 
world; a net contributor to the state; active citizens engaged in public life; and they would 
interact and overlap constructively with their fellow citizens.  
 
Ultimately, as with the British statement of values, the proposals on earned citizenship 
were not enacted.47 However, the figure of the good citizen was a powerful construct and 
a standard by which citizens could be judged. Discussions of citizenship explicitly placed a 
question mark against BME people aspiring to citizenship through the immigration system 
and emphasised the need to consider their suitability as Britons. By extension, this also 
revived broader concern contained in community cohesion that British BME people were 
problematic compared to desirable whiteness (Burnett, 2004; Robinson, 2005).  
 
3.2 BME people and dual citizenship 
While policymakers were pointing to the ambiguous position of BME people as citizens, 
BME-led race equality organisations argued that BME people had ‘earned’ their citizenship 
but were denied it in as full and equal terms as white British people. In effect there was 
dual citizenship in Britain. BME-led race equality organisations were drawn to the 
possibility of ‘renovating British citizenship’ and giving BME people the status the status of 
‘equal and valued citizens’ (Colley, 1999, cited in Weight, 2002: 732). Though these race 
equality organisations had been ambivalent about Britishness and Britain they were 
drawn to British citizenship. Floyd Millen, former Chief Executive of ROTA, stated that:  
                                                     
47
 They were due to come into force in 2011 but Teresa May, the Home Secretary of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government announced in November 2010 that earned citizenship would not be 
implemented – not because there was an objection in principle to such measures but because it was 
deemed that the policy would be ‘too complicated, bureaucratic and, in the end, ineffective’ (May, 2010).  
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Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities have for many years called 
for increased openness, inclusion and an adherence to a collective 
consciousness that is more than lip service and sees them as fully 
accepted citizens contributing to the success of Britain (Millen, 2002: 2). 
 
This passage was part of a report on a citizenship conference and Millen argued that BME 
people wanted to be included in the wider body of citizens but that wider society did not 
share this desire. BME people aspired to be full, equal and contributing citizens.  
 
Full and equal citizenship for BME people implied (but did not guarantee) certain rights 
with it, such as the entitlement to live without discrimination. In addition, the three 
organisations that I studied also wanted BME people to actively perform the role of the 
good citizen. This theme emerged in the programmatic work of the three BME-led race 
equality organisations that attempted to support BME people in various aspects of 
contributing citizenship. For example, when Jeremy Crook spoke about BTEG’s work on 
behalf of BME people it was: 
 
… to ensure that we can realise our full potential in this society… primarily 
means, you know, succeeding in education; having a robust voluntary 
sector; ... and [being] involved in the wider community (Jeremy Crook, 
2011, Interview). 
 
BTEG’s goals here were entirely consistent with good citizenship, both in terms of 
personal development and improvement, for example to do well in education; to get jobs; 
to start businesses; but also to play a role in public life and to be active in BME and non-
BME civil society. This view, consistent with policymaker ideas of good citizenship, was 
about making the most of life and the passage above showed BTEG in a parenting role 
wanting the most for its metaphorical BME offspring.  
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… our core message has been that there's a responsibility on two sides: 
both within our communities, i.e. within black, Asian communities, to 
make sure we do everything we can for ourselves to give to ensure that 
we can realise our full potential in this society… and on the other hand 
government and employers taking responsibility for combating unfair and 
discriminatory barriers and practices (Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview). 
 
Crook accepted that BME people needed to work hard.  The work of the good BME citizen 
was to control what they could control and corporate citizens such as government and 
employers were charged with ending discrimination. In this passage, like the one 
immediately above, Crook talked about BMEness in terms of ‘self-help’, self-reliance and 
the attainment of ‘full potential’.  
 
OBV’s work was aimed at BME people taking up positions in public life so that other BME 
people could fare better. By way of illustration OBV’s advert in the black newspaper The 
Voice (1997) asked for BME people to step forward as candidates for the May 1998 local 
elections to ensure that people were ‘fighting our corner at the policy table’. The advert 
ran under the heading ‘your community needs you’, adapting the tagline from the famous 
1914 British wartime recruitment poster featuring Lord Kitchener that declared that ‘your 
country needs you’. While the situation was not war, the OBV advert painted a picture of 
a crisis and the need for BME people to be public-minded and to heed the call to action.  
 
The advert was part of a larger conscription drive by BME-led organisations to promote 
not just active citizens but BME-centred citizens that saw the advancement of the life of 
the BME ‘community’ as part of their public contribution. BTEG, OBV and ROTA were 
themselves formed and run by BME citizens committed to an ethos of BME self-help and 
advancement and they wanted other BME people to follow suit. As Simon Woolley stated:  
 
For many individuals the work of OBV literally changes their lives. They 
become magistrates, school governors, sit on health boards and become 
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role models… Above all we seek to promote the idea that to play a full 
and positive role in the political and decision-making arena benefits all of 
society (OBV, 2010: 3). 
 
OBV viewed engagement in public life as both personally transformative and publically 
valuable. They argued that BME involvement in public institutions benefitted the whole of 
the public rather than special BME interests. They also actively embraced the idea of BME 
active citizens as role models and these super-citizens were designed to inspire the next 
generation of active BME citizens.  
 
The embrace of role models illustrated that BME-led organisations, such as OBV, believed 
in the spirit of self-help and what BME people could do, even in adversity.  It also hinted 
that BME-led race equality organisations accepted, to a degree, the idea of BME 
dysfunction, for example captured in the phrase ‘poverty of aspirations’ in which 
disadvantaged people were blamed for not doing enough to escape their own diminished 
circumstances (Bennett, 2012).48  
 
Walking this difficult line of self-help agentic possibility on the one hand and structural 
disadvantage on the other was difficult and involved different types of interventions. 
While OBV worked to enable BME citizens to rise to public office, BTEG and ROTA, in some 
of their work, attempted to provide support for BME citizens that had ‘fallen’ or those at 
risk of ‘falling’.  
 
BTEG was involved in delivering the REACH programme – a national role model 
programme with BME male mentors working with ‘Black boys and young Black men, 
supporting and inspiring them to raise their aspirations, attainment and achievement’ 
(BTEG, 2010b: 1). The programme began in 2008 and followed in the footsteps of other 
                                                     
48
 Even though there was little evidence to support the causal connection between aspiration and 
attainment (Cummings et al., 2012). 
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mentoring programmes used in Britain {Majors et al., 2000). REACH mentors provided 
guidance, support and inspiration for young people and the programme was aimed at 
reaching over 10,000 young black males with outreach through local engagement 
activities undertaken by approximately 50 local groups (BTEG, 2010b). The programme 
was particularly aimed at addressing disproportionately high black youth unemployment 
and disproportionately low educational attainment (BTEG, 2010b). 
 
As stated above the idea of role models did not deny the structural causes of race 
inequality but suggested that these structural factors needn’t determine the destiny of 
black people. The focus on the situation of black boys and young black men was driven by 
statistics on their relative lack of successful outcomes, but was also about an ongoing 
sense of alarm around the young black male (Hall, 1978). Middle-aged BME and black 
leaders saw black boys and young men as troubling and perhaps dysfunctional and 
underperforming citizens in need of redemption.  
 
ROTA’s Building Bridges Project was another example of engagement with young people 
to enhance their lives and prospects as citizens. This project involved youth-led research 
and a policy project into gangs, weapon use and serious youth violence. The project ran 
from 2006-2008 and involved a policy recommendations report which included a call to 
decouple gangs from ‘black culture’ in the policy and policing imagination (ROTA, 2008: 9).  
 
Apart from the findings and the commendable attempt to involve young people in 
research, the Building Bridges Project was similar to the REACH project in that it involved a 
group of engaged citizen-volunteers (such as young researchers or mentors) leading a 
process intended to safeguard or redeem BME people that were less active and/or 
potential ‘counter-citizens’. 
 
BTEG, OBV and ROTA’s interventions were consistent with the public-minded involvement 
and engagement that the government encouraged from its active citizens. As OBV noted: 
‘[o]ur ethos of engagement sat well with the previous Government strategy particularly 
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around community cohesion’ (OBV, 2010: 3). However, where BME citizenship and policy 
agendas parted ways in this third part of the New Labour period was in the way that 
organised BME citizenship was perceived to advance the interests of minority ethnic 
communities. By way of contrast, the government wanted active citizens but BME-centric 
citizenship was problematic. However, for an organisation such as OBV it was not enough 
that BME people were active in public life; they needed to be active with a BME 
perspective.  
 
Black politicians would say ‘I’m a politician that just happens to be black’. 
We want the opposite. We want our communities to say that I am just a 
black man or woman that happens to be a politician’ (Simon Woolley, 
2011, Interview).  
 
Simon Woolley wanted active citizens to put their blackness first, particularly in the case 
of politicians that had the opportunity to influence policy and ultimately the prospects for 
equality for BME people. OBV’s aim was not simply to raise the numbers of BME people in 
public office but to ensure that policymaking was more in tune with the needs of BME 
citizens.  
 
This meant that while policymakers saw citizenship as a means to nullify multiculture by 
making citizenship more explicitly about rights and duties and commitment to the larger 
populous, BME-led race equality organisations could view BME people as BME citizens 
first and national citizens second. Therefore citizenship was not necessarily a means to 
sidestep questions of multiculture.  
 
4 Re-framing equality  
A third attempt in this final part of the New Labour period through which policymakers 
tried to set questions of multiculture to one side came in the shape of a new framework 
for thinking about equalities that incorporated the potentially universalising force of 
human rights.  
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Towards the end of the New Labour period there was a major re-framing of the way that 
inequalities were understood and responded to by policymakers. While discussions of 
Britishness and citizenship attempted to escape from problematic notions of ethnic 
groupings the issue of persistent (race-based) inequality was still important. As Trevor 
Phillips argued: 
 
Well, it seems to me that the first pre-requisite for a society to live at ease 
with itself… is that there has to be at least the promise of equality. I don't 
think you have to have it [equality] actually. That's a much more 
complicated question, but at least people have to believe that they have 
the opportunity to exercise their talent and potential and all the rest of it 
in the same way as their neighbours. If they don't then you don't get past 
first base (Trevor Phillips, 2011, Interview). 
 
Phillips distinguished between the equality of outcomes – a ‘complicated question’ – and 
equality of opportunity, which he labelled the ‘promise of equality’. This latter variant of 
equality was a necessary but not sufficient condition for peaceful multicultural 
coexistence.  
 
The development of a new (race) equality framework in this latter part of the New Labour 
period had its roots in the early New Labour period and the 1998 Human Rights Act. The 
Act sought to further align British law with the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 14 of Part 1 of the Convention included the ‘prohibition of discrimination’ which 
meant that: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
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origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status 
(Home Office, 1998: 25).   
 
The 1998 Human Rights Act offered a strong statement on anti-discrimination. The Human 
Rights Act was passed before the events of the northern disturbances and the London 
bombings at a time when New Labour was rather more sympathetic to the BME-led 
pursuit of race equality. In time, as I will show, the notion of human rights provided a way 
to organise questions of discrimination and equality when multiculture was deemed more 
problematic.  
 
After the enactment of this legislation the government had hopes that human rights could 
help to bring the nation together. In the words of Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary: 
 
The HRA [Human Rights Act] will help us rediscover and renew the basic 
common values that hold us all together. And those are also the values, 
which inform the duties of the good citizen. I believe that, in time, the 
HRA will help bring about a culture of rights and responsibilities across 
the UK (Straw, 1999: 3).  
 
Human rights and freedoms were more than guarantees for individuals; they were 
collectivising because they were expressions of common values of citizenship and nation. 
For example, the right to education and the right to participate in free elections were 
public goods that should be of shared importance to the population and indicate what 
good citizens should do, i.e. become educated and participate in the electoral process. 
This framework of human rights therefore conferred privileges on and demanded duties 
from citizens.  
 
The anti-discriminatory leanings in the Human Rights Act did not resolve questions of how 
to promote greater equality or race equality. However, a process of changing the 
equalities regime was set underway with the publication in October 2002 of the 
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consultation document, Equality and diversity: Making it happen (Department of Trade 
and Industry, 2002). It highlighted the possibility of, but did not explicitly advocate for, the 
creation of a Single Equalities Body (SEB) bringing together the three previous equalities 
Commissions: the Commission for Race Equality; the Equal Opportunities Commission 
(which dealt with gender equality issues); and the Disability Rights Commission. At this 
stage the consultation document did relatively little to bring together the agendas of 
human rights and equality and the document made limited reference to human rights 
beyond saying that one of the strands of the work of an SEB would be the ‘promotion and 
protection of human rights’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002).   
 
In October 2003, Lord Falconer, the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, 
announced to Parliament that the government intended to set up an SEB providing 
support for human rights as well as equality (Klug and O'Brien, 2004). In 2004, a White 
Paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004) entitled Fairness for All outlined the 
government’s vision for the implementation of a new SEB that would initially be called the 
Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR). The White Paper included details 
about the powers, duties and role of the new Commission and integrated human rights 
more fully into the framework of the SEB. The 2004 White Paper also argued that the new 
arrangements were necessary because of the ‘changing nature of our society poses 
significant, complex and new challenges to social, economic and political life’ (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2004: 13). These changes included greater diversity from increased 
migration that was the result of the forces of globalisation.  
 
Greater diversity in our society poses a significant challenge to how we 
shape and promote the shared values that underpin citizenship. While 
respecting and celebrating our differences, citizenship will need to 
promote wider ownership of these common values and a shared sense of 
belonging. Human rights, establishing basic values for all of us, will play an 
increasingly important role in this, providing a language we can all share. 
This language is one that means something to, and is useful for, all people 
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no matter what social group they belong to (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2004: 15).  
 
According to this document, ethnic diversity was a problem. Human rights, ‘based on an 
idea of fairness for all’ (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004: 15) were offered as a set 
of shared guarantees and shared values so that individuals and members of social groups 
could feel that there were part of the same body of citizens. However, the government’s 
ambition that human rights would contribute to a shared sense of belonging, because 
they were in theory available to all, did not make sense in the presence of inequality 
across society. This was simply a reminder that inequalities did not seem to violate human 
rights (Parekh, 2006). 
 
Human rights were on occasion called to arbitrate some of the tensions in a multicultural 
society. For example, when a British National Party (BNP) candidate for the Welsh 
assembly burnt a copy of the Koran, the right to freedom of expression (Article 10, 
European Convention on Human Rights) was put into conflict with the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights). The 
balancing of these rights led to the arrest and charge of the BNP candidate in April 2011 
under Section 29 of the Public Order Act (Daily Mail, 2011) on the grounds that the act of 
burning the Koran could have incited hatred and violence against Muslims. This case 
showed how human rights legislation could be mobilised to protect ethnic minorities from 
particular episodes of racist behaviour whilst doing nothing to advance the daily lives of, 
and combat inequalities faced by, BME people in education, employment, public life and 
so on.  
 
The Equality Act 2006 brought the Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR) into 
being. The Commission was officially launched on 1 October 2007 and renamed the 
Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) when it took on its role as the new 
institutional hub for equality and human rights. The general duties of the Commission 
were expressed as follows: 
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The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Part with a view to 
encouraging and supporting the development of a society in which –  
 
(a) people’s ability to achieve their potential is not limited by prejudice or 
discrimination, (b) there is respect for and protection of each individual’s 
human rights, (c) there is respect for the dignity and worth of each 
individual, (d) each individual has an equal opportunity to participate in 
society... (HM Government, 2006: 2)  
 
The first four elements (items a-d above) of the desirable society were individually-
orientated and emphasised the sanctity of the individual and their right to achieve their 
potential on the basis of respect for their human rights, individual worth and equal 
opportunities. The section of the 2006 Act that defined equality and diversity further 
emphasised the individuated nature of this equality and human rights regime by stating 
that: 
 
“diversity” means the fact that individuals are different, “equality” means 
equality between individuals… (Equality Act, 2006: 4). 
 
In this way, the collective aspects of inequality such as being BME that had been so 
prevalent in talk of parallel lives and the troubles of multicultural Britain were downplayed 
and, similarly, equality was adjudged on the basis of the performance of one person – not 
one group – against another. Therefore, a high-flying BME person could then be seen as 
evidence both that the regime to promote individual endeavour was working and that 
membership of a group was not a constraint on progress. Despite this individualist leaning 
the idea of collectivity was introduced as part of the EHRC’s work to ensure that ‘there is 
mutual respect between groups based on understanding and valuing of diversity and on 
shared respect for equality and human rights’ (Equality Act, 2006: 2). The Act defined a 
‘group’ as:  
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a class of persons who share a common attribute in respect of any of the 
following matters – (a) age, (b) disability, (c) gender, (d) proposed, 
commenced or completed reassignment of gender (within the meaning 
given by section 82(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (c. 65)), (e) race, 
(f) religion or belief, and (g) sexual orientation (Equality Act, 2006: 5).49  
 
The 2006 Act diversified group diversity by constructing and naming additional ‘protected’ 
group characteristics that it deemed bases for discrimination. The emphasis on ‘mutual 
respect between groups’ was an echo of the parallel lives discourses that viewed 
(minority) ethnic groups as a basis for conflict. The task to ensure ‘good relations’ 
between groups (Equality Act, 2006: 5) had been passed down from the responsibilities of 
the Commission for Racial Equality, though it was notably not part of the duties of the 
Disability Rights Commission or the Equal Opportunities Commission (Klug and O'Brien, 
2004). Good relations were mainly an issue with the problem categories of race and faith 
and concerns about conflicts across the key fault lines in multiculture between BME/white 
people and Muslims/non-Muslims. The Act also confirmed that the EHRC would ‘work 
towards the elimination of prejudice against, hatred of and hostility towards members of 
groups’ (Equality Act, 2006: 5). In doing so policymakers acknowledged but did not 
prioritise the idea that an individual’s group membership could result in prejudice and 
discrimination.  
 
However, as if to reinforce the contradictory attitude of policymakers towards groups, it 
was also stated that the EHRC would ‘work towards enabling members of groups to 
participate in society’ (Equality Act, 2006: 5). This was part of a well-established trope 
located in the discussions of community cohesion, i.e. that BME ‘tribal loyalty’ acted as a 
                                                     
49
 The Equality Act 2010 came into force on 1 October 2010 bringing together over 100 separate pieces of 
legislation into one single Act, including part of the 2006 Equality Act.  
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brake on membership and active engagement in wider society and belonging to the 
nation. However, policymakers appeared unconcerned that older people campaigning 
with Age UK would have their ability to participate in society curtailed or that the mums in 
Mumsnet would get cut off from the rest of us. Therefore membership of some groups 
and organisations were problems and others were not. 
 
The new framework of equalities and human rights was ambivalent in regards to race 
equality as a priority because of the problematic way that it constructed multicultural 
groups and focused on numerous different ‘protected’ categories. However, human rights 
and race equality were not necessarily incompatible. For example the CFMEB had argued 
that ‘[h]uman rights principles provide a valuable framework for handling differences, but 
they are never by themselves enough’ (Runnymede Trust, 2000: ix). As the Chair of the 
CFMEB Bhikhu Parekh later explained:  
 
Although they are closely related, the ideas of human rights and equality 
belong to different historical traditions, rest on different presuppositions, 
and have different moral implications. To be sure, human rights include 
the right to equality, including equality of consideration, respect, 
treatment, rights and opportunities. However equality encompasses 
much more than this... Inequalities damage human lives but do not seem 
to violate human rights (Parekh, 2006: 36). 
 
At the centre of the criticism was that a framework for human rights was insufficiently 
attentive to the ways in which inequalities diminished human life. Like citizenship and 
Britishness, it was not clear what human rights had to offer to settle the ‘quarrel’ between 
multiculture and collective living where, as with the northern disturbances, the underlying 
problem was one of inequality, discrimination and a lack of opportunities (Amin, 2002; 
Kundnani, 2001). Parekh also argued that human rights were of limited assistance in 
addressing equality because they were predicated on the idea of the homogenous 
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individual and that rights were the same for each individual, whereas equality was also 
about collective differences: 
 
… human rights concentrate on individuals; equality does that too but 
also has a collective dimension. When individuals are discriminated 
against or subjected to demeaning stereotypes on grounds of colour, 
ethnicity, race, or gender, they are treated unequally by virtue of their 
membership of the relevant group. Their discrimination and the 
disadvantages cannot be tackled at the individual level alone and require 
actions directed at them collectively (Parekh, 2006: 37). 
 
Parekh argued that human rights downplayed the patterned and collective nature of 
discrimination and the role of discrimination as a group phenomenon. However, there 
were also attempts to better connect patterns of race inequality and human rights. For 
example, in 1997 the anti-racism organisation 1990 Trust set up a human rights 
programme to tie together questions of race and human rights (cited in Runnymede Trust, 
2000: 100) as part of a desire to establish the principle that racism was a violation of 
human rights (1990 Trust, 2010). This was still a race equality-centred approach whereas 
brap, the (explicitly not BME-led) equalities and human rights organisation, took a 
different view of overlapping issues of inequalities. Their Chief Executive Joy Warmington 
stated that brap was interested in: 
 
... issues of intersectionality. So the idea that you weren’t just a BME 
person, you were also a woman, you were also other things as well. It 
already had that broad message which did take it a little bit out of outside 
the kind of core messages of race equality organisations at the time… (Joy 
Warmington, 2011, Interview). 
 
Warmington was interested in intersectional individuals – those that were members of 
multiple groups and subject to discrimination on the grounds of those multiple 
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memberships. This approach was in line with the idea of the need for multiple protected 
group characteristics as identified in the 2006 Equality Act.  
 
Other race equality actors were critical of the proposed institutional reforms that New 
Labour proposed to undertake leading up to what eventually was the EHRC. The 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), which was established by the Race Relations Act 
1976 to prevent indirect and direct racial discrimination; to promote racial equality; and to 
review the working of the Act and make proposals for its amendment (Solomos, 1989: 8), 
suggested that the ‘protected’ characteristics under the proposed EHRC’s remit were 
simply too different to each other.  
 
… although all types of inequality share similar features, they also exhibit 
marked differences… we know that in the area of race, there are 
institutional and cultural forces at work that resist every effort by decent 
people at encouragement, promoting good practice and raising 
awareness (Commission for Racial Equality, 2004: 4).  
 
The CRE acknowledged similarities between different forms of group inequality and in 
doing so did it attempted to locate itself as a reasoned critic rather than a bitter one 
attempting to stave off its own demise. However, it argued that racism was more and 
differently entrenched as a phenomenon than was the case with other forms of group-
based discrimination. The CRE spoke of ‘forces at work’ pointing to the conspiratorial 
nature of racism and its hold on society. The depth and the breadth of the problem meant 
that it required a bespoke and specialist solution rather than a generic one.  
 
Some BME-led race equality organisations agreed with this criticism of the difficulty of a 
single body responding to different inequalities. OBV stated the problem in more forceful 
and dramatic terms than the CRE (which was constrained by its status as a non-
departmental public body).  
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Frustration has reached boiling point with Black community leaders now 
the new body has no specific focus on race and no guaranteed Black 
representation. 
 
Simon Woolley, Director of Operation Black Vote stated  
The fundamental failure of this body is its inability to accommodate the 
needs of various sectors that have different histories, challenges and 
require different approaches. This one size fits all seems to be a blatant 
attempt to ignore race equality (OBV, 2006: 1). 
 
The text above from an OBV press release attempted to do a number of things at once. It 
asserted the specialist nature of race equality through the assertion that the new body 
needed (but did not guarantee) specialist Black representation. This was consistent with 
the black political narrative that a black person with a black perspective was best placed 
to deal with inequality against black people. By extension the argument was that racism 
was ultimately unknowable to white people. Without black representation the single 
equalities body would offer a generic approach to a specialist problem, and the history of 
generic interventions were that they were white-led and overlooked race equality. 
Another element of the text was to express anger through claiming that Black community 
leaders were reaching ‘boiling point’ and the accusation that the design of the single 
equalities body was a ‘blatant attempt to ignore race equality’. While these latter 
comments could be said to fall into the caricature of ‘angry and black’, at the same time, 
reflecting on the earlier discussion about the narrow spectrum of issues on which race 
equality organisations were allowed by policymakers to speak, perhaps the tone and 
content was right for the intended audience. And it may have given the impression of OBV 
being in touch with and a legitimate carrier of the voice of the ‘community’ that OBV was 
expected to ‘represent’ (see chapter six for more on ‘representing’).  
 
By including age, gender reassignment, and sexual orientation (Equality Act, 2006: 5) as 
‘vulnerable’ groups and splitting (minority) faith and religion away from its previous place 
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embedded within minority race, one concern for BME-led race equality organisations was 
that this diluted the primary and privileged position of race as a locus for discrimination 
and inequality. 
 
BTEG Trustees and staff remain concerned about the impact of the single 
equalities agenda. Naturally we welcome the widening of the equality 
strands but a real consequence of this change is a shift away from race 
equality (BTEG, 2010: 5).  
 
BTEG adopted a three-tiered approach in this excerpt. The first tier was BTEG’s alarm 
about single equalities. However, they did not simply say that the concern was BTEG’s as 
an institution but that it belonged to BTEG’s trustees and staff amplifying and unifying the 
anxiety felt. Second, BTEG observed the niceties of policy discussion in accepting the 
already-implemented and irreversible policy development and stating that they ‘naturally’ 
welcomed the expansion of equality to other strands and groups. In doing so they 
attempted to demonstrate their balance and reasonableness in an attempt to make their 
criticism more credible. Third, and this was where the discursive centre of gravity lay in 
this text, was that the consequence of the increased number of ‘protected’ groups was 
that the protection against BME inequalities became diluted. For BTEG there was a ‘zero-
sum’ equation in operation with respect to ‘protected’ groups, i.e. if some groups were 
extended protection against inequality then others by definition, were less protected. 
 
Of the organisations at the centre of my study ROTA, though concerned that the new 
equalities and human rights apparatus was overly-focussed on individual rather than 
group race inequality (Gavrielides, 2009), was most interested in intersectional elements 
of inequality. They hoped that the new EHRC arrangements might create the possibility for 
joint and collective responses to discrimination and as a result the organisation 
‘championed the Commission amongst BAME [Black Asian Minority Ethnic] groups’ (Dinah 
Cox, 2011, Interview).  In doing so ROTA was an outlier amongst BME-led race equality 
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organisations, as Dinah Cox highlighted with a story of a meeting with other BME 
representatives on the proposed single equalities body: 
 
… I was the only person in the room that thought that there might be 
some positive elements of working together with people with other 
equalities groups but I am a woman as well as black so for me there's 
always been an issue of one's oppression isn't always necessarily based 
on a single issue … So yeah, in that way we weren't in tune with the rest 
of the black voluntary sector in London at that time. But I still think I was 
right (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview). 
 
Cox asserted her position as a black woman – and claimed double oppression as a result – 
to justify why she saw the potential in working with other equalities groups. Cox used her 
situation as an intersectional individual and tied this to a collective and overlapping 
response to discrimination for example by emphasising ‘working together with people 
with other equalities groups’. Furthermore Cox appeared proud to say that ROTA was out 
of line with the wider black voluntary sector and asserted the importance of not going 
with the crowd.  
 
Kamila Zahno, former Chair of ROTA, also supported the multiple dimensions of the single 
equalities body and explained how the organisation reconciled this with its BME-led and 
race equality dimensions:  
 
… we said we still are a race equality organisation and race equality is still 
our top priority, but we need to be considering, you know, disabled black 
people, you know, gay and lesbian, LGBT and black people... So in terms 
of policy and direction we wanted to be more inclusive (Kamila Zahno, 
2011, Interview). 
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Zahno re-emphasised race and race inequality at the heart of ROTA’s work. In doing so she 
attempted to avoid any suggestion that ROTA’s work was being diluted but rather that it 
was being augmented. Their work was therefore both grounded in BMEness but expanded 
on the principle of inclusion. The position was one where ROTA could justify itself on 
principled grounds. However, even though this may have been the driver behind ROTA’s 
position, it was also the pragmatic thing to do given the direction of policy and funding.  
 
Though ROTA’s intersectional rhetoric was distinct from BTEG and OBV’s more BME-
centred approach, at the level of specific programmatic intervention the focus of most 
BME-led organisations was already intersectional and sub-sectional. For example, BTEG’s 
REACH programme targeted young African-Caribbean males recognising that their 
aggregate experiences were different to young African-Caribbean females. 
Correspondingly, OBV’s work in secondary schools with BME and non-BME young people 
as part of their Understanding Power citizenship project targeted the next generation of 
voters and parliamentary candidates (OBV, 2006). Therefore the issue of singular or 
intersectional equality thinking and who was for or against either was not as clear cut as 
at first glance.  
 
The EHRC and its surrounding discursive and policy framework attempted to ‘pause’ 
multiculture or perhaps to dilute and disturb it by insisting both on more individuated 
approaches to equality and identifying an increased number of groups at risk of 
discrimination. The new framework for equalities brought the BME-centred way that 
BME-led race equality organisations had previously organised their work into question, if 
not into outright disrepute. BMEness was no longer a privileged or prioritised site of 
discrimination. 
 
Sir Bert Massie, Chair of the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) and an initial critic of the 
single equalities body, conceded the EHRC was ‘the only game in town’ (Disability Now, 
2007). Some race equality campaigners came to the same conclusion. Trevor Phillips, who 
had been Chair of the CRE, was appointed the first Chair of the EHRC. However, this was 
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only a partial concession to BME-led organisations given his controversial comments 
(outlined in chapter four) about multiculturalism being ‘killed off’ (cited in Baldwin, 2004) 
and ‘segregation’ (Phillips, 2005). In addition, OBV Chief Executive Simon Woolley was 
appointed a Commissioner in the EHRC two years after it was set up (OBV, 2009: 1). These 
appointments at least gave the Commission two race equality specialists. However, the 
broader pattern of the shift away from race equality was confirmed in changes in 2012 to 
the EHRC Chair and Commissioners which saw both Phillips and Woolley leave the 
Commission and stripped the organisation of race equality champions (Berkeley, 2012).  
 
5 Conclusion 
This third and final part of the New Labour period witnessed a three-pronged attempt to 
pause the troublesome idea of multiculture and to (re)establish other ways of thinking 
about difference and sameness as well as equality and inequality. However, just as was 
the case with previous discourses of parallel lives and community cohesion, discourses in 
this third part of the New Labour period had multicultural matters at their heart and 
turned away from questions of race inequality and impeded equality-orientated BME-led 
organising.  
 
The idea of the nation was explored by policymakers, particularly Gordon Brown, as a 
means to provide a transcendent sense of belonging and values that trumped cultural 
groupings. However, such notions were thin and struggled to locate the essence of 
Britishness or ‘the British thing’. At the same time Britishness was associated with 
whiteness (Ali, 2003; Back, 1994) and situated BME people and BMEness always on the 
edge of or precariously placed inside the nation.  
 
The discursive theme on citizenship crystallised the idea that citizens ought to be 
individually well educated, employed and employable and emphasised the requirement 
that their attitudes and actions were public-spirited. However, citizenship was positioned 
by policymakers as above ‘tribal’ or multicultural loyalties, but at the same time, as 
evidenced by race inequality statistics, was not fully and equally available to BME people. 
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Policymakers underpinned citizenship with explicitly British values and identification and, 
in doing so, once again located BME people on the margins.  
 
Finally, the reconfiguration of equalities and human rights developed more individuated 
notions of equality and weakened and diversified ideas of groups at risk of inequality. 
Both developments took focus away from race equality and diminished the relevance and 
influence of BME-led organising against race inequality.  
 
As a result, in the final part of the New Labour period the discourse of multiculture 
‘paused’ was a continuation of earlier ideas of problematic multiculture, BME people and 
BME-led organising. The centrality of the nation, the citizen and equalities and human 
rights may have attempted to step around the multicultural but at the same time they 
were focussed on amplifying its troublesome aspects.  
 
In the next chapter, I switch attention from the particular themes of discourse across the 
New Labour period onto how discursive themes were produced by policy actors. I also 
examine factors that affected the content of policy and political impact of discursive 
interventions from both BME-led race equality organisations and New Labour 
policymakers.  
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Chapter 6 Politics behind the discursive lines  
1 Introduction  
This chapter takes a sideways step from the previous three chapters and ventures behind 
the discursive lines related to nation, multiculture and race equality. It is about the politics 
of policy discourse – where I understand politics to be about the constrained use of power 
(Goodin and Klingemann, 1996; Goodin, 2009). Therefore my focus is about the 
constraints that affect the production of policy discourses as well as the efficacy of 
discourses in the policy process. The first part of this chapter considers the production and 
deployment of certain ‘official’ policymaker discourses. In this first section, I also explore 
the complicated relationship between what was said by policymakers and the connection 
between this and policy initiatives. In the second part of this chapter, I switch attention to 
interventions in policy discourses from BME-led race equality organisations. In particular, I 
examine the notion of BME political actors as ‘representative’ of ‘the BME community’ in 
policy discussions. I then go on to discuss how, in an increasingly hostile policy 
environment, ‘renegade’ BME perspectives sceptical about race inequality emerged as an 
alternative theme of BME-led policy discourse.  
 
Before moving on to discuss these matters in further detail, I want to reiterate the 
importance of policy discourses and the themes contained therein. In chapter one, I cited 
the ‘socially constructive’ effects of discourses (Fairclough, 2010; Wodak, 2009) as the 
reason for my interest in them. For policy actors and policymakers discourse was a means 
to ‘dominate or organise a field of meaning… in a particular way’ (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 3). This kind of manoeuvre relies on rhetoric, i.e. ‘the art of persuasion 
or effective communication…’ in favour of a particular point of view (Back, 2004: 398).50  
                                                     
50
 An example of persuasive impact came from Margaret Thatcher. She appeared on the current affairs 
television programme World in Action in 1979 and expressed ‘public’ concern about ‘swamping’ by 
immigrants. Prior to the interview just nine per cent of British citizens felt that there were too many 
immigrants whereas after the appearance 21 per cent said that they were worried (Winder, 2004: 401). 
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New Labour, with its close association with ‘spin’, language and communications 
management, was all too aware of the potentially constructive effects of discourse. This 
was perhaps most explicitly articulated by Sadiq Khan in 2008 – before he went on to 
become Minister of State for Communities. Speaking about the positive, outward-looking 
London portrayed in the bid for the 2012 Olympic Games, he stated: 
 
This was, in truth, a rather idealised version of London (and Britain), but 
the story we told was one of a Britain of different races, cultures and 
religions united in wholeness. We may not be quite there yet, but I think 
that we saw too how telling that story, to ourselves as much as to the 
wider world, can help to make it a reality, become a shared 
understanding of a mission that we want to live up to (Khan, 2008: 8-9). 
 
According to Khan, certain idealised discourses about multicultural Britain helped to make 
that ideal state more likely. By implication, more dismal discourses about ‘parallel lives’ 
helped to position BME people as problems.51 With this notion of the socially constructive 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Therefore, in claiming that the public was concerned about immigration, Thatcher made parts of the public 
concerned about immigration – creating a self-fulfilling discursive loop. 
 
51
 Sarah Teather, former Liberal Democrat Minister of State for Children and Families, powerfully made a 
similar point in July 2013 when she argued (specifically in relation to immigration) that:  
 
Public opinion does not exist in a vacuum, and I wonder whether colleagues have any 
understanding about language and the implications of language. Language is one of the 
powerful things you have as a politician, and we need to consider that. We forget that 
language actually forms society – we're integral to it – so people's attitude to their 
neighbours is formed partly by the things we say on television, and the way in which 
they are reported. Silence in the face of language that others are using is not enough 
(cited in Aitkenhead, 2013). 
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effects of policy discourses in mind, I now turn to processes of producing themed 
discourses of community cohesion and parallel lives.  
 
2 Policy discourse and policymaking 
In this section I consider some process and political dimensions of New Labour 
policymaker discourses about nation, multiculture and race equality.  In the first sub-
section below, I examine the production of discourses of community cohesion and parallel 
lives. In the following sub-section, I then explore the complex relationship between policy 
discourse and policymaking as part of a discussion about the efficacy of policy discourse.  
 
2.1 Producing a parallel universe 
As part of my research interviews, I discussed the production process of policy discourses 
with a number of people close to policymaking. For Nick Pearce, former Head of the 
Number 10 Policy Unit, the production of policy discourses was often driven by a feeling 
amongst politicians ‘that they have to name a moment and place themselves’ (Nick 
Pearce, 2011, Interview). Pearce pointed to the urge that policymakers had to both 
organise a set of events and to position themselves in relation to those developments. In 
naming a moment, policy actors were naming themselves and what they, as political 
actors, stood for.  
 
One such example of ‘naming’ was found in the discourse that centred on ‘parallel lives’ 
(Burnley Task Force, 2001; Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001). This was perhaps 
the defining discourse of the ‘problem’ of multicultural Britain in the New Labour period, 
driving not only the community cohesion agenda (see chapter four) but also the 
subsequent turn to Britishness and citizenship (see chapter five). This parallel lives 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Teather justified the idea of the power of language in social construction by suggesting a variety of pathways 
through various discursive pathways that carried pronouncements from on high by policymakers, down to 
the populous. 
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discourse was constructed as part of an unusually concerted effort. As described in 
chapter four, there were five main policy reports that shared a broad analysis on the 
existence of local ethnic-based segregation as well as the need for more ‘positive’ 
connection across ethnic groupings (Ouseley, 2001; Burnley Task Force, 2001; Community 
Cohesion Review Team, 2001; Home Office, 2001; Oldham Independent Review, 2001). 
The complementary nature of the five reports can be seen as an example of 
‘intertextuality’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011; Gidley, 2004), in which texts (for example 
those contained across different documents) intersect with other texts (Talbot, 2005). In 
particular, these five documents were complementary and could be read in conjunction 
with each other.  
 
Philip Collins, former Chief Speechwriter to Tony Blair, suggested that community 
cohesion had changed the landscape for policy discourse.  
  
I think looking back on it, obviously you're writing in a context defined by 
things you don't necessarily have in the forefront of your mind. You know, 
you know of them, but clearly writing after the Cantle report and other 
things is different from writing before it…  (Philip Collins, 2011, Interview) 
 
However, Collins also argued that such prior discursive inputs were not front of mind for 
people such as him and rather that ‘[one is] rarely conscious of them at the time’ (Philip 
Collins, 2011, Interview). Yet, even subliminally, the discourse of community cohesion and 
parallel lives cast an intertextual shadow and changed the terms and shape of policy 
debate. As Collins acknowledged, they became ‘part of the [speechwriting] mix’ (Philip 
Collins, 2011, Interview) and were inevitably something that policymakers writing on 
multicultural living had to take account of following the Cantle report. 
 
I have discussed the content of the reports that followed the northern disturbances in 
some detail in chapter four and do not intend to repeat this material here. Instead, I want 
to note the concerted process that went into the ‘naming’ and production of a social 
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phenomenon of parallelism as a policy concern and theme of policy discourse. Ideas such 
as ethnic groups living in ‘comfort zones’ (Ouseley, 2001: 16); ‘… the segregated nature of 
society...’ (Oldham Independent Review, 2001: 23); and ‘parallel lives’ (Burnley Task Force, 
2001: 7), ensured that a ‘field of meaning’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3) was being 
clearly set out and reinforced. This reinforcement included the commissioning of two 
reports in the aftermath of the 2001 disturbances by Home Secretary David Blunkett. One 
was the Community Cohesion Review Team, whose terms of reference required it to 
explore ‘the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active communities 
and social cohesion’ (Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001: 5). The other was John 
Denham’s inter-departmental ministerial group which was tasked to advise the 
government on what it ‘could do to minimise the risk of further disorder, and to help build 
stronger, more cohesive communities’ (Home Office, 2001: introduction).  
 
Professor Michael Keith raised the issue of government-commissioned reports in sealing 
and reinforcing certain ‘understandings’ and discursive themes. Reflecting on his own 
involvement as a Commissioner in the central government-appointed Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion (2007), he stated that: 
 
… you have the terms of reference; you have the bureaucracy [civil 
service and political advisors]; you have certain kinds of normative frames 
– and that, if you like, acts as the discursive boundaries (Michael Keith, 
2011, Interview). 
 
As Keith noted above, different state, policymaking and political forces were at work 
constructing tight discursive boundaries around ideas of parallels and cohesion. In effect, 
policymakers ensured that Ouseley’s early ideas (Ouseley, 2001) were followed through 
by the Cantle (Community Cohesion Review Team, 2001), Denham (Home Office, 2001) 
and, after a gap, Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) reports. Together these 
reports, and the political actors behind them, entrenched and ring-fenced the emerging 
discursive ‘field’ of parallelism and (in)cohesion.  
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The example of parallel lives and community cohesion, above, illustrates how certain 
themes can and did take hold in policy debates. Discourses on community cohesion and 
parallel lives were constructed in a concerted and concentrated way as policymakers 
threw their discursive weight behind these notions. However, it was not simply the 
support of policymakers that enabled these discourses to gain purchase. In my interview 
with Ted Cantle he suggested that part of the power of ‘parallel lives’ was its poetic and 
evocative nature. 
 
... I remember actually thinking of and writing the section on parallel lives 
and I thought… this does conjure up what we've been trying to express 
and what was being told to us… to express this idea of different 
communities going along parallel tracks. So, we tried to conceptualise 
that in a way that would capture people's imagination… (Ted Cantle, 
2011, Interview). 
 
In discussing his use of parallel lives, Cantle stated that he wanted to develop a phrase or 
idea that could capture people’s imaginations and crystallise what he believed the Review 
Team were being told. It was not clear whose imaginations Cantle wanted to capture, 
although likely suspects were the media; people working in ‘diversity’ and 
‘multiculturalism’; and/or the wider general public, including those living in the areas 
where the 2001 disturbances occurred. The point of such capturing of imagination 
appeared to be to have discursive and policy (making) effects. By way of contrast, 
‘conventional’ BME-led race equality themes appeared to lack the ability to organise and 
dominate policy discourses, for reasons that I explore later in this chapter. 
 
Even though policymakers had access to heavy discursive machinery, such as official 
commissions and reports, to enable discourses to gain a foothold, discursive interventions 
still needed to tread with care. In particular policymakers did not have carte blanche to 
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simply say anything they wished in regards to nation, multiculture and race equality. Philip 
Collins explained: 
 
… it's interesting how there's, in every speech, a sort of tyranny of things 
you can't not say. And it's actually a mark of progress that you can't not 
say some of that stuff. Because there was a day when you couldn't say it. 
And to be forced to have to say it is no bad thing. So to be compelled to 
do a eulogy to diversity in this speech [on integration delivered by Tony 
Blair in December 2006] is a much better world than one in which nobody 
ever says that. In a way I wish I didn't have to do it because I wanted to 
make a slightly different argument, but nonetheless you do have to do 
that thing. And there's a little bit that's partly good politics but it's also 
partly that's what you think. You do want – it's not cynical – you do mean 
that stuff, but even if you decided to leave it out because you were doing 
a different speech you'd then get three days of complaints from not 
having said it (Philip Collins, 2011, Interview). 
 
The first point to note was that speeches from the Prime Minister still mattered. Even in 
the modern communication age, the old-fashioned medium of the speech still drew 
attention and criticism if the Prime Minister did not say certain things to satisfy certain 
constituencies. The problem for Collins was that from the perspective of discursively 
intervening in policy matters, one could not simply get straight to the point. However, 
though Collins may have been frustrated by the ‘tyranny’ of what had to be said, it was 
not the case that the ‘eulogy to diversity’ obscured the central message in the ‘duty to 
integrate’ speech that he co-wrote with Blair. This was unambiguously captured in the 
following passage: 
 
The right to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly 
balanced by a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain, to be British and 
Asian, British and black, British and white (Blair, 2006). 
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Therefore, although Collins and Blair had to go through certain discursive hoops and 
observe particular niceties to get there, it was possible to send a loud and clear signal 
through the speech about their defining idea. In the case of the passage above, this was to 
serve a warning to BME people and put them on notice about the need to ‘integrate’ and 
to stop causing parallel lives.  
 
2.2 Policy discourse and its connection to policymaking 
Having made a discursive intervention and named political ideas and moments, it was 
uncertain about how such inputs might influence policymaking. The reality was that policy 
discourses did not necessarily translate (at least in the short term) into policymaking. For 
example, Nick Pearce argued the following about community cohesion – the proposed 
policy solution to parallel lives: 
 
... personally, I don't think that [community cohesion] had a secure place 
in the policy discourse of the government as much, you know, as people 
on the outside thought it did. Blunkett was very preoccupied with sorting 
out asylum and immigration. That was his big major concern when he was 
Home Secretary – less about established communities, although as I say, 
there were elements of that – particularly marriage. Blair, I think was 
absolutely preoccupied with asylum and terrorism – those were the 
things that most preoccupied him. I don't think he had a community 
cohesion agenda, really. And I think, you know, we have these periodic 
eruptions in British public in our history, you know, Notting Hill, Toxteth, 
Brixton, you know and I think probably those riots in Bradford and 
Oldham and so on, Burnley, probably had less impact on public policy-
making than perhaps Brixton through Scarman or Notting Hill did – to my 
mind anyway (Nick Pearce, 2011, Interview). 
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Pearce’s account suggested a disconnect between policy discourses, policy-thinking and 
policymaking. This meant that parallel lives and the community cohesion agenda was less 
influential, in policy terms than, for example, BME-led race equality organisations deemed 
(see chapter five). Although there was lots of discursive energy spent on these subjects, 
policymakers did not really understand how to respond in policy terms to the northern 
disturbances and other more pressing and practical aspects of ‘difference’, such as 
immigration and terrorism, were prioritised. In addition, the disturbances in Bradford, 
Burnley and Oldham in 2001 appeared to offer less clear policy solutions than earlier 
eruptions such as Brixton in 1981 (where the policy issues of policing and deprivation 
were more apparent). According to former Home Office Minister Fiona Mactaggart MP, 
community cohesion did not lend itself to national policy action. 
 
It [the community cohesion agenda] wasn’t just grassroots and practical 
enough… I think that was a mistake and I think I was to some extent 
responsible for that. But it [the community cohesion agenda] began to 
recognise that what one needed to do was to kind of create community 
initiatives where people could make a difference (Fiona Mactaggart, 
2011, Interview).   
 
In different ways, Mactaggart and Pearce agreed that community cohesion, and the 
parallel lives it was predicated on, held an ambiguous place in the policymaking 
imagination. For example, neither questioned the validity of the concepts, but both 
doubted their policy practicalities.  
 
Yet, this difficulty of converting community cohesion into policy terms did not mean that 
this discourse was not performing political or policy-orientated work. Indeed, discourse 
could be used to manage and maintain support amongst different constituencies, e.g. 
electors, the media, politicians, civil society actors and so on. For example, Nick Pearce 
talked about the function of specific discursive interventions to reassure constituencies. 
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I think they [some discursive interventions] are much more rhetorical. 
They function as a rhetorical device; as reassurance devices… So that, for 
me, is a very interesting question. Whether you get some of these 
political interventions which are designed to sort of function politically for 
the politicians, but remain largely rhetorical when it comes to the 
business of Government (Nick Pearce, 2011, Interview). 
 
For Pearce, the community cohesion agenda was largely rhetorical and lacked a hard 
policy edge. Instead, Pearce talked about the function of discourse as ‘reassurance 
devices’ – and as such, discursive inputs were still a useful tool of politics, policy, influence 
and persuasion.  
 
Another slightly different aspect of the connection of policy discourse, policymaking and 
reassurance was that, in some cases, policymaking connected to race equality came 
without a race equality discourse. As Sunder Katwala, former General Secretary of the 
Fabian Society, explained. 
 
[Sometimes]... people are hoping not to, I think, generate enormous 
amounts of discourse and discussion of it [policymaking] because there's 
a bit of a risk... You've got people like Robin Cook and Peter Hain 
essentially soft left sympathisers of New Labour saying we shouldn't do 
good works by stealth and not tell people about it. Where I think the sort 
of Blairite view is ‘what's the point of creating a public argument about 
stuff that we're getting on with and that hasn't been spotted’... I think, if 
you’re doing things like spending a lot of money on schools and the health 
service and trying to redirect resources to the poorest areas on a kind of 
evidence base, minorities will be disproportionate winners because they 
are the most disadvantaged; but you think you will be less successful at 
doing it if you were to articulate that. And I think, you know, there are 
kind of pros and cons about that... I think that... the Labour party will be 
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perceived by white voters as primarily interested in advancing the 
interests of non-white voters over white voters... (Sunder Katwala, 2011, 
Interview).  
  
Katwala argued that the discursive silence on the race equality dimensions of New 
Labour’s investment in public services, regeneration and renewal enabled New Labour to 
advance the position of BME people in society. According to Katwala, New Labour 
understood its policies as being redistributionary and reducing race inequality but that the 
absence of multiculture or race equality discourses accompanying these policies helped to 
ensure that this work could be undertaken reassuringly and without alarming white 
people. In other words, just as there were political moments that needed to be named 
there were other occasions when the politic thing to do was to leave things unnamed or 
to name them something uncontentious.  
 
In this section I have considered the complicated politics behind the discursive lines of 
policymakers. At times, as with community cohesion and parallel lives, policy discourse 
could be developed as part of a concerted and muscular effort. However, policymakers 
could not simply impose their discourses. For discursive interventions to gain ground they 
needed to observe certain rules and organise around memorable ideas and phrases as 
well as pay due regard to ‘sensitivities’ on ‘diversity’ in order for their central argument 
and rhetoric to be heard. The nature of policy efficacy of discourses was also complex. For 
example, community cohesion and parallel lives were discursively important but may not 
have had much direct policymaking follow-through. However, even where policy 
discourses could not directly be converted into policymaking they could organise 
understandings of a political field and thereby make a political and policy mark. It was in 
pursuit of this kind of influence that BME-led race equality organisations were active 
discursively. It is to this topic that I turn next.  
 
223 
 
3 Bringing BMEness to discourse 
3.1 BME engagement in policy: gaining footholds and treading carefully 
Whereas policymakers could not always convert policy discourses into policy action they 
could often shape policy debate with discursive resources and power at its disposal. By 
comparison, BME-led race equality organisations faced a number of difficulties in making 
effective discursive interventions on policy issues. For these organisations, the politics of 
policy discourse and policy-influencing involved countering what at times was ‘hostility’ 
from policymakers about the place of BME communities and BME organising in British 
society as well as difficult issues of new ethnicities (see chapter two). Both of these factors 
curtailed the ability of BME-led race equality organisations to turn policy discussions back 
to questions of race equality, discrimination and disadvantage – or to present such 
questions in a way to capture imagination and dominate a discursive field.  
 
Engaging in policy discussions with policymakers was difficult and often unrewarding for 
race equality initiatives in the New Labour period, as the Commission on the Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMEB) found to its cost (see chapter three). Reflecting on the 
response to the CFMEB report, Bhikhu Parekh echoed the point made by Nick Pearce and 
Philip Collins cited above about discursive interventions as reassurance. 
 
If you are trying to persuade people you must begin by praising them – 
say nice things about them... I think in our report we were carping from 
time to time; critical; and it might have been helpful if we had begun the 
report with a fulsome praise of Britain, saying it's a great society; proud to 
belong here; but it has some few blemishes and we need to correct them 
(Bhikhu Parekh, 2011, Interview). 
 
Parekh acknowledged that the CFMEB may not have observed certain reassuring niceties 
and instead the tone and content of its report could be perceived by policymakers as 
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overly critical. Parekh also suggested that the CFMEB’s intervention was mired in the 
politics of the time.  
 
Remember that there is also the politics to this report... We were 
associated – I was associated – with Tony Blair. Because I had just been 
appointed peer by Tony Blair. I was also connected with IPPR [the 
Institute for Public Policy Research] which is a Labour party think tank. So 
was Trevor Phillips. So, if you wanted to attack the Labour government in 
2001, one easy way to attack it was to attack the report and take the 
report as representing the hidden agenda of Labour government – 
breaking up Britain. 
 
According to Parekh, parts of the media that were hostile to New Labour coerced New 
Labour into a robust counter-response to the CFMEB report. In particular, Parekh 
suggested that the fact that the report was associated with him, as well as a critical 
thinker such as Stuart Hall, was a provocation to a right wing media already angered by 
what they saw as a meek and accepting policy response to the Macpherson report 
(Pilkington, 2003). Therefore the context in which a discursive intervention was made was 
crucial to its ability to influence policy debates and policymaking.  
 
Whereas policymakers rapidly shut out an intervention such as the CFMEB, in other cases, 
the policy process almost required that highly critical race equality actors were seen to be 
part of policy deliberations. Karen Chouhan, former Chief Executive of 1990 Trust, 
reflected on that organisation’s inclusion in policy discussions in the following way.  
 
I think what was good for the 1990 Trust was that it was never backward 
in coming forward [in its interventions in policy discourse]. It never was 
shy about saying things weren't actually with the grain they were against 
the grain and for a strange reason that actually... meant that we were 
included on a lot of things that we didn't think that we would naturally 
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be, partly because it's like they [policymakers] wanted their enemies in 
the tent. So, in a funny way, saying what you want to say and saying it 
loudly can actually make you more included (Karen Chouhan, 2011, 
Interview).  
 
Counter-intuitively, it was the robust and oppositional nature of 1990 Trust’s policy 
discourses that resulted in them being invited into the policy tent, as policymakers 
attempted to keep their ‘enemies’ close. The inclusion, by policymakers, of race equality 
campaigners in policy processes appeared, at least somewhat, to be aimed at 
demonstrating that the policy process embraced ‘diverse’ opinions. However, it was not 
clear that ‘inclusion’ in policy processes resulted in impact and influence in policy debate 
and policymaking. 
 
As discussed in chapter two, whether and how BME organisations and/or individuals 
should be involved with policymakers has been a contentious issue. Some critics saw such 
engagement as ‘selling out’ (Feinstein, 2010; Sivanandan, 1990) serving self-interests and 
failing the broader BME population. I suggest that these were relatively easy charges to 
make against policy-engaged BME-led race equality organisations and the reality was 
more complex, as the BME-led race equality organisations that I studied appeared to 
demonstrate.  
 
Some BME leaders understood that there were compromises in their policy discourses as 
part of the process of engaging with policymakers. As Dinah Cox explained: ‘We would 
tone down the use of our language in order to keep the door open...’ (2011, Interview). 
Cox went on to describe how, over the New Labour period, continued articulation of the 
need for action on race inequality led to resistance from policymakers: 
 
With policymakers I did put forward issues about – and I think you'll find 
in our writings at the time – you do need to address the balance by doing 
positive action... Yes I think there was some interest to start with. I do 
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think by the end eyes were glazing over and as policymakers moved away 
from the discourse of equality into the discourse of diversity placing the 
emphasis, I felt, on individuals... (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview).  
 
Cox described both an attempt to keep the policy door open through tailored language 
but also an understanding that the door was not fully open, e.g. it was closing in relation 
to ‘positive action’ to counteract the effects of past discrimination (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, undated). Also a policy door might ostensibly be open but access to 
and inclusion of BME-led race equality organisations in policy processes was not the same 
as impact. This ambiguous position was reflected as Cox stated the following: 
 
You do have to be co-opted to a certain degree to operate with 
policymakers but even if you feel that those policymakers even 
understand some of what you say and you're nuancing it or you're trying 
to help them to develop something going forward then the compromise is 
worth making because everything in life is a compromise for most 
people…  
 
If we don't tell them [government] when we think they’re wrong or what 
we think should be in its place or how to do it better there is a problem 
and then you get [to] the point where you are in government's pockets or 
you’re in funders’ pockets and you are no longer speaking truth to power. 
[Instead] you are sitting round nice dinners (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview). 
  
Cox did not fit the caricature of a ‘sell-out’, but was a sophisticated political actor acutely 
aware of the trade-offs involved in engagement with power. Cox was conscious of and 
torn by the struggle between contrasting notions of ‘compromise’ and ‘truth’ as well as 
the aim of making an impact. Cox, on the one hand, expressed a strong and pragmatic 
preference for compromise as long as policymakers ‘even understand some of what you 
say’ and justified the approach with the idea that ‘everything in life is a compromise’. On 
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the other hand, Cox also revealed an equally strong attachment to speaking ‘truth to 
power’; to remain outside ‘government's pockets’; and to avoid the glitz of being close to 
power whilst actually having no influence on it.  
 
Jeremy Crook from BTEG talked in similarly ambivalent terms in relation to what could be 
said in policy work. 
 
… I still feel able to talk about racism, institutional racism in government 
circles and civil servant circles and to ministers... Yeah, I am still happy 
and confident to talk about the issues directly. I think it's a bit more 
difficult talking about a white bias in thinking and policy in this country 
because you've got to kind of – you are trying to work closely with senior 
civil servants and ministers and you've got to keep that door open. 
(Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview).  
 
Like Cox, Crook prized the ‘open door’ to policymakers and the threat that it would be 
shut appeared to limit what BTEG could and could not say. In engagements with senior 
civil servants and ministers speaking about racism was not off limits but the concept of 
‘white bias’ was. This was analogous to the earlier discussion and what Philip Collins called 
the ‘tyranny of things you can't not say’ (Philip Collins, 2011, Interview). Instead, this time, 
the tyranny was in terms of what could not be said rather than what had to be said. White 
bias was a provocation to policymakers in a way that the more abstract notion of 
institutional racism was not, as the former called individual policymakers to account and 
named them as perpetuators and beneficiaries of white privilege. In this way, for BME-led 
race equality organisations, honesty in their discourse was not necessarily best for policy.  
 
3.2 ‘Representing’ BME voices 
The previous section was about what race equality actors could and could not say to 
policymakers in policy discourse and discussions. The idea of ‘white bias’ in policymaking, 
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though undoubtedly correct, was something that could/was not to be spoken in polite 
policy circles and yet it was also the raison d'être for involvement of BME-led 
organisations in policy processes. BME-led organisations argued that an absence of BME 
perspectives in policymaking and policy discourse led to policies that (further) 
disadvantaged BME people. For example, the BME umbrella organisation Voice4Change 
England, argued in a response to government proposals on ‘single (BME) identity’ funding 
(see chapter four) that such ideas were based on a ‘... flawed policy framework which is 
insensitive to the positive contribution made by the ‘single groups’ in mainstreaming 
equality and meeting the unmet needs of diverse communities’ (Voice4Change England, 
2008: 2).  
 
The argument was that the insensitive policy framework was the product of an unduly 
white policymaking process that did not and could not understand the contribution of the 
BME third sector in advancing equality. Similarly, Joy Warmington of brap also recognised 
that there was a problem of uniformity in policymaking.  
 
I think that we often don't have the right people doing the right thing. I 
think policymakers that tend to do this stuff; they're usually very bright 25 
year olds from Cambridge or Oxford. I think that what... [is needed]... in 
order to create good equalities policies is an understanding of people who 
have been trying to implement it and... understanding the culture of 
changing race relations. You need to bring a number of different people 
together and think okay what do we need now in terms of policy? (Joy 
Warmington, 2011, Interview).  
 
The problem to which Warmington and Voice4Change England were pointing was similar 
to that identified by Trevor Phillips, namely that policymaking and ‘... discourse... is 
conducted largely by people who don't inhabit a space that any of the minority 
populations do’ (Trevor Phillips, 2011, Interview). It wasn’t just that the policymakers and 
policy discourse-makers were white but that they were people who had parallel lives, 
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experiences and interests to BME people. Unsurprisingly, BME-led race equality 
organisations, such as BTEG, claimed that BME perspectives in the policy realm were 
required to reduce this distance and deficit:  
 
... [unless] these think tanks and the civil servants are informed from the 
experience of living with, working with diverse communities then we're 
not going to get a diverse kind of inclusive policy outcome at the end of it, 
you know. We're still going to get a very white middle-class view of the 
world; or of this country; or of communities and that's why I think, you 
know, our perspective has to be in the mix there to make sure that there's 
a balance and that kind of weighting in the thinking… (Jeremy Crook, 
2011, Interview). 
 
The central argument here was not about the tone and content of what was being said in 
policy discourse, but on whose behalf it was/was not being said. Crook claimed that 
inclusive policy outcomes could not be delivered through exclusive participation in 
policymaking. Only (using the language of chapter three) more ‘proportional’ presence of 
BME people and perspectives could deliver more ‘BME-friendly’ policy thinking, discourse 
and initiatives.   
 
According to both BME-led (race equality) organisations this could help to fill the policy 
void of absent perspectives.52 New Labour accepted the idea that BME-led organisations 
could bring a new dimension to policymaking and they formalised a role for third sector 
organisations (voluntary and community organisations, social enterprises, co-operatives 
and mutual) in the policy sphere in the 2007 Third Sector Review (HM Treasury, 2007). 
This set out a new framework for co-operation between the third sector and government 
                                                     
52
 However, against this was the idea that white masculine spaces such as Westminster and Whitehall had so 
far proved capable of resisting female and BME ‘perspectives’ even when more women and BME people 
infiltrated their workforces (Puwar, 2004). 
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in recognition of the role of organisations in the third sector as ‘legitimate’ 
representatives of groups in society. 
 
The Government recognises the value of the diversity of organisations in 
the sector in providing voice for underrepresented groups, in 
campaigning for change, in creating strong, active and connected 
communities, in promoting enterprising solutions to social and 
environmental challenges and in transforming the delivery and design of 
public services (HM Treasury, 2007: 4). 
 
The government viewed third sector organisations as a means to develop better-informed 
policy by ‘providing voice for underrepresented groups’ and ‘vulnerable members of 
society’ (HM Treasury, 2007: 3). This meant that New Labour shared, in principle, the view 
of Voice4Change England, Warmington and Crook (cited above) about the over/under-
representation of certain perspectives in the policy process and on the need to access 
‘perspectival diversity’ (Parekh, 2000: 3) to supplement existing policy inputs.  
 
The three BME-led race equality organisations examined in my study claimed that they 
could ‘represent’ the ‘underrepresented’ BME population(s) and perspective(s). The 
organisations justified their ‘representativeness’ in similar ways.  
 
It [ROTA] was set up to support voluntary and community sector 
organisations so during our time as well, we tried to ground the policy in 
what was important to small black organisations in London doing things 
on the ground and their voice in terms of policy... (Dinah Cox, 2011, 
Interview). 
 
Dinah Cox, formerly of ROTA, explained the organisation’s connectedness to BME 
interests and perspectives through BME voluntary and community sector organisations. 
The smallness and groundedness of the organisations that they represented was 
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foregrounded as a way of emphasising the ‘authenticity’ of the representative function 
undertaken by ROTA. ROTA was offered as the ‘missing’ link between real life in BME 
communities and the distant world of policy. BTEG was also a membership organisation 
that worked on a similar connective basis to ROTA and though OBV did not have a 
membership, it sold itself as the self-styled ‘home of black politics’ (OBV, 2005).  
 
However, as discussed previously (see especially chapter two), the very notion of 
‘representing’ BMEness in discursive and other political interventions was itself 
problematic. Numerous authors (Brah, 1996; Gilroy, 1997; Hall, 1991a, 1991b; Mercer, 
1994) have called for new patterns of black (cultural) politics that engage with black 
complexity and diversity and complicate attempts to speak on behalf of the ‘black 
community’. Joy Warmington from brap picked up on this idea, even though, as cited 
above, she had also recognised the need ‘to bring a number of different people together’ 
for policymaking (Joy Warmington, 2011, Interview). Warmington questioned whether the 
idea of representation of blackness as the means to this end:  
 
You know, equality policy… still had fundamental views of what blackness 
was and what BME was, you know, and that was based on tokenistic or 
representative views which we're not. You know you don't get one British 
person who’s white on telly saying ‘I'm the representative of all Yorkshire 
people’ (Joy Warmington, 2011, Interview). 
 
Warmington’s facetious end to this passage pointed to the impossibility and undesirability 
of attempts to reduce and represent all BME people for the sake of what Warmington 
calls ‘equality policy’. Warmington rejected this form of representational politics and her 
organisation claimed to represent the issue of equality rather than a particular 
community. In addition, even BME leaders whose legitimacy was based on some notion of 
‘representativeness’, recognised the limits of their claims to reflect BMEness.  
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We are, I think if we're honest, a bit of an elite in the sense that we are... 
organisations that focus on race equality issues that don't have a mass 
membership; have small networks of organisations... We probably didn't 
do enough and haven't done enough to kind of engage with the ordinary 
[BME] person on the street... whether they're working in a council, office 
cleaner or they're a teacher or lecturer in a university (Anonymous53, 
2011, Interview). 
 
The passage did not dispute the possibility or desirability of being representative of BME 
people and communities. Instead the interviewee recognised the limited extent to which 
BME organisations positioned as speaking on behalf of BME communities were connected 
to BME civil society and ‘ordinary’ members of the BME population.  
 
Added to this problem with outreach, were other structural shifts in the pattern of 
BMEness and new ethnicities that further complicated the job of being ‘representative’.  
 
I mean, to be honest with you, in those early days, we never easily 
incorporated the Chinese community or the Turkish community – we 
didn't. But... we didn't have competing forces such as a redefined Muslim 
community in particular, but also Sikh and Hindu that after 9-11 and 7-7, 
redefined themselves as not being the other. We're not Muslim; we're 
not black; we're Muslim (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview). 
 
Simon Woolley acknowledged that BME-led race equality organisations had not always 
engaged effectively with BME populations outside of their African, African-Caribbean and 
(South) Asian core constituency, such as Turkish and Chinese populations. However, 
                                                     
53
 I have anonymised this quote because although this statement would not come as a surprise to those 
working on equality or to funders and policymakers, such an explicit admission could be damaging to the 
organisation in question.  
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Woolley blamed the fragmentation of black communities on elements of the South Asian 
population community that were trying to disentangle themselves from one another and 
from blackness as a unifying political identity. In some ways Woolley’s criticism was similar 
to ideas of ‘feuding nationalisms’ (Sivanandan, 2000: 423) and ethnic ‘fiefdoms’ 
(Kundnani, 2002). However, all of these arguments downplayed risks of homogenising and 
silencing in ‘blackness’, e.g. in terms of differences between south Asians and African-
Caribbeans (Modood, 1988, 1994). Furthermore, it was not only south Asians that 
questioned collective blackness/BMEness. For example, Caribbean activists (BTEG, 2009) 
were also sceptical about the value of ‘generic all-inclusive approaches’ (Jeremy Crook, 
2011, Interview) because they felt their particular needs were not being met through this 
form of organising. 
 
Moreover, following Simon Woolley’s concern about religious identification (above), 
secular BME-led race equality organisations were disrupted by what Karen Chouhan (cited 
in chapter four) called ‘the tension’ presented by BME identification with faith and religion 
(Karen Chouhan, 2011, Interview). Similarly, Dinah Cox reflected that she ‘…didn't feel that 
ROTA was an organisation to deal with religion’ (Dinah Cox, 2011, Interview). The result 
was that the ability of secular BME-led race equality organisations to ‘represent’ BMEness 
in its various forms was further diminished.  
 
Even where BME organisations did feel that they were well-placed to deal with certain 
issues they were not necessarily allowed to do so as Jeremy Crook from BTEG explained:   
 
... the unfortunate fact is that if you just get bracketed as race equality 
organisations or... black organisations [then], very often, you're perceived 
as having a very narrow view of the world... that's only about black 
people or about black and Asian people (Jeremy Crook, 2011, Interview).  
 
Organisations such as BTEG were not seen within the policy process to be able to provide 
discursive or other inputs beyond rather narrow sectional BME interests. These 
234 
 
organisations were restricted by other political actors, such as policymakers, to engaging 
on ‘traditional’ BME issues and could not have something of value to add beyond this 
scope. In chapter two I discussed criticisms of BME differentialism, but the political reality 
was that BME voices only counted when talking about specific distinct ‘BME issues’. As 
Nirmal Puwar rightly argued ‘… because black people are racially marked, it is not easy for 
them to be the representatives of humanity’ (2004: 149). 
 
As a result of these difficulties about the tone, content, scope, representativeness and 
impact of discursive interventions of BME-led race equality organisations, the politics of 
policy discourse and policy input for these organisations was fraught and uncertain. In 
that uncertainty ‘other’ BME voices and discourses were taking the centre stage.  
 
3.3 ‘Unrepresentative’ BME voices: BME renegades 
In a policy environment where BME voices in policy discussions of nation, multiculture and 
race equality could result in the ‘eyes [of policymakers]… glazing over’ (Dinah Cox, 2011, 
Interview) there was rather more interest in policymaking and other circles for discursive 
interventions from BME political actors that had ‘alternative’ things to say about the 
problems of multicultural Britain.  
 
I call this class of BME political actor ‘renegades’. They were people in or given privileged 
discursive status to pronounce on race equality in ways that could be seen as 
‘representing’ a new set of BME perspectives and experiences. They could claim space in 
policy discussions about race equality because they were BME people and because they 
departed from ‘usual’ BME repertoires about the existence of racism and the need for 
positive action to support BME people in Britain. By contrast, this group in some way or 
another argued that a minority ethnic penalty in Britain was exaggerated and/or that 
multiculturalist policies had failed. 
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People of note in this category included educationalist Dr Tony Sewell who founded 
Generating Genius (Generating Genius, 2012) – an organisation working with high-
achieving secondary students from disadvantaged communities to win places at ‘top’ 
universities. Sewell has challenged the idea that institutional racism was holding back the 
progress of black Caribbean children and instead pointed to the negative and disruptive 
peer group culture associated with ‘black boys’ (Sewell, 2008) and the absence of black 
fathers (Sewell, 2010). Another educationalist, schoolteacher Katherine Birbalsingh, won 
acclaim at the Conservative Party Conference in 2010 for her ‘back to basics’, no excuses 
approach to education (Wilby, 2012). She has authored a book about the failings of the 
local authority school system (Birbalsingh, 2011) and now has a blog space on the 
Telegraph website (The Telegraph, 2013). Birbalsingh is also due to open an ‘academically 
rigorous’ free school in London’s Wembley Park, in September 2014 (Stevenson, 2013).  
 
In the cultural realm, Munira Mirza could also be described as having some renegade 
views. Mirza was a former staffer at Policy Exchange – a right-leaning free market and 
localist think tank favoured by Boris Johnson (Policy Exchange, 2013). Mirza is Deputy 
London Mayor for Education and Culture and as a cultural policymaker has argued that 
cultural policy is dominated by the politics of diversity and should be reoriented to 
universalism (Mirza, 2012). She was also involved in the steering group of the review of 
the Equality Duty (see the next chapter) undertaken by the coalition government (Home 
Office, 2012b). Perhaps most significantly in terms of policy discourse, Mirza edited a 
special edition of Prospect Magazine containing a series of articles critical of official anti-
racism and diversity policies (Mirza, 2010).  
 
These protagonists have faced criticisms from organisations working against racism and 
for greater race equality. For example, Operation Black Vote labelled such people 
‘inequality deniers’ (Woolley, 2010). There have also been accusations that these 
renegades were seeking to promote their own careers and interests (Wilby, 2012). In 
other words, in the discursive theatre, ‘renegadism’ got one noticed. 
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The highest profile BME renegade over the New Labour period was Trevor Phillips. He was 
Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality (between 2003 and 2006) and the first Chair, 
from 2007 to 2012, of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. One of his most 
prominent renegade moments was in 2004 in an interview with a Times journalist where 
he agreed that multiculturalism could be ‘killed off’, arguing that ‘[m]ulticulturalism 
suggests separateness’ (cited in Baldwin, 2004). 
 
In the same interview, Phillips argued that a major goal was an ‘integrated society’ and 
that multiculturalism was unhelpful to that cause. A year later, Phillips, after and in 
response to the London bombings of July 2005, reprised his role as outspoken BME 
renegade, this time in a set piece speech. In it he warned that Britain was in danger of 
‘sleepwalking our way to segregation’ and ‘becoming strangers to each other’ (Phillips, 
2005). 
 
In a chapter on the politics of policy discourse it is important to note the difference 
between these two discursive interventions. The first of these was in a newspaper 
interview where Phillips appeared to agree to ‘killing off’ the word multiculturalism and 
this was perhaps an off-the-cuff response to a very loaded question. By way of contrast 
‘sleepwalking our way to segregation’ came in a prepared speech and was therefore a 
much more deliberate discursive intervention. Phillips was able to reflect on the 
difference in the discourses in the following way. 
 
I did have an intention, when Tom Baldwin asked me that question, of 
saying I think that the language that we're using is not helpful in 
explanatory terms. My main point, really, is the same now as it was then. 
The term multiculturalism has lost explanatory power because… there are 
so many different meanings and people use it entirely to suit their 
purpose... What I didn't anticipate, was that people would essentially use 
an argument I was basically making about language and discourse, in 
order to have, to be honest, a much more substantive argument about 
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how you manage difference... So, I think the honest truth is that I didn't 
quite expect that people would react in the way they did. And I was a bit 
disappointed by it, but, in the end, actually, I think the statement did 
more than I expected it to. And, on balance, though it didn't particularly 
help me personally – you know. It turned me into a figure of controversy, 
which I've never particularly wanted to be; expected to be – but what it 
did do was it opened up the possibility of people having a more honest 
discussion about how we manage difference.  
 
... The speech I made in Manchester, which was what, 18 months later, 
the context was quite different. And that was deliberate. I mean 
everything I did, we did, with that was deliberate. It followed 7-7 and we 
made a decision, really the day after, that we would not say anything. 
Partly because, you know, who needed to hear, you know, our theoretical 
views when there were people who were, you know they'd lost their 
loved ones… My colleague who sits just the other side of that wall was on 
one of the tubes. She lost her leg, you know. She didn't need to hear me 
pontificating – number one. Number two, in my view, was pretty much as 
it is about what's happened recently [in the 2011 English riots]; that a lot 
of these things, on these kinds of issues, a little thought is a good idea. 
You know, stand back. Think about it (Trevor Phillips, 2011, Interview).  
 
There are a number of points of discursive interest in Phillips’ reflection. His explanation 
about his core point that the term multiculturalism had ‘lost explanatory power’ looks 
uncontroversial when explained as such. Certainly the term was flabby and had multiple 
meanings (see chapter two). The narrow point was about the failure and emptiness of 
language and was, according to Phillips, a bit of discursive ground-clearing so that one 
could have a better conversation about managing diversity. However, Phillips’ 
acquiescence to the violent language of ‘killing off’ multiculturalism meant that his point 
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about discourse was overtaken by controversy, stoked by a journalist but certainly fed by 
Phillips himself.  
 
If the first intervention on killing off multiculturalism was, a partially mis-interpreted point 
then there was no such cover for his second intervention. This was a controversial 
discursive theme in the speech, suggesting that the ‘parallel lives’ of the northern 
disturbances would mutate into an apocalyptic vision of US-style ghettos similar to the 
scenes in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. While Phillips positioned himself not as a 
controversialist but as an agent of ‘more honest discussion about how we manage 
difference’ (Trevor Phillips, 2011, Interview), he seemingly could not ‘do’ honesty without 
overstating the problems of multiculturalism and understating the problem of race 
inequality.  
 
In the end, Phillips’ aim to change discourse on nation, multiculture and race equality 
appeared to be successful as Simon Woolley commented in an OBV editorial: 
 
I believe that 99.9% of the population prior to Phillips’ comments would 
have concluded that ‘multiculturalism’ is a good thing and makes the UK 
special. Post Phillips that figure, although still the majority, has fallen to 
67% in a recent poll. Worse still, important figures in the Government… 
have bought into this cul-de-sac debate blaming multiculturalism for the 
radicalisation of some Muslims, and other social ills (OBV, 2007).  
 
Whereas, for Phillips ‘[m]ulticulturalism suggests separateness’ (cited in Baldwin, 2004) 
for Woolley multiculturalism was a necessary (though not sufficient) symbol of the 
togetherness of the diverse society. Indeed Woolley argued that ‘the multiculturalism 
agenda… said people integrate better [and] quicker when they're afforded equality’ 
(Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview). However, for Woolley the issue was not just that there 
was a clash of ideas over the meaning and consequences of multiculturalism. The problem 
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was that this was not a fair discursive contest and that BME renegades had a 
disproportionate impact on policy discourse: 
 
… there's a negation of tackling race inequality from a black perspective… 
and the talking heads that are articulating it are black. And they just 
happen to be actually seeking to find favour with those that are able to 
give them top jobs. So you find them in relative positions of power… 
pushing a particular agenda... I argue they do our community a grave 
disservice and at times it's a little shameful because of the 
disproportionate impact they can have (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview).  
 
Woolley lamented the denial of structural disadvantages for black people in society. For 
Woolley, as a committed believer in and builder of a politics of blackness, the discursive 
marginalisation of a black race equality perspective was made worse because the charge 
was being led by privileged black people. For Woolley there were two types of black 
people: those like him that strongly identified with other black people and thought of 
them as ‘our community’. In the opposite corner were those dis-identifying black people 
out for themselves.  
 
For Woolley, Trevor Phillips and other BME renegades changed the politics and 
parameters of policy discourse on nation, multiculture and race equality. They provided a 
surprising and newsworthy line to that offered in ‘traditional’ BME-led analysis54 and the 
voice of the renegades ‘crowded out’ BME race equality arguments. The renegades gave 
white policymakers an excuse to step back from action on race equality:  
 
                                                     
54
 In his work on media representations of ‘race’ and crime, Sveinsson quoted the then head of BBC TV 
news, Peter Horrocks, who argued that “news is largely based on rare and surprising events” and that 
audiences “are interested in, and we as a society want to understand things, that are new, that are different, 
and are surprising” (2008: 5). 
240 
 
So the whole policy agenda now instead of looking at the Lawrence 
Inquiry; about equality – race equality – delivering for people to come 
together, the policy’s now changing… (Simon Woolley, 2011, Interview).   
 
Despite his prominence and status as the most high profile BME renegade, Trevor Phillips 
had the self-awareness to note that what was really going on in the construction of the 
discourse on multiculture and race equality was another form of racist exclusion. 
 
You know, the fact that I’m important is almost entirely and wholly one of 
the outcomes of institutional and cultural racism. It’s ridiculous that – 
[and] this is not me being, you know, kind of coy and modest – but I am 
far more important than I ought to be. You know, the fact that there 
ought to be a dozen people like me who are from ethnic minorities whose 
voices count and who people listen to. And who can have an argument 
between themselves about what is going on to which other people will 
listen… If I am thinking, you know, you just look at the response, the 
media response to all of the [2011] riotage. Okay, David Lammy and Diane 
Abbott had a presence. That's because they were MPs for their 
constituencies. And they exist – their media presence was principally to 
explain and to react to the local events. Nobody really asked them for a 
broader, more global account. I mean I expect if, even when, I choose to 
give one it will be noticed. But that's just because I've been created as the 
guy who does that. But there ought to be 20 guys like me.  
 
There are no [BME] voices. There's no platform and I think that is; that's 
the real and biggest problem with the discourse; that [it] is conducted 
largely by people who don't inhabit a space that any of the minority 
populations do (Trevor Phillips, 2011, Interview).  
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Phillips’ point was a powerful one. It was not about BME spokespersons acting as 
‘representatives’ of BME people or perspectives but that simply there were too few black 
policy voices. As a result, a renegade voice like his was amplified in a context where other 
BME opinions were often silenced. Ironically, in a policy discourse environment where 
BME voices tended not to count, the voices of renegades counted too much. 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have shown that the politics of policy discourses on nation, multiculture 
and race equality was a varied and messy process. Policymakers sometimes appeared to 
build a discourse in a concerted manner as with discussions of parallel lives and 
community cohesion. Even so, and with all of the discursive resources invested in them, 
such discourses did not necessarily have a direct impact on policymaking. Even if this was 
the case discursive interventions could still have a policy and political impact, shaping 
future policy debate and setting discursive boundaries.  
 
For their part, BME political actors led a precarious existence as actors in policy discourse. 
Even though the BME-led race equality organisations that I have examined did have some 
semi-official and sanctioned ‘voice’ function in policy discussions, they had unenviable 
calculations to make about judging the tone, content and scope of their discursive 
interventions. Unlike government and government-appointed commissions, race-equality 
orientated endeavours such as the CFMEB could easily and firmly be ‘shut down’ by 
policymakers and media and their emergent discourses be stifled. BME-led race equality 
organisations were, therefore, working with the ever-present threat that an open policy 
door was going to slam shut or, perhaps worse, would stay open but with no prospect of 
influence. It was also unclear how BME-led race equality organisations could ‘represent’ 
BMEness as it unravelled and refused to be contained.  
 
In addition, BME-led race equality organisations and their (familiar) narrative of racism 
and race inequality risked being ‘crowded out’ and displaced by BME ‘renegades’ offering 
an alternate and ‘fresh’ line. The existence of renegades was entirely consistent with new 
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ethnicities and the differences that existed amongst BME people in terms of experiences 
and perspectives. However, they were also products of a distorted discursive system that 
rewarded ‘unfamiliar’ and policymaker-friendly discursive interventions on nation, 
multiculture and race equality. More specifically, as noted by Trevor Phillips (2011, 
Interview) above, the discrimination, disadvantage and racism that BME-led race equality 
organisations were attempting to combat in wider society was limiting the ability of these 
organisations to speak about the continued presence of these same phenomena. That is, 
the politics of policy discourse was as subject to race inequality as other spheres of 
national life.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusions: Rewriting the lines  
1 Introduction  
 
To begin this ending, I want to return to some of the issues of positionality outlined in the 
opening chapter and to reflect on my own shifting relationship to my research. As part of 
the rites of this final phase of my PhD, I decided to look back at the application that I 
submitted to the London School of Economics in January 2009. At that time New Labour 
was still in government and Gordon Brown was wrestling with the concept of Britishness 
as a way to reconcile the nation with and to itself. Looking back, my research proposal was 
somewhat oversized and unresearchable, but at heart it concerned the policy 
problematisation of multiculture and race equality in Britain – an aspect of policy that, if 
anything, is more relevant now than it was nearly five years ago. My original proposal was 
orientated towards an idea that a rhetorical device such as South Africa’s ‘Rainbow 
Nation’ could help to reconcile race equality with the commonality, solidarity and diversity 
– the balancing act cited in the opening epigram of this thesis (Wetherell, 2007). I also 
hoped that I might devise a ‘killer’ discourse of the multicultural nation that would 
somehow resolve the difficult entanglements of nation, multiculture and race equality. I 
now see this very notion of discourse as antidote as fanciful and the ‘reality’ of the 
situation as much messier and deeply ingrained. There are deep antagonisms that lie 
behind discursive lines about tensions between nation and multiculture.  
 
At the time of my PhD application, I was clear that BME-led race equality organisations 
were part of the solution to such bleak policy discussions of nation, multiculture and race 
equality and, in particular, that their BMEness counted for something in terms of insight 
and as a basis for social action. I wanted my thesis to help BME-led race equality 
organisations to increase their discursive efficacy and to be able to intervene more 
effectively at that level rather than waiting for policy proposals to come threateningly 
towards them. To use a meteorological analogy, I wanted these organisations to stop 
providing an umbrella in response to political downpours and to change the weather 
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instead. My position is more equivocal now and depends not on what these organisations 
‘are’ or claim to be but on what they do. 
 
2 Three moments in time 
I have organised New Labour’s time into three main overlapping discursive waves that 
connect multiculture, the nation and the place of race equality within it. My research has 
shown how policy(maker) discourse across this period can be thought of in terms of three 
Ps: proportional multiculture; parallel multiculture; and paused multiculture. Another way 
to think of this is in terms of the metaphor of the ‘line’. 
 
In the first period from 1995 to 2000, policymakers and BME-led race equality 
organisations emphasised that the nation was out of line with itself in terms of the 
disparities and discrimination in life in Britain for ethnic minority people. In particular the 
discursive emphasis was on making both positive and negative outcomes in British life 
more proportional to the ratio of BME to non-BME population. This, for example, might 
mean less of the BME population in the criminal justice system and more of the BME 
population in good jobs. In other words, the focus was on re-shaping Britain so that BME 
people were distributed more evenly socially, economically and politically. This policy 
debate and position was invested in and co-constructed by BME-led race equality 
organisations as well as by New Labour policymakers. In the latter case this agenda was 
viewed as part of a wider realignment and renewal of the nation after 18 years of 
Conservative government.  
 
The second phase outlined in this study ran from 2001 to 2007. The centre of gravity in 
policy discussion was on the parallel nature of (parts of) multicultural life in Britain. In this 
case the idea of the line was not about discrepancies in race equality but instead, in the 
eyes of New Labour policymakers, the line represented the way that the nation was 
divided by ethnicity. From this perspective, multicultural policies enabled and indeed 
encouraged BME people, and Muslims in particular, to cluster in their own ‘communities’ 
and to self-segregate away from the rest of society. This idea of (BME) preferences for 
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‘parallel’ lives informed an ill-defined notion of ‘community cohesion’ as a means to 
ensure overlapping lives, but it also heightened policy ambivalence towards race equality 
as the goal of race equality. ‘Special measures’ to address race inequality were viewed by 
policymakers as another concession to BME people in a context where separate 
arrangements led to separate communities. BME-led organisations – including coalitional 
race equality organisations that explicitly and deliberately crossed ethnic groupings 
(although not always completely or effectively) – such as BTEG, OBV and ROTA were 
implicated in this process of creating dividing lines and increasingly became considered 
dubious political actors. Though BME-led race equality organisations accepted, and indeed 
existed because of, the idea of the parallel, for them it represented the gap between 
white and BME lives due to racism and race inequality rather than BME separatism.  
 
The third part of the New Labour period ran from 2006 until general election defeat in 
2010. During this time the emphasis from policymakers was to ‘pause’ multicultural 
questions and move beyond the nation defined in terms of multiculture. Instead the stress 
was placed on redrawing and rezoning the nation along new lines. 
 
One element of redrawing the nation was to look to Britishness as a ‘big idea’ containing a 
common set of values that were larger, more important and more unifying than 
multiculture. The second element in the redrawn nation was an appeal to something 
smaller than multiculture, namely citizenship. Like Britishness, citizenship had been a 
leitmotif from New Labour’s early days. In this late period it was used as a proxy for the 
responsibilities of citizens and non-citizens towards society and nation and exemplary 
citizen-like behaviour of individuals was asserted as a priority over ‘loyalties’ to ethnic 
groupings. The third element of the redrawn nation in this period was embedded in a new 
Equality Act (HM Government, 2006) and an Equalities and Human Rights Commission. 
This legislation promoted an individuated idea of equality and also identified a number of 
additional ‘protected’ groups beyond race and ethnicity that were deemed subject to 
discrimination. These included age, religion or belief and gender reassignment (HM 
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Government, 2006). The naming of these groups, perhaps inevitably and deliberately, 
diverted attention away from groups subject to race inequality. 
 
The combined discursive direction of the second and third parts of the New Labour period 
foregrounded the problem of the de-lineated nation and BME organising as part of that 
problem of delineation. This left organisations such as BTEG, OBV and ROTA standing on 
the side-lines and being seen by some policymakers as a problematic form of civil society 
organising. This situation was most vividly  illustrated when the Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government stated that the ‘growing selfconfidence of minority 
communities can actually be seen as a threat to communities under pressure’ (Denham, 
2010: 6). In other words, BME organising was no longer primarily seen as a response to 
race inequality but was seen to result in perceptions of unfairness within and towards 
white communities.  
 
This perception amongst policymakers, so clearly stated by John Denham, was reflected in 
the politics of policy discourse. In the first part of the New Labour period when there was 
some overlap and consensus between New Labour and BTEG, OBV and ROTA on the 
connections between nation, multiculture and race equality, these race equality 
organisations appeared to be somewhat influential on policymaker-thinking. The paradox 
of discursive influence was that organisations appeared to make an impact when in tune 
with prevailing policy-thinking and vice versa. This paradox raised questions about what 
happened when BME-led race equality organisations were ‘out of tune’ with 
policymakers. In particular, these organisations could be forced to compromise in order to 
maintain their position as policy ‘insiders’ or face being ignored altogether.  
 
The rise of BME ‘renegades’, such as Trevor Phillips, formerly of the Commission for Racial 
Equality and Chair of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission further complicated 
the politics of policy discourse for BME-led race equality organisations. The renegades, to 
continue the image of the line, were prepared to break rank with ‘conventional’ BME race 
equality arguments. The BMEness of these renegades meant that they could open up new 
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discursive ground in ways that might be difficult for white policymakers more susceptible 
to charges of racism. The rise to policy prominence of the renegades also confirmed that 
the presence of racism in wider society, against which organisations such as BTEG, OBV 
and ROTA were fighting, was also prevalent in policy discourse itself. Specifically, it 
appeared that only a certain number of BME policy actors could be given discursive space 
at one time. If a set of renegades took up much of the available room, then there was less 
space for BME race inequality ‘traditionalists’ to have their say and for their voice to make 
an impact on policy.  
 
Just as the ground of policy discourse was being cut from under BME-led race equality 
organisations by policymakers, at the same time BME race equality organisers were 
contending with what had been a long-standing disruption of ‘black’ politics and the rise 
of complex ‘new ethnicities’ (Ali, 2003; Back 1994; Hall, 1991b, 1992a) that brought into 
question the idea of a coherent ‘black’ or BME perspective, experience and politics. In the 
New Labour period, firmly drawn lines of BME sameness no longer appeared a credible 
‘meta’ container for the lived realities of Muslims and a range of other ‘sub-BME’ 
communities. This disruption, combined with the turn in thinking amongst policymakers, 
meant that BME-led race equality organisations such as BTEG, OBV and ROTA could be 
said to be caught in a difficult space between New Labour and new ethnicities. 
 
3 Redrawing the discursive lines: After New Labour 
The shifts in discursive and political landscape associated with nation and multiculture 
outlined over the course of the New Labour period suggest that the future prospects for 
policy and policymaking on race inequality are somewhat bleak. The period since New 
Labour has been out of office has seen  policymakers continue to downgrade concerns for 
race equality.  
 
The new coalition government has been dominated by the theme of austerity. 
Nonetheless, there have been some discursive interventions in my area of study by both 
the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Back in 2007, when David Cameron was still 
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trying to convince everyone that the Conservatives were compassionate, he authored an 
article in the Observer entitled ‘No one will be left behind in a Tory Britain’. The by-line of 
the piece asserted that by ‘vigorously promoting equal opportunity and fairness, we will 
make this a better country for all’ (Cameron, 2007). Whilst adopting a fairly typical and 
critical Conservative line against multiculturalism as a doctrine of division, the piece also 
recognised that government could not ‘bully people into feeling British…’ (Cameron, 
2007). Cameron also correctly stated that the community cohesion agenda entailed ‘… a 
dangerous muddling of concerns: community cohesion, the threat of terrorism and the 
integration of British Muslims’ (Cameron, 2007). The article was written a long time ago 
and was specifically designed to appeal to and reassure Guardian and Observer readers. In 
government, Cameron and his colleagues appear to have returned to a discursive line 
more in keeping with mid-to-late New Labour and a more traditional brand of 
Conservatism. 
 
In February 2011, David Cameron delivered a speech in Munich (Cameron, 2011) and 
echoed the scepticism of his host, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, about 
multiculture and multiculturalism.55 He argued against the idea of ‘state multiculturalism’ 
– even though no such comprehensive strategy has been implemented in Britain (Younge, 
2011) – and in favour of ‘muscular liberalism’. It has been suggested that Cameron’s 
pronouncements were similar to those of Emma West who was filmed in 2011 shouting 
racist abuse on a tram in Croydon, south London (BBC, 2013). Both Cameron and West 
shared a sense of Britain’s loss of national identity due to the problem and prevalence of 
cultural difference (Gilroy, 2012). Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg followed Cameron’s 
‘multiculturalism’ speech with his own in March 2011. Clegg’s speech was more 
optimistically framed and entitled ‘An Open, Confident Society’ (Clegg, 2011). However, 
Clegg agreed with the central argument of Cameron’s Munich speech, fixing in place a link 
                                                     
55
 In a speech in Potsdam in October 2010, Merkel argued that ‘the approach [to build] a multicultural 
[society] and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed’ and that immigrants 
needed to do more to integrate, such as learning German  (cited in BBC, 2010). 
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between multiculture and the problem of (Islamic) extremism and the need for robust 
responses to such threats. Moreover, neither of these speeches by Cameron or Clegg, 
discussed race equality or equal opportunities as a means to advance integration in the 
multicultural nation.  
 
In May 2012, Teresa May, the Home Secretary, announced a review of the Public Sector 
Equality Duty (PSED), as part of the government’s ‘Red Tape Challenge’ (Home Office, 
2012b). 56 The Equality Duty requires public bodies to pay ‘due regard’ to the need to 
eliminate discrimination; advance equality of opportunity; and foster good relations 
between groups in society (Home Office, 2010: 96). The review of the Equality Duty has 
been overseen by a Government-appointed ‘independent’ steering group which included 
former Conservative MP Rob Hayward as its Chair and Onora O'Neill, the Chair of the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (Home Office, 2012a). Another member of the 
group was Munira Mirza – mentioned in the previous chapter as critical of ideas advanced 
by BME-led race equality organisations about the existence of racism and race inequality. 
Given Michael Keith’s comments, also cited in the previous chapter, about his experience 
in the Commission on Integration Cohesion and the ‘boundaries’ within which such groups 
operate, the independence of the steering group was certainly questionable. Notably, the 
committee was entirely composed of politicians and public officials and included no one 
from a frontline equalities organisation (Curley, 2013). The findings of the review have, 
unsurprisingly, been critical about the implementation of the Duty. Yet, due to the lack of 
evidence and the relatively short time since the Duty had been implemented (since 2011), 
the steering group acknowledged that ‘it is too early to make a final judgement about the 
impact of the PSED’ (Government Equalities Office, 2013: 11). However, the broader 
discursive point, related to discussions in the previous chapter on dominating and 
organising a field (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000), is that the very co-articulation of 
equalities and ‘red tape’ means that the damage to the Duty may already be done. 
                                                     
56
 The review of the Equality Duty is part of an overall review of the 2010 Equality Act (Home Office, 2010) – 
which replaced previous anti-discrimination laws with a single Act.  
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Certainly, equalities organisations have expressed understandable concern that the 
government intends to curtail or end the Equality Duty (The Fawcett Society, 2012).  
 
The government will also halved the EHRC’s budget to £26m by 2015, by which time staff 
numbers will be 180 (compared to 455 in 2010). In addition, its new Chair is paid £56,000 
a year for two days of work a week compared to Trevor Phillips who earned £112,000 a 
year for a three-and-a-half day working week (Ramesh, 2012). These reductions symbolise 
a downgrading of the Equality and Human Rights Commission under the coalition 
government.  
 
In 2012, the coalition government launched an Integration Strategy (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2012) which outlined a notion of Britishness in 
rather New Labour terms: 
 
We should be robustly promoting British values such as democracy, rule 
of law, equality of opportunity and treatment, freedom of speech and the 
rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind. It is 
these values which make it possible for people to live and work together, 
to bridge boundaries between communities and to play a full role in 
society (DCLG, 2012: 4). 
 
The passage combined ideas of Britishness with community cohesion and the spectre of 
multiculture-gone-wrong. The Integration Strategy was based on five principles (DCLG, 
2012: 5): common ground (shared aspirations and values); responsibility (commitments 
and obligations); social mobility (people can get on in life); participation and 
empowerment (participation in local and national life); and tackling intolerance and 
extremism (responding to threats such as discrimination and extremism). Apart from a 
telling refusal to use the language of equality, the conditions for integration appeared 
every bit as ‘muddled’ and ‘catch-all’ as the version of community cohesion that Cameron 
(2007) had previously criticised. The meaning of integration had expanded to encompass 
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everything from immigration to the disturbances that occurred in a number of English 
towns and cities in August 2011.  
 
In all of these ways, the coalition government has reduced action and emphasis on (race) 
inequality as a means to allow multiculture and the nation to co-exist. These discursive 
and policy developments can be seen as a continuation and acceleration of trajectories 
from the latter part of the New Labour period. Furthermore, in opposition, Labour under 
Ed Miliband has appeared similarly ambivalent about issues of equality.57 In an important 
speech in December 2012, Miliband outlined his vision of One Nation Labourism.  
 
A Britain where people of all backgrounds, all races, all ethnicities, all 
cultures, can practise their own religion, continue their own customs, but 
also come together to forge a new and better identity  (Miliband, 2012).  
 
The speech celebrated ‘diversity’ and acknowledged the right to be multicultural in private 
but it also argued for a form of Britishness in the public realm. The same speech 
emphasised: the primacy of the English language; the problem of immigration as a source 
of excessive diversity; and the need for integration to counter the threat of disintegration. 
The speech included just one fleeting reference to a ‘fair nation’ and no uses of the word 
‘equality’ (Miliband, 2012) – as if, counter to the evidence on display in this thesis, BME 
people ought to be reassured that the idea of One Nation in itself would guarantee them a 
full and equal place in Britain.58  
                                                     
57
 An interesting development is that Tom Baldwin, the man who asked Trevor Phillips if multiculturalism 
should be ‘killed off’ (Baldwin, 2004), is now Ed Miliband’s Director of Strategy. This post involves shaping 
the narrative surrounding Miliband (Hodges, 2012; The Telegraph, 2012). It is conjecture, but Baldwin may 
be strategically steering Miliband clear of associations with ‘toxic’ multiculturalism. 
58
 However, as part of its policy review process in the run up to the 2015 general election, Labour has 
developed a consultation document about a new race equality strategy and connected this to the goal of 
‘realising one nation’ Labour Party (Labour party, 2013). The document recognises the continued existence 
of ‘race’ discrimination and accuses David Cameron’s Government of ‘turning the clock back on racial 
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The post-New Labour period suggests that there are some important shared 
understandings and articulations amongst the major political parties on questions and 
problems of nation, multiculture and race equality and limited sign that race equality 
might re-emerge as a discursive theme or policy priority for mainstream policymakers. 
This is not to dismiss some of the legislative progress on equality and anti-discrimination 
that took place under New Labour (Hills et al., 2009), such as provision for positive action 
in employment (Jarrett, 2011). Nor does it rule out the possibility of policy attention on 
particular extremes of race inequality such as ‘stop and search’.59 Rather, I suggest that 
such situations are likely to be considered as anomolous by policymakers and in need of 
specific reform rather than as evidence of the limited effects of race equality policies to 
date (Phillips, 2009) or the need for a renewed and concerted policy effort to advance 
race equality. If anything, the discourse since the end of the New Labour period, 
particularly about action on equality as bureaucracy and the emphasis on the integrity, 
fairness and supremacy of the national collective, suggests that measures against race 
inequality may be repealed rather than enhanced.  
 
This lack of impetus amongst policymakers places even greater onus on BME-led and 
other race equality actors to organise effectively. It is to this group; their discursive 
interventions and policy-influencing endeavours that I turn to next.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
equality’ (Labour party, 2013: 3). As such this appears to be a piece of political differentiation that might 
appeal to the party’s ‘core’ BME vote. Yet, the fact that Miliband chose not to make race equality a feature 
of his keynote One Nation speech in December 2012, suggests that the party is not going to make 
combatting race inequality a prominent or meaningful part of its general election 2015 manifesto or policy 
platform. 
59
 For example, the Home Secretary Theresa May has plans to curtail improper use of stop and search 
powers on the grounds of potential illegality and public resentment (Travis, 2013). 
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4 To affinity and beyond? 
The section above suggests that if policy discourse and policy action are to be turned 
towards the problem of race inequality then, at least in the first instance, it will fall to race 
equality actors in civil society to instigate such a shift. 
 
As discussed in chapter two, BME organising has had a complex history in Britain informed 
by problematic conceptions of nation and shifting notions of ethnicity and black/BME 
identity. In this context, and that of continued racism and race inequality, various authors 
have contemplated the difficulties of both BME and anti-racist political organising. For 
example, Paul Gilroy has criticised the inertia in the anti-racist movement; its failures of 
organisational form; and identified within anti-racism a crisis of ‘political language, 
images, and cultural symbols…’ (Gilroy, 1992: 50). For her part, Kalbir Shukra (1998) laid 
out a programme for BME organising and organisations for the 21st century focusing of 
making the consequences of racism relevant to all social groups and creating room for a 
new generation of leaders in BME organising (1998). Both Shukra and Gilroy’s 
contributions were aimed at stimulating more meaningful and effective organising for 
race equality. Sadly, their reflections from so many years ago, remain just as relevant 
today.  
 
 
In this thesis I argue that the ability of BME-led race equality organisations to contribute 
to contemporary efforts on race equality depends in part on whether and how they can 
respond to the ‘maelstrom’ that unsettled notions of blackness as part of the thesis of 
new ethnicities (Hall, 1991b, 1992a). As discussed in chapter two, Stuart Hall argued that 
new ethnicities demanded a ‘second phase’ of black cultural politics that recognised that 
‘black’ was ‘politically and culturally constructed’ (Hall, 1992a: 252) and that there was no 
unitary notion of the ‘the Black experience’ (Hall, 1991b: 55).  
 
My analysis shows that BME-led race equality organisations have found this transition to a 
second phase of black cultural politics extremely difficult. Such organisations have 
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struggled to imagine, articulate and organise around more fluid notions of BMEness and 
multiple experiences of BME people (Gilroy, 1992; Shukra, 1998; Tompson, 1988).  
 
Furthermore, shifts in the New Labour period such as the rise of Muslimness; the 
emergence of ‘newer’ ethnic minority groups, including people with Turkish, Chinese and 
central and eastern European connections; and the identification of new groups by 
policymakers vulnerable to structural inequality, such as lesbian and gay people, mean 
that a second phase of black politics may no longer be sufficient for meaningful 
contemporary organising against race inequality. Building on Shukra’s idea of making 
connection with other social groups (1998), BME-led race equality organisations are faced 
with the challenge of crossing existing (ethnic) divides and to join the campaign for race 
equality  to other struggles against discrimination and disadvantage. Perhaps what is 
required, therefore, is a ‘third phase’ of black politics that responds to new ethnicities; 
keeps in sight the ongoing problem of racism; and that is also part of a wider politics for 
equality.  
 
BME-led race equality organisations have been battered by the twin storms of New 
Labour and new ethnicities. Some of these types of organisations are no longer in 
existence60; others have much-reduced funding; and all have fallen out of policy favour. 
Such developments may mean that BME-led race equality organisations may not be in a fit 
state to respond to the need for radical and imaginative change that a third phase of black 
politics would entail. However, there are tentative signs of a response, including talks 
between BME-led race equality organisations about increased co-operation, possible 
mergers and new approaches to race equality work.  
 
                                                     
60
 BME-led organisations with a race equality remit that have ceased operating in 2013 include BME regional 
umbrella organisations in the East of England (MENTER, 2013) and in the North West of England (One North 
West, 2013) as well as the BME multi-purpose organisation Council of Ethnic Minority Voluntary Sector 
Organisations (CEMVO) (Mair, 2013). 
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4.1 A last throw of the dice? 
BTEG, OBV and ROTA have all put their name to an initiative provisionally called the Race 
Equality Coalition (REC).61 The REC is intended to become ‘a unified, high profile national 
voice that is able to lay bare the realities of racism and discrimination and speak up for 
race equality’ (Race Equality Coalition, 2013a: 2). Eighteen (predominantly) BME-led 
organisations are in the coalition including a mix of local, regional and national 
organisations (Race Equality Coalition, 2013a: 1). Prominent Coalition members, apart 
from BTEG, OBV and ROTA, include the race equality think tank, Runnymede Trust, and 
the BME-led policy umbrella organisation, Voice4Change England. The latter is acting as 
the accountable body for the initiative. The REC offers some potential as an incubator of a 
third phase of black/BME politics. It has received development funding from three 
funders: Barrow Cadbury Trust, The Esmée Fairbairn Foundation and Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, and those co-ordinating the REC are developing a work and business plan 
to try and secure its future. The fact that start-up funding has been provided from three 
leading independent, i.e. non-state funders, is an important development in light of the 
discussion in chapter two about race equality actors being co-opted by the state. Another 
interesting and welcome development is that BME-led organisations have come together 
despite the fact that some that have traditionally been rivals for impact, attention and 
funding.  
 
Outreach work has been undertaken by the REC in order to strengthen its development 
phase. This has included engagement exercises such as a July 2013 meeting with 
academics including Claire Alexander, Suki Ali and Floya Anthias (Race Equality Coalition, 
2013b: 4) in an attempt to cross an often uncrossed line between BME voluntary sector 
organisations and academia  (Bhattacharyya and Murji, 2013).  
 
                                                     
61
 The Coalition is now known as CORE. 
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I was invited to another REC outreach meeting held in July 2013 – this time for those 
labelled ‘critical friends’. Participants were defined as people that organisers of the REC 
could ‘feel comfortable to be uncomfortable with’ (Race Equality Coalition, 2013b: 8). The 
meeting offered me an opportunity to advocate for some of the lessons in this thesis to be 
taken up by the REC. In particular, I argued that being ‘correct’ on the prevalent and 
pernicious nature of racism and race inequality was evidently not enough to combat 
either. I worried out loud that the document that we were sent prior to the meeting 
looked discursively ‘familiar’, re-iterating longstanding campaigning messages and 
evidence of injustice. At the same time the political and policy landscape was much 
changed and hostile to BME-led race equality work. Given this, I suggested that the REC 
rethink both the tone and content of race equality political interventions and that it had to 
not only point out and challenge race inequality but also intervene in the discursive 
environment that repeatedly situated BME people as a problem in the nation. This might 
involve performing some kind of ‘discourse-watch’ function to identify and challenge 
discriminatory discursive practice as and when it happened in high profile policy and 
media circles.  
  
My comments received a fair hearing at the REC meeting and other ‘critical friends’ made 
complementary points to my own. We now have to wait and see how the REC develops. 
The risk is that the REC becomes little more than an attempt to put the Humpty Dumpty of 
‘old’ black politics back together again. However, a ‘familiar’ BME-led approach has, in 
recent times, been unable to ensure race equality gains. Instead, I believe that a more 
productive stance would be to locate a third phase of BME organising in ‘race critical’ 
thinking (Bhattacharyya and Murji, 2013) that would involve both a desire to use BMEness 
as a constructed political resource alongside an intention to dismantle the category of 
BMEness (Ali et al., 2004). Adopting a ‘race critical’ stance would appear to allow (BME) 
people to be human in the manifold ways that this might entail. At the same time it would 
perhaps also provide a basis to destabilise policy discourses that focus on and blame BME 
people for ethnic divisions in the nation whilst also downplaying racism and its ongoing 
consequences. It is not clear if this stance will shift the orbit of policy discourse and lead to 
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policy gains. However, I would argue that this approach is fundamental to new forms of 
black/BME politics and allows for a better quality of discourse – something that is an 
important goal in its own right. 
 
5 A final word 
A new politics amongst BME race equality actors is unlikely to take hold quickly or easily. 
Just as the second phase of black/BME politics was never fully realised the same may be 
true of a third phase that engages with the complexities of BMEness and connects with 
the struggles of other groups – in Britain and internationally.  
 
Certainly, if BME-led race equality organisations and organisers wish to transform 
themselves and the politics and policy of race equality then there is much to be done. 
Brett St Louis’ comment about the ‘hard ethical labour’ (St Louis, 2009: 571) facing black 
activists seems salient here. The need for that work is even more urgent given the legacy 
of New Labour on ideas of and connections between nation, multiculture and race 
equality. Furthermore, I suggest that, in this particular moment and despite the decades 
of struggle that BME-led race equality organisations have been engaged in, it appears as if 
the hard labour for social justice-orientated BME organising has only just begun. 
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees 
 Organisation and role62 Date of interview 
Policymakers 
Anonymous Senior Civil Servant in the Department of Communities 
and Local Government 
15 September 2011 
Philip Collins  Former Chief Speechwriter to Tony Blair 11 May 2011 
Sunder Katwala Former General Secretary of the Fabian Society 18 August 2011 
Fiona Mactaggart 
MP 
Former Home Office Minister (Parliamentary Under 
Secretary for Race Equality, 
Community Policy, and Civil Renewal) 
01 November 2011 
Alun Michael MP Former Home Office Minister 15 September 2011 
Nick Pearce Former Head of the Policy Unit at Number 10 
Current Chief Executive of the Institute for Public Policy 
Research  
25 July 2011 
Henry Tam Former senior civil servant in the Home Office 18 May 2011 
 
  
                                                     
62
 The organisation/role identified is the one that led me to approach the person for an interview and to 
view the person as relevant to my study. 
259 
 
 Organisation and role Date of interview 
Race equality actors 
Karen Chouhan  Former Chief Executive of 1990 Trust 28  June  2011 
Dinah Cox Former Chief Executive of Race on the Agenda 21 June 2011 
Jeremy Crook Chief Executive of Black Training and Enterprise Group 21 June 2011 
Seán Hutton Policy Officer of Federation of Irish Societies 02 August 2011 
Joy Warmington Chief Executive of BRAP 18 July 2011 
Simon Woolley Chief Executive of Operation Black Vote 22 June 2011 
Kamila Zahno Former Board Member and Chair of Race on the Agenda 27 June 2011 
 Organisation and role Date of interview 
External ‘experts’ 
Ted Cantle Former Chair of the Community Cohesion Review Team 08 September 2011 
Michael Keith Former Member of the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion 
01 July 2011 
Bhikhu Parekh Former Chair of the Commission on the Future of Multi-
Ethnic Britain 
15 June 2011 
Trevor Phillips Chair of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission 23 August 2011 
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